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USS Harnett County, shown just before 
departure for Vietnam in 1966, is now 
BRP Sierra Madre. The dilapidated 
former U.S. tank landing ship is currently 
“on station” in the Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea—aground on Ayungin, 
or Second Thomas, Shoal. Philippine 
marines stationed aboard the ship 
maintain a maritime presence to bolster 
their country’s claim to the disputed area, 
also claimed to varying degrees by China, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia. In this issue, in 
“Getting Serious about Strategy in the 
South China Sea,” authors Hal Brands 
and Zack Cooper analyze the four basic 
strategic options by which the United 
States might respond to China’s mode 
of advancing its interests in this area of 
contrasting and conflicting claims, capa-
bilities, methods, and values.
Credit: United States Naval Institute
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FROM THE EDITORS
In spite of some early signs of a hardening attitude toward People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) provocations in the South China Sea, the Trump administration 
thus far has not articulated a vision of how it intends to deal with what is, in 
many respects, the sorest spot in U�S�-Chinese relations� Hal Brands and Zack 
Cooper, in “Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea,” analyze the 
broad strategic options facing the United States and make the case that a care-
fully calibrated combination of deterrence and “offsetting” actions holds the most 
promise� They argue that the Chinese have shown some willingness to pull back 
if challenged sufficiently by the United States, and hence that such a strategy, in 
spite of obvious risks, is not bound to fail� Less clear is the extent to which the 
United States is prepared to jeopardize other aspects of its relationship with the 
PRC in order to follow through effectively on such a strategy� Hal Brands is the 
Henry A� Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hop-
kins School of Advanced International Studies; Zack Cooper is the Senior Fellow 
for Asian Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies�
In “Antiaccess Warfare as Strategy: From Campaign Analyses to Assessment of 
Extrinsic Events,” Sam J� Tangredi invites us to consider China’s encroachments 
in the South China Sea, in effect, as antiaccess warfare at the strategic level� His 
argument thus nicely complements the article of Brands and Cooper� The United 
States, he argues, must broaden the currently fashionable concept of antiaccess/
area-denial (A2/AD) beyond the military operational level to encompass other 
elements of national power, as well as to take into greater account the potential 
role of actions or events extrinsic to the theater in question� Doing so would 
require, he suggests, significant adjustments in decision-making mechanisms at 
the national level� A retired USN captain, Sam Tangredi is director of the newly 
created Institute for Future Warfare Studies at the Naval War College�
Kevin Rowlands provides an important reminder of the strategic importance 
of rivers in affording unique “access” to the land, particularly in older times or 
in areas where roads are lacking, such as Africa and Latin America� In “Riverine 
Warfare: Exploiting a Vital Maneuver Space,” he offers an overview of riverine 
operations historically, from ancient Egypt through the American Civil War to 
recent conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Colombia� Rowlands deplores the relative 
neglect of this history; the absence of sustained analysis of its particular features; 
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and, related to it, the transient nature of riverine forces, including those of the 
United States. Kevin Rowlands is a commander in the Royal Navy.
Ben Wan Beng Ho, in “The Aircraft Carrier in Indian Naval Doctrine,” offers 
perhaps the first close analysis of the role of India’s two (eventually to be three) 
light aircraft carriers in a notional war with Pakistan. Noting that these vessels 
suffer severely from what he calls the “small-deck carrier conundrum,” under 
which any significant projection of offensive power seriously reduces the ship’s 
defensive strength, he argues that the only sensible employment of such ships—at 
least at the outset of a conflict—would be securing the sea lines of communica-
tion (SLOCs) for vital Indian commercial traffic. He suggests that the Indian navy 
would be well advised to rethink the balance between investment in carriers and, 
especially, long-range cruise missiles that can hold at risk Pakistan’s developing 
A2/AD capabilities. Ben Ho is a senior analyst with the military studies program 
of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
Much can be learned from not-so-recent history about the challenges facing 
middle-rank naval powers such as India in a global environment of technologi-
cal change and strategic uncertainty. In “From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune École: 
French Naval Policy and Strategy under the Second Empire and the Early Third 
Republic (1852–1914),” Hugues Canuel surveys the history of the French navy’s 
struggle—and ultimate failure—to develop a realistic strategy and force structure 
to counter Britain’s global naval dominance. Hugues Canuel is a captain in the 
Royal Canadian Navy and director of programs at the Canadian Forces College 
in Toronto.
John Nash, in “Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War,” also uses history—in 
this case, ancient history—to illustrate enduring issues relating to the role of sea 
power in war and peace. While some scholars have tended to downplay the con-
tinuities between naval operations in the present era and those of classical Greek 
and Roman times, Nash argues that the Greeks featured in Thucydides’s famous 
history of the Peloponnesian War (late fifth century BCE) were quite conscious 
of such matters as the importance of command of the sea, control of SLOCs, and 
defense of trade and the role of fleets in diplomacy. John Nash, a reserve officer 
in the Royal Australian Navy, is a PhD candidate in classics at the Australian 
National University.
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Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309)� 
For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main en-
trance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236)�
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President 
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE’S educational and research efforts 
are focused clearly on maintaining a careful balance between 
learning the timeless lessons of the past and keeping a steady weather eye on 
trends that promise to shape the nature of future warfare. Over the past year, we 
have reoriented our course of study to prepare our students better to man and 
lead a Navy in which readiness is the key and lethality is the product.
• The College added three weeks of additional war fighting–focused studies, 
kicked off by a four-day Future Warfighting Symposium, which included lec-
tures and discussions on topics such as emerging technologies, cyber warfare, 
and space operations.
• We continued to operationalize our educational and research efforts to 
optimize near-term support to the fleet. In particular, the College provided 
greater focus on understanding today’s threats while further enhancing com-
bat readiness through expanded teaching of maritime warfare. In his “Design 
for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
charged the Navy with testing and refining naval power concepts “through 
focused wargaming, modeling, and simulations” that will connect directly to 
fleet exercises and training. Implicit in this charge is the challenge that opera-
tions research and analysis across the Navy enterprise must be conducted in a 
cohesive or holistic manner that provides what the Navy’s leadership needs to 
make fully informed decisions. We have answered this clarion call. The Col-
lege has forged increasing connections among experimentation, campaign 
analysis, and war gaming. The College of Maritime Operational Warfare 
has provided focused courses, assist visits, and routine support to maritime 
The Naval War College’s Direct Role in Enhancing  
Readiness and Lethality
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operations center / scenario-based exercises for Navy leaders at all ranks and 
grade levels�
• The Russia Maritime Studies Institute continued to expand and mature� This 
institute occupies a unique space at the nexus of the academic, policy, and 
operational communities, and the resident scholars study a wide variety of is-
sues, including naval policy, strategy, and operations; maritime technologies; 
shipbuilding; maritime law; deterrence; and naval diplomacy�
• We expanded the maritime-centric portions of our curricula to anticipate 
and respond to changes in the strategic environment and to fulfill our mis-
sion of optimizing understanding of sea control� The courses offered by the 
College of Naval Warfare at the most senior level and in the College of Naval 
Command and Staff at the intermediate level are, first and foremost, about 
war fighting and gaining sea control in a contested environment� Both types 
are designed to challenge students intellectually in the theory and practice of 
war fighting and are geared toward war-fighting concepts that will prepare 
our future military leaders to fight the maritime force across all warfare do-
mains� The capstone event for the 2016–17 academic year focused on the U�S� 
Pacific Command area of responsibility� Work being done by various other 
Naval War College activities—such as the Halsey Research Group, the China 
Maritime Studies Institute, and the Russia Maritime Studies Institute—has 
provided students with opportunities to deal with current capabilities and 
emerging issues�
• Although the College functions as a joint school, we have sprinkled an 
increasingly large dose of “salt water” on our research and gaming activi-
ties� In the past year the Navy Strategic Enterprise, through the vehicle of 
the Strategic Executive Group, has worked to provide more fleet input into 
the selection and prioritization of war games� A new vehicle for this shar-
ing is the Wargaming Virtual Community of Practice, which is currently in 
development, with an initial operational capability scheduled for the closing 
months of 2017, on both the unclassified and classified networks� Our Center 
for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) has strengthened the faculty specifically 
in maritime-centric areas to address better such issues as future fleet design, 
the impact of a reinvigorated Russian navy, and the emergence of “gray-zone” 
warfare at sea�
• The College’s efforts to focus on the future war-fighting environment have 
driven us to conduct an ongoing reassessment of how best to prepare stu-
dents for the strategic environment articulated in the CNO’s “Design for 
Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” with its emphasis on contestation of the 
Winter2018Review.indb   10 11/1/17   9:56 AM
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/12
P R E S I D E N T ’ S  F O RU M  1 1
maritime system, the rising influence of the global information system, and 
the increasing rate of technological change� With regard to the informa-
tion domain, the College recently doubled the cyber content in its curricula� 
We have coordinated with the Naval Postgraduate School on a core cyber 
curriculum with overlap between the two institutions in four content areas: 
cyber concepts; international cyber law, ethics, and standards; military cyber 
operations; and cyber policy and strategy�
• Our talented CNWS researchers continued to support future thinking and
analysis through work with the College’s Center for Cyber Conflict Studies
and the work of the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law in the
area of cyber conflict�
• We established the Institute for Future Warfare Studies in February 2017 as a
research-and-study department� It aims at understanding how armed conflict
may evolve in the future and how the U�S� Navy can prepare for it better�
• The College strove to establish itself further as the locus of international mar-
itime cooperation� Through a series of initiatives undertaken in this spirit, it
has sought to promote ever-greater levels of cooperation and interoperability
among the world’s navies and coast guards�
• We increased the frequency of our regional alumni symposia from one to two
annually� These symposia are international academic conferences premised
on the belief that military education is not solely the product of a school-
house but rather a lifelong attempt to acquire knowledge about the profession
of arms�
The College is moving out smartly to execute a vision in which the institution is 
more supportive of the needs of the operating forces, more attentive to the unique 
challenges and opportunities represented by our naval heritage and our focus on 
flexible sea power as an instrument of national will, more cognizant and attuned 
to the impact that technological change will have on our maritime and joint 
forces, and more assiduous in our efforts to enhance maritime cooperation and 
friendship around the globe�
JEFFREY A� HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Hal Brands and Zack Cooper
GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT STRATEGY IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA
 America is suffering from a strategy deficit in the South China Sea� For nearly a decade—and at accelerated speed since 2014—Beijing has been salami 
slicing its way to a position of primacy in that critical international waterway, 
while eroding the norms and interests Washington long has sought to defend� 
To date, however, Washington has struggled to articulate an effective response� 
The Obama administration opposed Chinese maritime expansion rhetorically 
and worked to improve the overall American military and geopolitical posture in 
the Asia-Pacific� Yet the administration only occasionally mustered the leverage 
necessary to check China’s quest for dominance of the South China Sea, and often 
it was unable even to impose substantial long-term costs on Beijing for its short-
term assertiveness� For its part, the Trump administration has yet to formulate or 
implement a coherent South China Sea strategy, and it has swung from suggest-
ing that America might deny Chinese access to islands in the South China Sea 
physically—something approaching an act of war—to appearing subsequently to 
deprioritize the issue�
Today, the situation in the South China Sea is reaching a critical stage as 
Chinese advances accumulate, America’s room for maneuver diminishes, and 
observers throughout the region wonder whether the United States is up to the 
challenge� And yet Washington still is searching for a strategy�
Part of the trouble, no doubt, lies in the sheer difficulty of meeting a calcu-
lated Chinese offensive that is simultaneously audacious and subtle, one that is 
changing the geopolitical status quo profoundly but incrementally, in ways de-
signed not to provoke a decisive response� Yet getting America’s South China Sea 
strategy right also requires thinking more-systematically about what Washington 
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should seek to achieve and what it should hazard in the effort� It has become com-
mon, in recent years, to hear calls for the United States to get tough with China 
over its illegal island building, militarization of disputed features, and coercion of 
U�S� allies and partners�1 Yet it is far less common to hear in-depth discussion of 
what the long-term goal of such a program should be, whether that goal is actu-
ally achievable, and how much cost and risk the United States should accept along 
the way�2 This is dangerous, because it increases the possibility that America may 
commit itself to goals that cannot be obtained at a reasonable price, or simply 
may follow a muddled, confused policy on a crucial geopolitical issue�
What is needed is to elevate the strategic debate by identifying clearly—and 
assessing rigorously—the main options for countering China’s offensive in the 
South China Sea� Four basic strategies are available� 
1� Rollback aims to push China back from its recent gains in the South China 
Sea and restore the status quo ante; it accepts a substantial likelihood of 
military conflict as the price of attaining this ambitious objective�
2� Containment accepts Chinese gains made to date, in recognition of just 
how difficult and dangerous it would be to reverse those gains, but draws 
the line firmly—including by threat or use of military force—against 
further advances�
3� Offset does not seek to prevent further Chinese encroachments in the 
South China Sea, but aims to penalize Beijing for destabilizing actions, 
while also offsetting their impact through measures that strengthen the 
overall U�S� position in the region�
4� Accommodation accepts Chinese dominance of the South China Sea, on 
the theory that it is simply too costly and perilous to compete with Beijing 
in its own back yard, and instead seeks to ensure a smooth transition to 
Chinese regional primacy�
None of these strategies is perfect, and each has substantial liabilities that ac-
company its advantages� In the final analysis, however, a strategy that blends the 
most-compelling aspects of containment and offset is best suited for protecting 
U�S� interests at a reasonable cost—and for steering the proper course in a turbu-
lent South China Sea�
THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The situation in the South China Sea is both complex and simple� The complexity 
lies in the fact that this body of water is the subject of multiple disputes among 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and most recently 
Indonesia�3 The simplicity lies in the fact that only one of those claimants— 
China—has been making a concerted drive for regional primacy�
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In 2009, China surprised regional observers by submitting to the United Na-
tions its so-called nine-dash-line map, which claimed up to 90 percent of the 
South China Sea� Since then, China has become increasingly coercive in deal-
ing with its South China Sea neighbors, through measures such as asserting 
“indisputable sovereignty” over disputed features and seizing effective control 
of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012� Meanwhile, China has up-
graded its facilities in the Paracel Islands, particularly the military base on Woody 
(Yongxing / Phu Lam) Island, which now houses a military-grade airfield, aircraft 
shelters, and missile batteries� Since 2013, moreover, China has “reclaimed” 
roughly 3,200 acres of land in the Spratly Islands, compared with just 120 acres 
for Vietnam and less (or none) for the other claimants�4 Beijing has created arti-
ficial islands and military bases on seven features in the Spratlys, three of which 
now house three-kilometer-long airfields with aircraft shelters, advanced radars, 
and point defenses�
In addition to expanding its military footprint, Beijing has announced and 
enforced fishing and resource-exploitation restrictions in various parts of the 
South China Sea, empowered its coast guard and maritime militia to interfere 
with the vessels of other nations, regularly allowed Chinese-flagged fishing boats 
to exploit endangered species in disputed areas, and made clear that it intends 
to disregard any legal challenges to its claims� In mid-2016, for instance, Beijing 
simply brushed aside the ruling of the arbitral tribunal that largely invalidated 
the nine-dash line and found that many of China’s maritime claims and activities 
were not in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea�5 Finally, Beijing has become more assertive in challenging foreign activity in 
the South China Sea by increasing its own military presence in the area, harassing 
American planes and vessels (as well as those of other countries), and warning 
Washington against “interfering” in China’s ongoing maritime disputes�6
By any reasonable standard, then, recent years have seen a pattern of Chinese 
rhetoric and behavior geared toward making Beijing the dominant power in the 
South China Sea�7 Chinese gains have been incremental rather than sudden, and 
Beijing has calibrated its actions carefully to avoid triggering a military clash 
with Washington or galvanizing the region to balance against it� Nonetheless, 
the cumulative results have been significant� “In short order,” writes one former 
Obama administration official, “China has laid the foundation for control of the 
South China Sea�”8
So why does any of this matter to the United States? Some American experts 
on Asia assert that it does not—that Washington’s own “core interests are not 
really at stake” in the South China Sea�9 After all, the United States has taken no 
position on who has sovereignty over the South China Sea and the various fea-
tures therein, other than to argue that the disputes should be resolved peacefully 
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through negotiations free from coercion� Why, then, should Washington take 
risks to prevent Beijing from controlling and exploiting maritime features that 
the United States maintains might be Chinese in the first place?10 The answer is 
that China’s offensive is not simply a matter of who controls “a bunch of rocks on 
the other side of the world”; it is a challenge to a series of key U�S� interests in the 
South China Sea and the broader Asia-Pacific region�11
From an economic perspective, trade through the South China Sea amounts 
to roughly U�S�$3�4 trillion per year, and many U�S� allies and partners are highly 
dependent on both the com-
merce that passes through that 
waterway and the resources 
—from fish to oil and natural 
gas—that can be extracted 
from it�12 Were China to be-
come the predominant power 
in the area, it would have the 
capability to put a choke hold on one of the world’s most important trade routes if 
it wished to do so—or Beijing simply could use the implicit threat of doing so to 
coerce and influence other countries that rely disproportionately on this dynamic 
portion of the global commons�
From a military perspective, China’s seven bases in the Spratlys (and its up-
graded facilities in the Paracels) greatly extend the reach of both its antiaccess 
forces and its power-projection capabilities� Chinese bases in the Spratlys are 
some five hundred miles south of Woody Island, putting new areas at risk from 
Chinese missiles and aircraft� In peacetime, these bases provide Beijing with 
facilities to help it exert control over the South China Sea using military, coast 
guard, and maritime militia forces�13 In wartime, these bases would be vulnerable 
to U�S� attacks—but nonetheless they would allow Chinese forces to complicate 
American operations in support of the Philippines or other allies and partners�14
Finally, from a geopolitical perspective, the stakes are high indeed in the 
South China Sea� The United States long has sought to prevent any rival power 
from dominating East Asia or a significant part thereof� America’s standing in 
the Asia-Pacific is largely dependent on its ability to uphold existing rules of 
the road, such as freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes, and 
face down challenges to the region’s stability and order, as well as its openness� 
Thus, permitting Chinese control over a critical part of a critical region would 
represent a major strategic setback for the United States; it also might embolden 
China to attempt to revise the status quo elsewhere, whether in Taiwan, the East 
China Sea, or the Indian Ocean�15 Not least, it would signal to regional observers 
that Washington no longer can play its traditional role in the Asia-Pacific, and 
thereby would encourage regional players to accommodate Beijing rather than 
Part of the trouble . . . lies in the sheer diffi-
culty of meeting a calculated Chinese offensive 
that is simultaneously audacious and subtle, 
one that is changing the geopolitical status quo 
profoundly but incrementally, in ways de-
signed not to provoke a decisive response.
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join with the United States to balance against an increasingly assertive China� 
Countries in Southeast Asia have been explicit about their need for continued 
U�S� engagement, lest they be forced to bandwagon with China, as the Philippines 
has done under Rodrigo Duterte�16 Thus, from a geopolitical standpoint, the 
struggle over the South China Sea is not about “rocks,” but about whether states 
in Southeast Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific region will align with the United 
States or China�
Although U�S� interests in the South China Sea are clear, U�S� policy there 
remains muddled�17 The Obama administration frequently warned China not to 
carry out “reclamation, construction, or militarization” in the South China Sea, 
but these statements created expectations among states in Southeast Asia that 
U�S� leaders were unwilling to fulfill� Meanwhile, Washington worked diligently 
to strengthen U�S� diplomatic relationships and military capabilities in the region, 
yet U�S� leaders refused to comment publicly on whether the U�S�-Philippine 
Mutual Defense Treaty would apply in the South China Sea� The United States 
also encouraged Southeast Asian states to push back against Chinese coercion in 
both diplomatic and legal forums, and the White House worked with Congress 
to begin upgrading the maritime awareness and security capabilities of allies and 
partners in the region� Yet, as well-intentioned as these efforts were, the Obama 
administration ended its second term with a more divided Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite China’s construction spree on disputed 
features and coercion of ASEAN members� Beijing’s lead over its neighbors in 
military and other coercive capabilities also remained enormous, and in most 
cases—most notably the seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012—Beijing simply 
went ahead with reclamation, construction, militarization, or other destabilizing 
actions despite U�S� warnings or attempts at mediation� As Obama’s presidency 
ended, there was a growing perception in the region—and even among some se-
nior American policy makers—that the administration had drawn redlines that it 
ultimately had not upheld, and that too often it had failed to slow, let alone halt, 
China’s drive for primacy�18
So far, the Trump administration too has struggled to articulate an effective 
approach� Administration officials initially took a hard line, with Secretary of 
State–designate Rex Tillerson suggesting in his confirmation hearing that Wash-
ington might prevent Beijing physically from accessing its artificial islands in the 
Spratlys�19 Then the issue appeared to recede from the policy agenda as the ad-
ministration focused on bilateral trade and North Korea as the dominant issues 
in U�S�-China relations� Although the U�S� military has conducted freedom-of-
navigation operations (FONOPs) to challenge China’s (and other states’) exces-
sive claims, the administration has given the impression—which has been noted 
in key countries such as Vietnam—that it lacks an overall strategy for addressing 
Chinese advances�20 Indeed, Vietnam’s reported decision in July 2017 to back 
Winter2018Review.indb   17 11/1/17   9:56 AM
23
College: Winter 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 1 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
down in the face of explicit Chinese threats, rather than to continue exploiting 
its own claimed offshore energy resources, provides a recent and disturbing in-
dication of the effectiveness of Beijing’s coercive strategy�21 The lack of top Asia-
focused officials in place at the State Department and other key agencies only has 
exacerbated this problem�22
As China consolidates existing gains, and perhaps seeks new ones, America’s 
strategic options and maneuvering space only will decrease� It is imperative that 
U�S� leaders decide what course to follow—whether to roll back, contain, offset, 
or accommodate China’s growing influence in the South China Sea�
STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Rollback
The most ambitious strategy would aim to roll back China’s gains—essentially, to 
force Beijing to withdraw from key features in the South China Sea (certainly the 
artificial features in the Spratly Islands, and perhaps its holdings in the Paracel 
Islands as well), or at the very least to demilitarize those features by removing the 
military facilities and capabilities� As noted, Rex Tillerson initially appeared to 
support such a policy when he called not simply for halting Chinese island build-
ing but also for denying Beijing access to artificial islands constructed to date�23 
In addition to barring access to the islands, a rollback strategy might seek to force 
Beijing to walk back its maritime claims in the South China Sea—in particular, 
to abandon the nine-dash line and accept the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling, which 
held that China must derive its maritime entitlements from legitimate claims to 
land features�
The core premise of a rollback strategy is that China’s increasing dominance 
in the South China Sea poses an unacceptable risk to U�S� interests, and that the 
South China Sea will become a “Chinese lake” unless Beijing’s advance is not 
simply halted but reversed� By this logic, permitting China to consolidate even its 
existing gains will allow it to threaten or disrupt trade flows, rob other Southeast 
Asian countries of badly needed economic resources, and strengthen its regional 
military position in ways that threaten U�S� freedom of action� Most importantly, 
regional states—always sensitive to who is winning the Sino-American competi-
tion for influence—will bandwagon with Beijing if they conclude that Washing-
ton lacks the capability or will to restore the status quo ante� The United States 
therefore should confront China in the South China Sea today, when it still enjoys 
a preponderance of military and geopolitical power in the region, rather than 
tomorrow, when the balance may have shifted decisively in China’s favor, owing 
to Beijing’s rapid economic growth and corresponding military buildup�
Rollback is thus an extremely forward-leaning strategy, one that would rely 
heavily on the threat or use of force, as well as other coercive measures, to compel 
Winter2018Review.indb   18 11/1/17   9:56 AM
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/12
 B R A N D S  &  C O O P E R  1 9
Beijing to pull back� At the most extreme, the United States might attack physi-
cally features in the Spratlys or Paracels, or threaten to do so, to eliminate their 
military facilities and force a Chinese withdrawal� A less aggressive alternative 
would be to blockade or quarantine the islands (on the legal theory that China 
enjoys no rights of access to islands it has created illegally), but U�S� forces still 
would have to be willing to risk war by intercepting Chinese ships or aircraft 
seeking to break the blockade�24 As either a substitute for or complement to these 
approaches, the United States might use economic or diplomatic measures—
broadly applied trade sanctions, threats to recognize Taiwan’s independence and 
conclude a formal mutual-defense treaty with Taipei, or other relatively dramatic 
nonkinetic moves—to generate the coercive pain necessary to persuade China to 
relinquish its South China Sea claims�25
The appeal of rollback is obvious, because the strategy—if successful—would 
restore U�S� credibility and remove a major threat to American interests in the 
Asia-Pacific� And there is little question that, if the United States were willing to 
pursue the most aggressive versions of rollback—military assault or blockade—it 
could achieve the desired strategic objective� Great gains do not come cheaply, 
however, and the risks of this strategy would be tremendous�
First, given the degree to which the Chinese Communist Party has staked its 
prestige and legitimacy on standing up to foreign powers in general and assert-
ing expansive claims in the South China Sea in particular, it seems unlikely that 
anything short of military conflict actually would suffice to achieve the aims of 
this strategy� Retreating in the South China Sea would be a great humiliation for 
the Chinese leadership; one imagines that Beijing would be willing to accept a 
great deal of pain rather than submit to it� After all, Chinese leaders repeatedly 
have made clear that they view the South China Sea as both a part of China 
and a vital national interest, and as Fu Ying, chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the National People’s Congress of China, has warned, “The people 
won’t tolerate if we lose territory yet again�”26 Washington therefore would have to 
be prepared to wage war to remove Beijing from its features in the South China 
Sea—and, most likely, to be willing to paint itself as the aggressor by firing the 
first shot in that conflict� The United States almost certainly would win such a 
conflict—particularly if it occurred in the next few years—but the military costs, 
potential for escalation, and reputational costs likely would be severe�
A second, related point is that the United States probably would find most 
regional states—which would fear being caught in the middle of a shoot-out be-
tween their primary trading partner and their primary security patron—strongly 
opposed to such a strategy� Few, if any, regional states—even other South China 
Sea claimants—would support rollback openly; it is not hard to imagine U�S� al-
lies such as the Philippines moving further away from Washington and toward 
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Beijing were the United States to take this approach�27 Rather than upholding U�S� 
relationships in the Asia-Pacific, in other words, rollback might weaken them 
severely� Finally, even if rollback did not lead to a military conflict, China likely 
would respond by imposing costs of its own: ceasing cooperation on an array 
of other issues in the relationship—from North Korea to climate change—and 
perhaps increasing its coercive activities in the East China Sea, putting additional 
pressure on Taiwan, or using economic measures to punish U�S� businesses�
Even in the best-case scenario, then, rollback would lead to a severe disruption 
of the bilateral relationship and alienate many U�S� allies and partners; at worst, 
it could plunge Washington and Beijing into precisely the military conflict that 
American policy makers long have sought to avert� For these reasons, it is highly 
unlikely that rollback will be attempted; indeed, not even the most hawkish U�S� 
national security experts have advocated such a strategy openly�28
Containment
Should the risks associated with rollback prove prohibitive, a second strategic op-
tion is containment� The goal of containment would be to stop China from using 
force or coercion to alter any element of the status quo in the South China Sea, 
and particularly to prevent it from building additional features or seizing features 
held by other nations� The basic logic of this approach is that, while rollback 
may be too dangerous, any further erosion of the situation in the South China 
Sea is unacceptable� Additional Chinese gains would undercut the credibility of 
American leadership and guarantees in the region and risk allowing Beijing to 
complete its dominance incrementally� Containment thus would permit Beijing 
to keep what it has, but it would draw the line firmly against further advances�
In practice, containment would mean issuing sharp, clear warnings against 
further Chinese expansion or coercion, coupled with policies meant to substanti-
ate those warnings� Washington would station substantial military forces in and 
near the South China Sea to respond quickly if Beijing sought to seize features 
held by other nations; it also might consider landing U�S� forces on features 
controlled by American allies and partners to discourage aggressive Chinese 
moves�29 To dissuade China from undertaking further land reclamation, the 
United States would threaten explicitly to sanction Chinese individuals or enti-
ties involved in such activities� Washington would maintain a robust regimen of 
FONOPs, preferably in concert with friends and allies from within the region and 
beyond, and it would refuse to recognize—and, if necessary, prevent China from 
enforcing—any declaration of straight baselines in the Spratly Islands to match 
previous illegitimate declarations in the Paracels, or any air defense identification 
zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea not limited to accepted interpretations of 
international law� Finally, the U�S� government would continue upgrading U�S� 
military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, negotiating additional military-access 
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and -basing arrangements, and enhancing the maritime self-defense capabilities 
of Southeast Asian partners and allies, all to ensure that America and its friends 
maintain the military superiority and escalation dominance necessary to make 
containment credible�
Containment is thus a hard-edged, confrontational policy, one that is heavi - 
ly reliant on military tools� Yet a primary selling point of containment is that it 
is both less risky and less difficult to execute than rollback because it relies on 
deterrence—preventing China from seeking new gains—rather than compellence— 
requiring China to accept the 
humiliation of giving up gains 
it has pocketed already�30 And 
while the United States so 
far has struggled even to halt 
China’s advance on any con-
sistent basis, containment has 
worked in certain isolated cases that might serve as “proof of concept” for a larger 
strategy� In a little-noted incident in 2014, for instance, China stopped seeking to 
prevent resupply of Philippine marines stationed on Second Thomas Shoal after 
the United States signaled its commitment by placing a maritime surveillance 
plane overhead� In this episode, Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, commander of the 
U�S� Seventh Fleet, also made a clear statement of U�S� resolve by saying, “Without 
going into hypotheticals, the Seventh Fleet is going to support this alliance, pe-
riod�”31 Similarly, although the United States failed to prevent China from taking 
effective control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, public reports indicate that, in 
2016, China backed away from a planned effort to begin land reclamation there 
after U�S� officials issued explicit, high-level warnings that doing so might disrupt 
seriously the Sino-American bilateral relationship�32
In other words, China may be increasingly assertive, but only when it believes 
it can advance without encountering serious resistance� Beijing remains more 
risk averse when it comes to actions that could spark a military clash—or even 
produce a severe wrench in the relationship—with Washington� China has re-
spected American redlines when those redlines are clearly drawn and seem likely 
to be enforced� Containment seeks to raise significantly the risks of further Chi-
nese advances and thereby bring Beijing’s offensive to a halt; it seeks to translate 
periodic successes into a more consistent policy of holding the line� And should 
China find itself stymied in the South China Sea over a long enough period, con-
tainment advocates suggest, Beijing eventually might moderate its behavior and 
conclude an equitable diplomatic settlement with its neighbors�
Nevertheless, containment also has significant limitations and liabilities� 
Diplomatic difficulties abound� Many U�S� allies and partners are likely to be 
China’s offensive is not simply a matter of who 
controls “a bunch of rocks on the other side of 
the world”; it is a challenge to a series of key 
U.S. interests in the South China Sea and the 
broader Asia-Pacific region.
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wary of such a policy, in part for fear of antagonizing China, in part for fear that 
Washington might lose its nerve should Beijing precipitate a crisis� Moreover, a 
policy of helping Hanoi, Taipei, or Manila hold the features that it has occupied 
or constructed would cede the moral high ground that Washington has claimed 
by championing widely accepted international rules and norms� More seriously 
still, containment does not deal with the military capabilities and positions that 
China has created already, nor does it prevent Beijing from emplacing additional 
capabilities on features it already controls� And, of course, containment requires 
the United States to run a significantly heightened risk of severe tensions with 
China, to be willing to jolt badly a relationship in which it has many and varied 
equities, and to be willing to follow through on its deterrent threats—resulting, 
potentially, in a Sino-American war—should Beijing not back down� Critics 
of U�S� policy in the South China Sea long have asked whether Washington is 
willing to fight a war to stop Chinese salami slicing; containment, like rollback, 
ultimately requires answering that question in the affirmative�33
Finally, holding containment in place is likely to become more dangerous 
and expensive over time, as China’s ongoing military buildup shifts the strategic 
balance in the region� One recent RAND Corporation report indicates that the 
“tipping point” in a conflict over the Spratly Islands might come as soon as 2030, 
and that China’s risk tolerance only will increase as its military power does�34 
Absent major and continuing U�S� military investments, a containment strategy 
eventually could become untenable� Containment in the South China Sea thus is 
likely to resemble containment as practiced in many other contexts: a potentially 
useful policy, but one that is nonetheless difficult, costly, and potentially danger-
ous to execute, and would require enormous patience and persistence to succeed�
Offset
If U�S� leaders are not willing to accept the risks inherent in more-aggressive 
strategies, a third option would be to focus on offsetting—and penalizing—Chi-
nese gains rather than directly preventing them� Washington would respond 
to Chinese moves in the South China Sea by imposing costs—diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and otherwise—on Beijing; it also would work creatively to strengthen the 
relative positions of the United States and its allies and partners�35 As its name 
implies, this strategy essentially would accept some short-term competitive losses 
in the South China Sea in hopes of offsetting those losses through longer-term 
competitive gains�36
Logically, an offset strategy derives from a peculiar mix of tactical pessimism 
and strategic optimism� Advocates of an offset strategy believe that trying to halt 
China’s advances altogether risks danger and disappointment, because China’s 
inherent geographical advantages allow it to choose when and where to press� 
In addition, the South China Sea simply matters more to Beijing than it does to 
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Washington: while it may be an important interest for America, it is absolutely 
crucial for China� Fortunately, advocates of this strategy contend, fully halting 
China’s advance is not strategically necessary to uphold the broader U�S� position 
in the region�37
Washington may not be able to stop Beijing from dredging up sand at some 
isolated reef, for instance, but it can use a range of diplomatic and economic tools 
to force China to bear significant costs for such actions� Moreover, it can work 
to ensure that Chinese advances are more than matched by upgrades to the U�S� 
regional military posture and the deepening of America’s security relationships 
with China’s neighbors� By doing so, the United States can make China pay for 
each artificial island constructed by ensuring that any tactical advance for Bei-
jing results in a broader strategic loss� Over time, this approach may persuade 
Chinese leaders that the game in the South China Sea is not worth the candle; 
at the very least, it will minimize, if not cancel out, the strategic benefits that 
China reaps from its offensive� The struggle for the South China Sea—and for 
the Asia-Pacific more broadly—will be decided not by who controls a few rocks, 
proponents of this strategy argue, but by who has the stronger overall position 
and who better commands the loyalties of the key regional players� An offset 
strategy keeps this bigger, longer-term picture in focus, as it also reduces the risks 
of a near-term conflict�
In practice, an offset strategy would accept Chinese changes to the status quo, 
so long as those changes did not lead to conflict with the United States or its treaty 
allies� Yet Washington would respond to Chinese advances, such as further land 
reclamation, by slapping economic sanctions on firms involved in such activities, 
by suspending broader bilateral economic initiatives such as negotiation of a 
bilateral investment treaty, or by incrementally expanding the U�S� defense rela-
tionship with Taiwan or other regional parties� When Chinese advances created 
regional unease, the United States would exploit them aggressively by continuing 
to broaden defense relationships and opportunities for basing access with coun-
tries throughout Southeast Asia and beyond; it also would continue to encourage 
Southeast Asian countries to challenge Chinese policy through diplomatic and 
legal forums� Not least, America would respond to Chinese assertiveness by de-
ploying more advanced military capabilities to the South China Sea and strategic 
points surrounding the area, by exercising and operating more frequently and 
more visibly in the region, and by taking concrete steps to strengthen its overall 
military posture in the Asia-Pacific� In essence, an offset strategy would entail 
demonstrating to Beijing, through a wide array of measures, that its assertiveness 
will leave it only more encircled and isolated in the end�
The evident allure of this strategy, of course, is that it offers a chance to win 
the region without precipitating a U�S�-China conflict in the process� This is 
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precisely why the Obama administration pursued a variant of this approach from 
2010 onward� Under Obama, the United States generally declined to provoke 
showdowns over particular Chinese advances (with the exceptions noted previ-
ously)� But it also attempted to upgrade the U�S� alliance with the Philippines, 
pursued enhanced partnerships with Southeast Asian partners such as Vietnam, 
deployed additional military capabilities to the South China Sea and surround-
ing areas, and sought to inspire greater regional diplomatic unity in opposing 
Chinese coercion� The strategic logic was one of avoiding clashes in areas where 
China had the upper hand, 
while simultaneously refocus-
ing the competition on those 
areas where America’s diverse 
regional relationships and 
greater overall strengths might 
give it the strategic edge�
Compelling as the strategy was in theory, however, the Obama years demon-
strated that it also had a number of distinct weaknesses and challenges� First and 
most obviously, in the near term offset would do little or nothing to prevent Chi-
na from consolidating existing gains or seeking new ones, with all the negative 
consequences—both material and psychological—that flow from that� Indeed, 
by not stymieing Chinese advances, the United States risks giving the impres-
sion—as it did under Obama—that it is walking back from its declared redlines 
because it is either unable or unwilling to stop Beijing’s regional expansionism� 
That perception, in turn, may encourage regional states to acquiesce to rather 
than resist China’s dominance of the South China Sea; it even may encourage 
Beijing to accelerate its drive for primacy�38
Second, if the hope is that cost imposition will affect Chinese decisions over 
time, then the costs imposed on Beijing must be quite significant—which once 
again raises the risk of significantly upsetting the relationship or triggering an 
undesired crisis�39 This was precisely the problem that the Obama administra-
tion never could solve adequately� As former administration officials such as Ely 
Ratner have noted, the White House was determined to preserve stability in the 
overall relationship, and therefore never was willing to impose the higher costs 
necessary to make this approach work�40
Third, offsetting Chinese gains by improving the U�S� position and forging a 
stronger balancing coalition is easier said than done� Washington spent consid-
erable time and energy upgrading its military and diplomatic relationship with 
Manila during the Obama years—only to see that progress jeopardized by the 
ascent of Rodrigo Duterte� American diplomats continually prodded ASEAN to 
take a firmer position on the South China Sea, but Beijing effectively derailed 
There is no guarantee that this hybrid strategy 
will work, of course; were there an obvious so-
lution to China’s challenge in the South China 
Sea, U.S. policy makers surely would have 
found it by now.
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these efforts by using its own economic and diplomatic leverage to keep regional 
states divided�41 As a result of these challenges—and U�S� failure to ratify the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have linked the United States 
more closely to Southeast Asia—China had made short-term gains yet avoided 
most long-term costs when the Obama team left office�42
Finally, and related to this point, an offset strategy requires that U�S� officials 
continually walk a tightrope: acting aggressively enough to convince regional 
actors that Washington is serious about preventing Beijing from dominating the 
region, but not so aggressively as to unnerve allies and partners who often try 
to avoid explicit alignment� As Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan notes, 
“[t]o the countries of Southeast Asia, the American porridge is always going to be 
too hot or too cold; countries will always fear the United States entangling them 
in its quarrels with rivals or being left to deal with other major powers without 
adequate support�”43 An offset strategy may carry advantages, then, but it also 
remains fraught with difficulties�
Accommodation
This brings us to a fourth and final strategy available to the United States: accom-
modation� In contrast to the first three strategies, the goal of accommodation 
is not to stop Beijing’s destabilizing behavior ultimately, or even to maintain a 
dominant position in the South China Sea and the broader Asia-Pacific region� 
The goal, rather, is primarily to avoid conflict with China over the South China 
Sea, with a subsidiary objective of conserving the resources that would be needed 
to compete more effectively�
To that end, the United States unilaterally would make concessions to wind 
down tensions in the South China Sea� It would avoid military, diplomatic, or 
legal challenges to Chinese activities, essentially acceding—whether tacitly or 
explicitly—to Beijing’s island building, militarization, and coercion of its neigh-
bors� FONOPs would be phased out; military exercises and presence would be 
reduced, if not terminated� The United States would maintain its alliances and 
security partnerships in the region, but it would make clear that its alliance guar-
antees do not cover disputed features such as Scarborough Shoal and Second 
Thomas Shoal, and it would urge its allies and partners to come to some diplo-
matic accommodation with Beijing� Just as the British acceded to U�S� primacy 
in the Western Hemisphere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the United States would accede to Chinese primacy in the South China Sea in the 
twenty-first century, and encourage others to do likewise�
The core premise of this approach is that resisting Chinese dominance of the 
South China Sea is a fool’s errand� China already controls much of the area, this 
argument runs, and there is little that Washington can do short of threatening 
—and perhaps waging—war to halt Beijing’s progress� Rather than making 
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Scarborough Shoal or Second Thomas Shoal the West Berlin of the twenty-first 
century, then, Washington simply should recognize that Beijing’s rise makes it 
inevitable that the South China Sea eventually will become a Chinese lake�
Variants of this strategy have been advocated periodically by observers within 
the Asia-Pacific region—including Australian strategic thinker Hugh White—
and the logic of the approach is not entirely without merit�44 Certainly, competing 
with China in the South China Sea will be costly and potentially dangerous over 
time; accommodation would avoid those costs and risks, at least in the short term� 
It is undoubtedly true that geography and an asymmetry of interest favor China 
in the South China Sea, just as geography and an asymmetry of interest favored 
America vis-à-vis Great Britain and other extraregional powers in the Caribbean 
in the late nineteenth century; 
accommodation thus would 
extricate America from a dif-
ficult struggle over distant 
waters and limit the danger 
of war with China� Moreover, 
given that the South China 
Sea is of such great strategic and economic importance to China, it is not beyond 
the realm of possibility that Washington—if it acted skillfully—could gain some 
marginal Chinese concession on North Korea, climate change, or one of the 
myriad other important issues in the bilateral relationship in exchange for giving 
Beijing a free hand in the area�45
It seems unlikely, however, that even a complete U�S� capitulation in the South 
China Sea would lead Beijing to change its policy fundamentally on North Korea, 
Taiwan, or any other key issue, because Chinese leaders surely would assess that 
the weakness of the U�S� position on the South China Sea was compelling the 
United States to seek such a “grand bargain�” And as tempting as accommoda-
tion might be for a country with no shortage of challenges around the globe, the 
fact is that the benefits of this approach would be more than offset by powerful 
disadvantages�
A strategy of accommodation would undercut U�S� alliances and partner-
ships in Southeast Asia and beyond, by demonstrating that the United States 
is no longer willing to contest Chinese power in this area� Washington thereby 
would risk forfeiting the leadership role that the United States long has played 
in the region, while perhaps encouraging countries from Vietnam to the Philip-
pines to align with a rising Beijing� Indeed, if the United States cannot summon 
the wherewithal to uphold the rules-based order, then American leaders should 
not expect smaller states to do so on their own� Moreover, although a policy 
of accommodation would reduce the risk of confrontation in the short term, 
[F]or the United States to accomplish even the 
limited aims of this approach, it must be will-
ing to accept greater risks, incur higher costs, 
and impose more-serious penalties on China 
than it has been willing to do to date.
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it might increase it in the long term� The lesson that Beijing surely would take 
away from such an approach is that American redlines are not actually so red 
and the country’s “ironclad” alliance commitments are not actually so ironclad; 
that perception, in turn, could encourage greater Chinese risk taking that ul-
timately might transgress a real American redline and bring the two countries 
to blows�
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this approach would guarantee Chi-
nese hegemony over the South China Sea, an area that American policy makers 
long have deemed to be of vital economic and geopolitical importance to the 
United States� It thereby would complicate dramatically any U�S� effort to defend 
Taiwan, the Philippines, and other partners and allies in the event of Chinese ag-
gression or coercion� U�S� accommodation also would put China well on the path 
to becoming a regional hegemon of the sort America always has felt compelled 
to resist� Beijing indeed may have a greater interest in the South China Sea than 
Washington does, but it hardly follows that the United States has no interest there 
worth defending� Accommodation, in other words, would have devastating ef-
fects for the U�S� position in the Asia-Pacific—with no guarantee that it actually 
would reduce the danger of an eventual conflict with China�
Fortunately, selecting this undesirable option is unnecessary� China indeed is 
pressing assertively for primacy in the South China Sea—but the game is not yet 
over� As noted previously, there have been instances (at Second Thomas Shoal in 
2014 and Scarborough Shoal in 2016) when Beijing backed down in the face of 
strong U�S� warnings and pressure� Yes, the United States has struggled to stem 
Chinese advances in the South China Sea on a consistent basis, but where it has 
Rollback
• Physically attack Chinese forces in the South China Sea
• Blockade Chinese forces on South China Sea features until they withdraw
• Apply economic sanctions to force Chinese military to withdraw
• Undermine “core” Chinese interests, such as Taiwan, unless China withdraws
Containment
• Land U�S� forces on features controlled by China’s neighbors
• Provide military support to other South China Sea claimants
• Maintain a large regional military presence, especially near Scarborough Shoal
• Recognize China’s neighbors as rightful claimants of disputed features
Offset
• Enhance U�S� political-military engagement in Southeast Asia
• Impose economic/diplomatic penalties in response to Chinese advances
• Offset Chinese gains with greater U�S� military deployments
• Encourage diplomatic and legal challenges to Chinese activities
Accommodation
• Publicly accept Chinese reclamation, construction, and militarization
• Cease freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea
• Communicate that Washington will not intervene in regional disputes
• Clarify that U�S� commitment to the Philippines excludes the South China Sea
SUMMARY OF SOUTH CHINA SEA STRATEGIC OPTIONS
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drawn redlines clearly and appeared ready to enforce them vigorously, China has 
not brought the matter to a climax� Were it simply impossible to resist or mean-
ingfully offset the Chinese offensive, then accommodation might make strategic 
sense� But it is not impossible to do so, and accommodation thus would be the 
strategic equivalent of committing suicide for fear of death�
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
So where does this analysis leave the United States? Neither of the extreme op-
tions—rollback or accommodation—represents a desirable strategy or an ap-
proach that the Trump administration is likely to adopt� Rollback has rhetorical 
appeal, but it would require Washington to accept extremely high levels of cost 
and risk, and it likely would endanger many of the objectives it is meant to protect� 
Indeed, this strategy would require Washington to accept far more risk than U�S� 
allies and partners themselves have accepted, a dynamic that is quite incongruous 
considering President Trump’s emphasis on the importance of allies’ contribu-
tions to their own defense� Conversely, an accommodation strategy effectively 
would abandon most of Southeast Asia to China� This would constitute a strategic 
disaster for the United States under any administration, but for an administra-
tion that has proclaimed itself determined to adopt a “strong” China policy, an 
approach that resembles appeasement is likely to be particularly unattractive�46
This leaves two strategic options: containing or offsetting Chinese actions in 
the South China Sea� Containment has worked in isolated cases, and it holds 
some promise of altering Chinese behavior through deterrence rather than com-
pellence� Yet containment is still a costly and potentially dangerous strategy, one 
that an opportunistic adversary presumably will find numerous opportunities to 
test in the coming years� An offset strategy, for its part, would have the benefit 
of avoiding near-term military confrontations, while focusing U�S� leaders on 
the long-term objective of imposing costs on and enhancing regional balancing 
against China� Unfortunately, an offset strategy is difficult to execute in its own 
right, and, as the experience of the Obama era shows, it risks permitting further 
Chinese changes to the status quo and thereby undermining U�S� credibility with 
friends and adversaries alike� Containment and offset are certainly superior to 
the extreme options, but neither one is an ideal strategy in and of itself�
Containment and offset are not mutually exclusive, however, so the best ap-
proach for U�S� policy makers would be to combine the most compelling aspects 
of these two strategies, while seeking to avoid some of their associated liabilities� 
Specifically, the United States should contain the most destabilizing Chinese ac-
tivities while offsetting and penalizing less threatening behavior�
The containment elements of a new strategy would demonstrate that the Unit-
ed States is willing to accept short-term risk—including military risk—to prevent 
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China from coercing regional states and consolidating control of additional 
features in the South China Sea� The United States has shown episodically that 
when it draws redlines clearly and credibly threatens to enforce them it can deter 
Chinese efforts to take features from other claimants (as with Second Thomas 
Shoal in 2014) and to build on contested features (as with Scarborough Shoal in 
2016)� If U�S� leaders are willing to issue clear deterrent threats, and to back up 
those threats with potential military, economic, and diplomatic sanctions, they 
may be able to mitigate the worst aspects of Chinese aggression by preventing 
Beijing from seizing or reclaiming additional disputed features�
The offsetting elements of the strategy, meanwhile, would seek to ensure that 
China suffers long-term losses whenever it obtains any short-term gains coer-
cively� Unfortunately, no U�S� containment policy is likely to prevent China from 
using its maritime militia to harass other countries’ vessels, violating the 2016 
arbitral tribunal decision, further militarizing its existing artificial islands in the 
Spratlys, or declaring an ADIZ around the South China Sea�47 The United States 
is just not likely to go to war, or even threaten to do so, in response to such run-
of-the-mill coercion, and China knows as much� U�S� leaders therefore have little 
option but to impose economic and diplomatic penalties on Beijing in response 
to such actions, while offsetting such gains by enhancing the U�S� military posture 
in the region and working to build regional support for deeper American engage-
ment and tougher policies toward China�
There is no guarantee that this hybrid strategy will work, of course; were there 
an obvious solution to China’s challenge in the South China Sea, U�S� policy mak-
ers surely would have found it by now� A contain/offset hybrid still will entail 
many of the liabilities that inhere in the separate strategies: it will not reduce 
China’s existing military-geopolitical footprint, for instance, nor will it preclude 
all forms of Chinese assertiveness and coercion in the region� This strategy, more-
over, will be difficult to execute—for all the reasons spelled out previously—and 
will become ever harder to implement over time as China’s power grows� Indeed, 
for the United States to accomplish even the limited aims of this approach, it 
must be willing to accept greater risks, incur higher costs, and impose more-
serious penalties on China than it has been willing to do to date� A contain/offset 
strategy will not allow U�S� policy makers to avoid dangerous crises and daunting 
dilemmas—even if it does represent the best approach for navigating them deftly 
enough to preserve America’s key interests in the South China Sea�
America has limped along without a clear or coherent approach in the South 
China Sea for several years� Now is the time to get serious about strategy—before 
it is too late�
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ANTIACCESS WARFARE AS STRATEGY
 Thinking about the concept of antiaccess warfare may be likened to thinking about the Renaissance. Leonardo da Vinci, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Dante 
Alighieri did not know that they were part of a renaissance; they simply experi-
mented, strategized, and wrote in a fashion that seemed logical to them and ap-
propriate to their times. It was the nineteenth-century European historian Jules 
Michelet who “discovered” that “the Renaissance” had occurred.
Likewise, Themistocles, Elizabeth I, Isoroku Yamamoto, and Adolf Hitler (af-
ter early 1943) did not know that they were conducting antiaccess warfare. They 
simply applied a strategy that was logical for a situation in which a strategically 
superior power was attempting to penetrate—militarily, politically, or both—a 
region they controlled. Originating circa 1991, the term antiaccess warfare is 
simply the best appellation that has been developed to describe their strategies 
for comparative purposes. As used throughout this 
article, the term strategy incorporates political and 
economic objectives and activities, not military 
operations alone.
From this perspective, the concept of antiaccess 
warfare precedes and transcends the development 
of the air-sea battle concept, the Joint Operational 
Access Concept (JOAC), the Joint Concept for Access 
and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), 
and other recent efforts to understand the logic 
of opponents’ military operations that the United 
States would face if major war were to occur un-
der current conditions. This logic derives from 
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the fact that presently the United States is a strategically superior global power 
whose homeland lies outside the regions of potential crisis and conflict� As a 
global power, it has allies, commercial ties, and deep interests in areas that are 
thousands of miles from the continental United States, where most of its military 
power is based� While the United States maintains a forward military presence in 
many world regions, whether at sea or operating from bases in partner nations, 
these deployed forces are necessarily limited, either by the physical hulls or by 
diplomatic agreements� Forward-presence forces are intended to act as deterrents 
to major war and as on-scene responders to more-limited crises—to prevent the 
latter from becoming the former� If we are particularly alert, quick, or lucky, such 
forces may prove sufficient by themselves to deal even with significant crises� But 
they do not necessarily represent the full power required to prevail in a major 
regional conflict� Hence, in most cases we would need to move decisive forces 
from outside to inside the conflict region� Unlike most other nations, the United 
States actually possesses the military logistics capabilities and control of the 
global commons to do so�1
Antiaccess warfare is part of the strategy—used throughout history—of op-
posing such force movements (or the capacity, or the very decision, to move), 
along with an effort to empty the region of forward-presence forces and reduce 
the opponent’s overall regional influence� It is important for U�S� national secu-
rity professionals to analyze and understand antiaccess warfare as an element of 
peacetime as well as wartime strategy, if we are to counter it when required�
If the United States is to develop and maintain the capacity to defeat—and 
thereby have the ability to deter—sophisticated antiaccess strategies that threaten 
to reduce the U�S� presence in, influence over, or access to contested regions, a 
coordinated, articulated, and persistent intragovernmental approach is required, 
not just Department of Defense (DoD)–only planning� Logical first steps toward 
creating such an interagency approach involve acknowledging and analyzing the 
problem, examining its consequences, identifying mutually supportive actions, 
and outlining processes by which an approach can be coordinated�2 This article 
identifies the elements of antiaccess warfare strategies, outlines several historical 
examples of success or failure, briefly suggests some of the means of countering 
such strategies today, and describes ways to coordinate these means and evaluate 
the assumptions and risks entailed�
TOWARD STRATEGIC-LEVEL ANALYSIS
To understand how to neutralize antiaccess strategies, we must analyze the 
problem at the strategic level� In countering an antiaccess strategy, as opposed 
to simply preparing or tailoring a military force package to defeat an antiaccess 
military campaign, we must recognize that a viable antiaccess strategy—one 
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designed to reduce U�S� influence and operational capabilities in a region of po-
tential conflict—includes political, diplomatic, economic, legal, social, and media 
actions, not just a military posture� This way of thinking goes beyond the military 
campaign analysis often used to assess antiaccess warfare scenarios�3 Antiaccess 
strategies involve all the phases of conflict, including preconflict “peace,” referred 
to in planning documents as Phase 0� Some of these activities are captured by 
current buzzwords, such as lawfare, soft power, cyber war, and gray-zone conflicts� 
However, a comprehensive, multifaceted U�S� government strategy to actually 
counter deliberate antiaccess efforts does not exist, nor has a comprehensive plan 
appeared in the literature published by public research centers (think tanks) or 
academic institutes that influence government policies�4
In other words, we know that potential opponents rely on the concept of an-
tiaccess (no matter the term they use) as their primary approach to defeating, or 
at least diminishing, U�S� regional influence backed by American military power� 
But most of our government organizations either do not recognize the activities 
involved or are not interested in analyzing and responding to them� Similarly, 
most academic analysts have not examined these mutually supportive activities 
as a broader unified strategy, rather than as individual issues or the elements of 
active military campaigns�
Largely this is the result of antiaccess being perceived as but a military term 
that applies solely within the province of DoD� The unfortunate, tactically ori-
ented acronym A2/AD, which stands for antiaccess/area-denial, cements this per-
ception�5 Indeed, the most authoritative official document discussing antiaccess 
warfare, the Joint Staff J7–authored JOAC, briefly notes the comprehensiveness 
of antiaccess strategies, but limits itself to developing a “warfighting concept” 
to deal with such strategies militarily�6 It does not reject the pertinence of other, 
nonmilitary activities, but simply does not regard them as falling within the 
purview of the joint force� However, as noted previously, the problem is that 
few outside DoD see these activities as falling within their purview either� The 
JOAC notes that maintaining “operational access” to regions of interest is the 
U�S� military’s contribution toward the “assured access” of the United States to 
the global commons that is the prerequisite for economic access to these regions 
themselves�7 However, there is no evidence that the wider U�S� government per-
ceives the need for a strategy to ensure access, and access issues are mentioned 
rarely, beyond cursory observations concerning the Navy’s role in maintaining 
“freedom of the seas�”
One might argue that preparing to defeat antiaccess campaigns militarily is ex-
actly the narrow focus on which DoD should concentrate� However, the problem 
is that DoD does not control the totality of resources necessary to defeat an anti-
access strategy, and thus is at a severe disadvantage in planning or prosecuting a 
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counterantiaccess campaign� Such a campaign needs to include a wide range of 
nonmilitary activities�
Moreover, with the end of the Cold War against Soviet expansionism, there 
actually is less coordination of these activities within the U�S� government� Dur-
ing the Cold War there was often a tension between defense objectives and trade 
policies (wheat sales to the Soviets provide one example), requiring higher-level 
resolution�8 Today there is less tension, since there is little perception that such 
activities are in any way related, except for occasional, often ineffective, economic 
sanctions or embargoes of selected technologies or strategic materials imposed 
on individual states�9 Admittedly, the need to counter terrorism following the 
traumatic events of 9/11 did prompt mutual support among military operations, 
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement, but in a relatively narrow 
band of activities (e�g�, physical security) against a relatively unsophisticated 
threat� Coordination of other transagency activities during the unending con-
flicts within Iraq (and Syria) cannot be rated as stellar�10
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTIACCESS WARFARE
To discuss a comprehensive antiaccess strategy, it is important to examine the 
fundamental elements of antiaccess warfare itself� They are as follows:
1� The perception of the strategic superiority of an opponent
2� The primacy of geography, as the element that most influences time and 
facilitates the combat attrition of the opponent’s forces
3� The general predominance of the maritime domain as conflict space
4� The criticality of information and intelligence, and concomitantly the 
effects of strategic and operational deception
5� The determinative impact of extrinsic, sometimes apparently unrelated, 
events in other regions or globally
The first element motivates a nation (or an armed group) to adopt antiaccess 
as a primary defense strategy� The specification of defense strategy does not mean 
that the nation or group has no offensive objectives, such as the seizure of an-
other’s territory or the intimidation of neighbors; rather, it indicates that the pri-
mary aspect of the potential conflict is the involvement of an opponent of greater 
military, political, diplomatic, or economic power, considered on a global scale�
This characterized the grand strategy of imperial Japan in the Second World 
War� Competent Japanese leaders, such as Admiral Yamamoto, knew that the 
United States was a strategically superior power by almost any measure� (Having 
spent time in the United States, Yamamoto knew that firsthand�) However, Japan’s 
leaders were committed to making conquests in the Asia-Pacific� This required 
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driving U�S� military forces out of the region and ending U�S� political, diplomat-
ic, economic, and social influence in the western Pacific� To protect their gains, 
they needed to create an antiaccess barrier (fortified island chains and a powerful 
navy) to ensure that the strategically superior but now regionally ousted United 
States could not reenter the contested region� The United States thus needed to 
penetrate that barrier�
All military planners recognize geography to be a critical operational factor 
and seek to “manipulate the physical environment, exploit its strengths, evade its 
weaknesses � � � and contrive always to make nature work for them�”11 If an anti-
access defender has greater accessibility to nearby regional geographic features, 
it can facilitate attrition of its opponent through delay and constraint� Exploit-
ing geography is the primary physical factor underlying an antiaccess strategy� 
For example, without a barrier of islands (to complement the advantage of the 
vast distances the United States faced) in the central and western Pacific, impe-
rial Japan would have found it difficult to adopt an antiaccess posture (i�e�, the 
positioning of its forces) against a U�S� response to its conquests� Similarly, the 
islands and straits that isolate the South China Sea and East China Sea from the 
vast expanse (and maneuver space) of the Pacific allow China today to adopt an 
antiaccess strategy against potential military responses and to counter U�S� po-
litical influence in the region� A Chinese antiaccess posture would be much less 
effective without the vast distances of the Pacific, the relatively shorter distances 
from China to its neighbors (the probable targets of any military action and the 
definite targets of its expansion of influence), and the maritime geography that 
would channel the U�S� fleet if it sought to enter the so-called first island chain� 
The very use of the term first island chain by military planners implicitly ac-
knowledges the geographic underpinning of China’s antiaccess strategy�
Given that wide oceans separate the United States from the areas of potential 
regional conflict, it is an incontrovertible fact that the maritime domain (which 
includes the air and space above it) would be the predominant conflict space in 
any contingency involving the United States opposing a major enemy employing 
an antiaccess strategy� Quibbles concerning that verity are largely parochial�
The criticality of information and intelligence in the cyber age is acknowledged 
by everyone� However, when discussing them in terms of antiaccess warfare, the 
focus is primarily on operational and tactical deception; yet what has succeeded 
best in antiaccess campaigns has been strategic deception� Whereas operational 
and tactical deception is directed at an opponent’s military operations, strategic 
deception is directed at decision making on the national command authority 
level, and is linked to the manipulation of extrinsic events, defined as events that 
occur outside the contested region or do not involve military force, yet have a sig-
nificant impact on the strategically superior power’s decision making� According 
Winter2018Review.indb   37 11/1/17   9:56 AM
43
College: Winter 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 3 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
to an influential source, strategic deceptions “involve large numbers of individu-
als and organizations as perpetrators and victims of deception, including the na-
tional command authorities on both sides of the deception interaction; second, 
� � � they are relatively long-term deceptions � � � and third, � � � their stakes are very 
high, in that they can affect the outcomes of wars�”12
In contrast to all the above, the determinative impact of extrinsic, sometimes 
unrelated events on the efforts and attention of the strategically superior power 
is generally the element least acknowledged by those who conduct campaign- or 
tactical-level analyses of antiaccess warfare, yet it is the most important� The 
current “win-hold” construct—building an American joint force that can de-
feat an opponent in one region while holding off another in a different region 
until forces can be “swung”—does appear to acknowledge that simultaneous 
conflicts can occur� However, what is grasped only rarely is that events that are 
not conflicts, or have not yet become conflicts—events that may occur in other 
regions, are merely prevalent on a global basis, or are confined to nonmilitary 
dimensions—nonetheless can have a profound impact on any “win�”
Research indicates that most nations (or armed groups) adopting an antiaccess 
approach never actually defeat their strategically superior opponents in combat�13 
What has occurred historically is that the strategically superior power just quits 
fighting, because the costs appear too high when an event or other concerns of 
even greater interest occur elsewhere�
For example, the ancient Greeks, led by Themistocles, were able to cut the sea 
lines of communication that had allowed Xerxes to feed his vast Persian force in 
Greece during the conflict of 480–479 bce� However, what actually caused Xerxes 
to cease his efforts at conquest was his perception that revolts were brewing in 
his empire, so his repressive hand was needed elsewhere� Of course, the Greeks 
played a role in fanning those revolts�14
Similar actions have been a hallmark of antiaccess strategies throughout his-
tory� In preventing and defeating the Spanish armadas (note the plural), Eng-
land’s Queen Elizabeth I used multiple methods to incite extrinsic events� She 
financed the prolonged war of independence that the Dutch United Provinces 
fought against Spain� She let loose the English pirates of the Caribbean (in her 
eyes, unofficial privateers or high-risk “adventurers”) against Spanish colonies� 
She employed spies and agents, and even feigned contemplation of marriage to 
forestall a Franco-Spanish alliance against England� All this was done in a time of 
ostensible peace�15 Over a period of more than two decades, such activities effec-
tively bankrupted Spain, ensuring that Philip II never could concentrate enough 
force to plow through the Royal Navy and land on English shores, an event that 
would have pitted battle-hardened Spanish troops against local English levies� By 
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the time the first Spanish armada reached the English Channel, Spain’s strategic 
power already had been reduced�
In the example of imperial Japan, its improbable 1940 alliance with Nazi 
Germany (and tacit nonaggression agreement with the Soviet Union) can be 
understood only as an effort to help ensure that a war in Europe would draw in 
the United States� Generating this extrinsic event was intended to divert U�S� at-
tention and forces away from the western Pacific�
With this in mind, a strategist might be prompted to ask: In the event of a 
pending conflict, what would China do today, or in the future? Is a potential war 
in the South China Sea over reefs claimed by Vietnam or the Philippines of more-
profound interest to U�S� decision makers than Russian pressure on the Baltic 
nations, all of which are members of NATO? These questions—often stated but 
only lightly examined—must be analyzed in detail, because they, not a weapons 
count, will determine the outcome of an antiaccess conflict� Again, historical 
analysis indicates that antiaccess forces rarely have defeated the strategically su-
perior power on the battlefield (witness the Korean and Vietnam Wars)� In many 
cases, the dominant actor seemed on course for a military victory; it was other 
considerations that caused that superior power to change course� In the case of 
the Greek-Persian conflict, it should be recalled that Athens—one of Xerxes’s 
major targets—already had been abandoned and burned to the ground before the 
Athenian Themistocles was able to orchestrate the battle of Salamis�16
The sorts of questions posed above, generated by the fact that extrinsic events 
historically have played the greatest role in successful antiaccess strategies, should 
prompt analysts both in government and in think tanks to make a more detailed 
examination of the phenomenon on the strategic level� Mostly, however, we just 
continue to argue about A2/AD�
THE UNFORTUNATE ACRONYM
The discourse on antiaccess warfare has been dominated by the acronym A2/
AD, standing for antiaccess/area-denial� Credit for the term largely belongs to the 
highly influential defense issues think tank the Center for Strategic and Budget-
ary Assessments (CSBA)� However, since its origination the term A2/AD has 
been used more often as an adjective to describe the types of weapons systems 
and networks expected to be used in an antiaccess campaign, rather than to refer 
to the underlying strategy�17 The tortuous origin of the A2/AD acronym—which 
has been in use for over fifteen years—has been covered elsewhere, and that 
discussion will not be repeated here�18 What should be noted is that use of the 
acronym, and the full term antiaccess/area-denial, has driven much of the discus-
sion of antiaccess away from strategy and almost exclusively toward tactics and 
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force structures� The construct seems perfectly tailored to campaign analysis� 
This is not to say that discussion of tactics and force structures is not important, 
only that discussion of how to deter or defeat the underlying strategy is equally 
important, if not more so�
There has been some pushback, albeit rare, on the use of the A2/AD acronym� 
In October 2016, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson, 
USN, authored an article on the National Interest’s website that sought to “de-
construct,” and thereby discourage, use of the A2/AD term� In the CNO’s view, 
“A2AD is a term bandied about freely, with no precise definition, that sends a 
variety of vague or conflicting signals, depending on the context in which it is 
either transmitted or received�” More importantly, from his perspective, the “area 
denial” half of A2/AD symbolizes a “mindset” in which the U�S� Navy automati-
cally would be forced to operate outside the “red arcs” that mark the theoretical 
range of the kinetic weapons of the potential opponent, thereby discounting 
the Navy’s ability to operate within that range—particularly using its superior 
undersea warfare forces—from the outset of any conflict� As he puts it, “Often, 
I get into A2AD discussions accompanied by maps with red arcs extending off 
the coastlines of countries like China or Iran� The images imply that any military 
force that enters the red area faces certain defeat—it’s a ‘no-go’ zone! But the real-
ity is much more complex� � � � Those arcs represent danger, to be sure � � � but the 
threats are not insurmountable�” He concludes, “If we fixate on A2AD, we are not 
looking far enough forward�”19
In his article, the CNO does not go on to capture the complexity of antiaccess 
strategies from the broader perspective, as that was not his intent� But his point 
about not “looking far enough forward” also can be applied to critiquing the lack 
of a broad approach to the broader perspective� The combination term A2/AD 
prompts a focus on weapons system performance in operational situations (e�g�, 
Chinese DF-21 missiles vs� USN aircraft carriers), making it easier for analysts 
to neglect nonmilitary aspects and the role of deterrence� Indeed, the area-denial 
portion of the A2/AD construct refers to what could be considered standard 
tactics in force-on-force combat, and therefore contributes little to the broader 
perspective�
AN EXAMPLE OF THE BROADER VIEW
To apply a broader strategic perspective to an apparent antiaccess disposition, let 
us consider the South China Sea scenario that many defense analysts wargame 
to assess the outlines of a potential conflict between the United States, particu-
larly the U�S� Navy and Air Force, and China, particularly the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force, and the PLA Rocket Force (the 
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latter controls both conventional warhead– and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles)� 
The chosen battleground is the vicinity of the Spratly islets that China has solidi-
fied and fortified�20
The South China Sea situation has been analyzed in extensive detail in clas-
sified and unclassified reports and war games, and academic studies abound, 
so only a sketch will be included here� It would be most logical for the scenario 
to incorporate Chinese adoption of an antiaccess strategy� By all open-source 
measures, the U�S� Navy appears superior to the PLAN� Combined with U�S� Air 
Force assets, the U�S� Navy potentially could establish sea control in the South 
China Sea if it faced the PLAN alone� (It is China’s potential use of land-based 
Rocket Force missiles that makes an antiaccess approach viable�) The current 
capabilities of USN attack submarines would make it difficult for major PLAN 
vessels to sortie without considerable risk� China is working steadily to improve 
PLAN capabilities, particularly in naval aviation (aircraft carrier based) and 
antisubmarine warfare; but, as a point of comparison, the U�S� Navy can deploy 
in force and threaten Guangzhou, whereas the PLAN cannot deploy out of area 
and threaten Pearl Harbor� Clearly, the United States is strategically superior in 
terms of conventional force on a global basis� (Since this is a maritime scenario, a 
contest between U�S� land forces and the PLA is presumed not to occur�)
As would any antiaccess force facing an out-of-area, strategically superior 
power, China would attempt to take advantage of the geographic conditions to 
employ asymmetric means to prevent the American fleet from entering the South 
China Sea� Most planners agree that the primary asymmetric means would be the 
antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) (e�g�, DF-21Ds) or land-attack intermediate-
range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) (e�g�, DF-26s) controlled by the PLA Rocket 
Force� These are definitely asymmetric capabilities, since the U�S� joint force does 
not possess such weapons (primarily because of the U�S�-Soviet Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty of 1988, which eliminated all land-based U�S� 
IRBMs)�21 In the event of conflict, U�S� analysts expect China to use ASBMs and 
IRBMs in addition to ship- and land-based cruise missiles against American ships 
and allied naval ports, along with cyber- and other electronic–warfare attacks�
But in the broader perspective, would China really have to rely on military 
means to achieve the goal of neutralizing a U�S� response? Antiaccess strategies 
include nonmilitary means, along with every other possible leverage that the 
antiaccess nation (or armed group) possesses, to make entering the region very 
costly to the out-of-area, strategically superior power� An important factor not 
usually discussed is that the DF-21 (and probably the DF-26) was designed to 
carry a nuclear warhead, and it is difficult to determine which missile is con-
ventionally armed and which is nuclear armed� An early means of achieving an 
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asymmetric effect could consist of political-military-diplomatic signaling and be 
informational: China might declare that it will not rule out using tactical nuclear 
weapons to defend its sovereignty claims over the Spratlys and the South China 
Sea� Since the U�S� homeland would not be threatened, such use logically would 
not trigger an intercontinental nuclear response� Perhaps such a statement would 
constitute strategic deception—the Chinese Politburo might be very reluctant to 
spark (or reenergize) what otherwise inevitably would become a nuclear arms 
race in East Asia�22 However, the threat is credible because the PLA has built 
the means (antiaccess systems) to carry it out� The PLAN fleet would not even 
have to sortie� In response, U�S� decision makers would face the difficult choice 
among threatening a nuclear response—which could escalate into an interconti-
nental nuclear war; avoiding any confrontation of the Chinese claims; issuing an 
ambiguous “all military options are on the table” statement; or simply ignoring 
the threat�
The United States has many global interests besides those in the South China 
Sea� Some would argue that it has no vital interests riding on who controls that 
area� Because of the INF Treaty, the United States has no IRBMs with which to 
threaten an analogous response and thereby deter the PLA� Would the U�S� presi-
dent hazard a tactical nuclear attack on U�S� and allied forces over the Spratlys? 
Would DoD feel confident that it could determine which DF-21 is nuclear armed 
and which is not, such that it could determine the validity of the threat? Would 
it feel confident that it could blind the PLA strike-reconnaissance network suf-
ficiently to make the threat ineffective? How would U�S� allies and partners react 
to the potential for tactical nuclear use in East Asia?
Going a step further, consider the integration of the Chinese economy into the 
West and Western manufacturing supply chains� What if China declares that it 
will end the export of rare earth elements (minerals) if its sovereignty claims are 
challenged in the South China Sea?23 This would increase manufacturing costs 
in the near term, and eventually would affect high-tech industries worldwide� 
For that matter, what if China threatened to withdraw its global investments? 
A “coalition of the willing”—those countries that would be willing to challenge 
Chinese sovereignty claims in the Spratlys—might prove to be pretty thin�
In effect, such actions would generate extrinsic events in the global economy 
that would increase the cost of a U�S� movement or a “return to the region�” Simi-
lar Chinese threats against Japanese or Korean sovereignty likely would have no 
effects whatsoever on the current strong U�S� commitments to defend Japan and 
Korea—except possibly strengthening them� But our nontreaty partnerships with 
other countries involve no formal U�S� commitments�
Using nonkinetic means, the antiaccess force potentially can check the strate-
gically superior power� That is what antiaccess strategies are all about�
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GENERATING CONSIDERATION OF EXTRINSIC EVENTS
The point of examining the South China Sea scenario from a broader perspec-
tive is not to give Chinese military planners new ideas; undoubtedly they are not 
new to them� The point is to identify considerations that the U�S� government 
must examine as a whole� For example, a Chinese tactical nuclear threat might 
be neutralized by negotiating an Asian INF arms control treaty� Conversely, an 
analogous deterrent effect might be achieved if the United States reinterpreted 
the existing INF Treaty as allowing the deployment of IRBMs in the Pacific re-
gion� That is not to suggest that doing either of these things is possible, or even 
wise policy� Rather, it is to suggest that these are actions that the U�S� Department 
of State (DOS) should be examining if the U�S� government—not just DoD—were 
to recognize antiaccess warfare as necessitating a whole-of-government strategy 
(to employ a clichéd phrase), not as just a military operational problem� There are 
ideas with which DOS needs to grapple if it is to be part of the effort to counter 
or deter the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) antiaccess calculus� (The PLA is 
pledged to the Party, not the Chinese state; the matter of the CCP’s survival also 
can have an impact on extrinsic events�)
The rest of the U�S� government needs to recognize the importance of ex-
trinsic events (or the threat thereof)� In the scenario of a temporary Chinese 
stranglehold on rare earth elements—which would be extrinsic to the issue of 
South China Sea sovereignty—it would fall to the Department of Commerce to 
determine whether there is indeed a dependency, and therefore whether the U�S� 
government should maintain a stockpile of such strategic materials to protect U�S� 
industries in the event of a cutoff executed as an element of a Chinese antiaccess 
strategy� Maintaining a stockpile is a deterrent to the threat or execution of such 
an embargo to further Chinese objectives in East Asia� However, one profitably 
might ask whether any planner in the Department of Commerce ever has heard 
the term antiaccess�
One hopes that the Department of the Treasury is scrutinizing closely the 
likely effects of a Chinese disinvestment from global markets (particularly the 
securities market in the United States)� But the South China Sea scenario is prob-
ably not a concern within the Treasury Department, so Treasury likely is not 
considering such disinvestment as part of an antiaccess strategy that the United 
States must prepare to counter� Have the department’s planners determined 
whether, from a global perspective, the U�S� government could declare treasury 
bills held by the CCP or Chinese citizens to be null and void—without completely 
unraveling the rest of the bond market? The threat of these actions might provide 
more deterrence against the PLAN than a military theater posture�24 Would other 
investors lose faith in the security of U�S� treasury bonds, even if these extraordi-
nary actions were necessitated within a context of armed conflict? What would 
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happen to global markets if the U�S� Navy were to interdict the transshipment of 
oil from the Persian Gulf to China? The operational aspects of such a presidential 
decision fall to the Navy, but the economic effects transcend DoD and need to be 
examined by other departments and agencies�
A COORDINATED U.S. RESPONSE
Countering an antiaccess challenge—whether it emanates from the CCP, Iran, 
ISIS, or other entities—requires a whole-of-government approach� If extrinsic 
events ensure the success of antiaccess strategies, a mechanism must be created 
to bring together the resources of non-DoD agencies to identify, analyze, plan 
for, and take actions to deter or respond to the antiaccess strategies of particular 
competitors�25 The problem is broader than a strictly military challenge, so the 
solutions must emanate from something broader than military campaign analy-
sis� These solutions, when combined, would enhance the deterrence from armed 
conflict and the credibility of military options� DoD traditionally has had strong, 
practical, working relationships with DOS and the Central Intelligence Agency, 
but—as the examples above make clear—this is not enough�
It is never fair to argue for solutions without suggesting a process to gener-
ate them� There are at least three distinct methods or processes that the U�S� 
government has used in the past to coordinate across departments and agencies, 
or at least to determine how to coordinate� They are as follows: (1) creating an 
executive committee; (2) drafting presidential-level strategic plans; and (3) ap-
pointing a bureaucratic “czar” or setting up a “coordinating center�” Each method 
has its pros and cons, its assumptions and risks, and all should be considered�26 
Of course, the last thing most government executives want to do is to staff yet 
another committee or maintain an independent center�
A primary model of the executive committee approach is the National Se-
curity Council (NSC)� The public often perceives the assistant to the president 
for national security affairs (i�e�, the national security advisor) and his or her 
staff as constituting the NSC, but that is primarily bureaucratic and journalistic 
shorthand�27 The council actually is chaired by the president and falls under the 
Executive Office of the President� Its statutory members are the vice president, 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy� Other cabinet 
members (often the Attorney General) attend when requested (or when they 
insist on being invited)� As strategic analysts are well aware, the national security 
advisor controls the process (the scheduling and content of meetings), thereby 
wielding an influence over policy that sometimes exceeds that of cabinet mem-
bers, depending on his or her relationship with the president� The national secu-
rity advisor has a staff of at least twenty-five deputies and special assistants (most 
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of whom focus on regional affairs), who attempt to tailor policy responses to the 
council’s (or the national security advisor’s) interests�28
Creating a position of special assistant for countering antiaccess strategies 
within the NSC staff would be one method of raising the awareness of top na-
tional security decision makers, including the president, regarding how com-
prehensive the antiaccess challenge is� This special assistant could coordinate a 
government-wide strategic response� Of course, the assumption is that such a 
special assistant would be able to raise the issue to the council via the national 
security advisor� The risk of that assumption is that the number of issues and 
topics facing the national security advisor is prodigious, and the need for a com-
prehensive strategy in this area might not be considered a priority� The personal 
relationship between the special assistant and the national security advisor might 
determine whether the issue rose to the council level�
An additional assumption is that, having been given direction by either the 
council or the national security advisor, the special assistant would have the cred-
ibility and interpersonal skills necessary to coordinate responses from agencies 
that might be disinterested or recalcitrant�29 The NSC staff itself has no authority 
over the policies of the agencies except that which the relationship between the 
national security advisor and the president implies� The cabinet-level council 
members likely would inform their own staffs of decisions relating to a compre-
hensive strategy; but, again, the risk is that the strategy’s importance would get 
lost amid the noise of other issues, leaving the special assistant with little influ-
ence over member priorities� Moreover, many departments and agencies are not 
represented on the council, and incorporating them via invited attendance or 
through the efforts of the special assistant likely would be difficult� However, 
if the special assistant were successful in these tasks, he or she might become 
effectively an antiaccess issues czar—converting this first option into the third 
method of coordination�
At first glance, the second process—drafting and promulgating an executive, 
presidential-level, public document for implementing a counterantiaccess strat-
egy (which might be termed an access strategy)—would seem the most desirable 
method by which to achieve government-wide coordination� The assumption 
is that once the president states, “This is my policy,” members of the executive 
branch would endeavor to incorporate it into their department or agency plans 
and carry it out� The problem (and risk) is that it would get lost amid the myriad 
of such policy pronouncements—most published in “slick and glossy” format—
on a variety of issues, many of which contain language designed for public 
consumption that is too vague for actual policy implementation� Making gov-
ernment policy clear to the voting public is commendable; however, the reality is 
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that, because such “strategies” primarily are a means of public communication, 
they generally are limited in actionable direction and are read only rarely by deci-
sion makers in other agencies, each of which has its own strategic plan, or at least 
its own policies and priorities�
Issuing a classified plan might allow the inclusion of actionable direction, ap-
proaching the specificity of a war plan, and perhaps that would be the appropriate 
way to initiate interagency coordination and collaboration� However, two risks 
or disadvantages need to be considered� First, classification inevitably results 
in limiting the audience� Second, allowing access to classified material across 
agency boundaries is difficult owing to conflicting or inconsistent classification 
standards, particularly among agencies that do not have a history of close coop-
eration� Both risks can be mitigated, but they cannot be ignored�
The third method is the creation of a czar who has independent authority over 
specific actions and can direct activities through a coordination center staffed by 
individuals seconded from and empowered by their parent agencies� As it relates 
to the federal government, czar is an informal term used, primarily by the media, 
to refer to a senior official charged with developing and implementing a specific 
policy rather than leading an agency� Examples include the head of the Office of 
War Information during the Second World War and the director of the National 
Cybersecurity Center, director of National Drug Control Policy, and director of 
the Office of National AIDS Policy today� However, the effectiveness of the indi-
viduals appointed to these positions is always dependent on their personal rela-
tionships with the president and their ability to assuage the concerns of cabinet 
members and agency directors as well as Congress�30 The risk of tasking a policy 
czar with coordinating an overall approach to countering antiaccess strategies is 
that he or she becomes bureaucratically ineffective if he or she does not remain 
in the president’s direct view�
So, which of the three methods would be appropriate for coordinating an 
intragovernmental response to competitors’ antiaccess strategies? The most 
honest answer—“It depends”—is hardly satisfying� However, application of the 
principle that, when dealing with uncertainty, the simplest solution is the place 
to start means that appointment of an NSC staff special assistant for countering 
antiaccess strategies would be the logical initial—inevitably experimental—step� 
It appears the least costly option, in that it builds on an existing process, with a 
specific individual responsible for success or failure� That individual would be 
responsible for managing the drafting of an actionable U�S� counterantiaccess 
plan—here’s where access strategy might be a better term—by subject-matter 
experts from all agencies involved�31 Once such an access strategy was approved 
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via the NSC process, the same special assistant would be tasked with achieving 
interagency implementation� The risks can be mitigated only by appointing a 
particularly skilled and determined individual, and those risks might reemerge 
when that particular individual departed�
PURVIEW OF AN ACCESS STRATEGY
It is important to note that a government-wide access strategy should not dupli-
cate the campaign analysis that DoD conducts� Responsibility for planning to 
conduct combat operations against an opponent’s antiaccess posture or campaign 
belongs to DoD, and the department has expended great effort to examine the 
problem from a war-fighting perspective� In Admiral Richardson’s article, the 
CNO comments that “the A2AD problem is currently well understood—chal-
lenging, but understood�” On the operational level, he is right� There is plenty of 
room for debate concerning the means and force structure required to “break the 
great walls,” but that debate is ongoing�
The government-wide access strategy should focus on assessing extrinsic 
events—that is what is lacking� We need a plan—one that goes beyond the purely 
military—to routinely identify, analyze, deter, and, if necessary, respond to ele-
ments of an antiaccess strategy� National security agencies certainly examine 
many of the nonmilitary aspects of antiaccess, such as governments deploying 
fishermen as maritime militia, exerting economic pressures on neighboring 
states, and fomenting ethnic disturbances in “near abroads�” However, these 
nonmilitary aspects currently are considered as isolated phenomena or merely 
regional events� China experts examine the use of the maritime militia� Russia 
experts examine naval basing in Syria� Such steps are examined in terms of their 
effects on sovereignty claims in the South China Sea or the military balance in 
the Mediterranean; they are not examined as tactics in support of strategies to 
reduce the influence and presence of the United States and other Western nations 
as a prelude to denying U�S� access to the region through military means� They 
are not seen as coordinated components� Moreover, the questions of how to deter 
such actions and how to respond with nonmilitary means currently are examined 
in isolation or not at all�
Use of the term grand strategy often provokes definitional debates� If it is 
defined as a strategy based on all vital interests of a nation-state (or some other, 
nongovernmental global actor), then antiaccess strategies are only a part of grand 
strategy� Yet the perspective required to understand antiaccess must be grand, 
the instruments of deterrence and response must be grand, and countering anti-
access strategies must be a grand effort�
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What are the assumptions and risks involved in creating a government-wide 
access strategy?
Obviously, the entering assumption is that the very concept of antiaccess is 
real or practical and not simply an academic construct� Thus far, experts have 
not challenged its validity, but perhaps that is only because it is perceived as a 
DoD-only issue� A vigorous debate would be useful� Some analysts may doubt 
that potential opponents can implement and coordinate antiaccess strategies, be-
cause of their complexity� However, antiaccess strategies leading to war primarily 
have been the tools of authoritarian regimes (such as imperial Japan and junta-
controlled Argentina), which have the means to coordinate nongovernmental as 
well as governmental resources�32
The risks might include the NSC fixating on the antiaccess concept, so that 
it sees conspiracies at every hand� However, the likely military and geopolitical 
opponents of the United States and its allies and partners are pretty easy to iden-
tify� If assessing their actions in terms of the antiaccess concept and examining 
nonmilitary means of responding lead to enhanced deterrence, a coordinated 
access strategy has done its job� From the perspective of DoD, any nonmilitary 
means of response serve to fortify its military planning� A strategic plan need not 
be implemented to be useful; it is useful if it identifies options that the president 
had not examined previously� The primary risk, therefore, is that the time and 
effort of the planners involved will be wasted if decision makers ultimately reject 
the concept and plan� Of course, that occurs every single day in the world of 
strategic planning�
OPERATIONALLY READY, BUT STRATEGICALLY UNPREPARED
Regarding the CNO’s remarks, DoD indeed has examined the antiaccess concept 
from a war-fighting perspective� The studies and reports are numerous, and 
presumably the key insights have been integrated into the operational planning 
of the combatant commanders� The naval services, like the other services, have 
attempted to grapple with the A2/AD environment in developing their force 
structures� DoD officials of the Obama administration certainly were attuned 
to the military aspects of the antiaccess challenge� Indeed, prior to his return to 
government service, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O� Work authored sig-
nificant reports related to A2/AD�33 The air-sea battle approach to syncing Navy 
and Air Force efforts in a potential counterantiaccess campaign eventually was 
sunk, but that was because it hit the rocks of joint ideology, diplomatic concerns, 
and academic alarmism, not because the existence of the threat was rejected�34
It is easy to argue that the U�S� Navy, along with other services, has not made 
the correct investments to deal with antiaccess campaigns, but making force-
structure changes to a current fleet whose life span exceeds thirty years is not 
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easy.35 There are many gaps in our capabilities to break the great walls.36 Yet it 
would seem that the CNO’s perception that—within DoD—the A2/AD problem 
is “currently well understood” is true.
But while that may be true on the operational level, the strategic antiaccess 
challenge will not be understood well unless we examine it as a whole. We need 
to move beyond DoD campaign analysis to assessing the extrinsic events that can 
constitute the nonmilitary elements that comprise such campaigns. We do not 
need the genius of a Leonardo, Machiavelli, or Dante to do that. What we need 
is a process that brings together the minds of all the practitioners, develops an 
intragovernmental strategic plan, and assigns responsibility to an individual to 
ensure coordination and execution. Would integrating the planning of DoD and 
the other relevant agencies perhaps produce a “strategic renaissance”?
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poses� The problem is that developing an 
operational concept without an examination 
of nonmilitary factors results in operations 
divorced from strategic objectives�
 18� Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare, pp� 40–52�
 19� John Richardson [Adm�, USN], “Decon-
structing A2AD,” National Interest, October 3, 
2016, nationalinterest�org/�
 20� This leaves aside the fact that the South China 
Sea scenario both is less probable and would 
be less operationally taxing than a conflict 
over Taiwan�
 21� The treaty does not ban sea-based IRBMs� 
A recent congressionally mandated study on 
USN future fleet architecture completed by 
the MITRE Corporation recommends the 
development of a sea-based Pershing III  
missile as a deterrent and response to Chinese 
ASBMs� MITRE, Navy Future Fleet Archi-
tecture Platform Study (McLean, VA: July 1, 
2016)� The publication is available on the 
website of Senator John McCain, www 
�mccain�senate�gov/�
 22� Paul Bracken long has argued that a nuclear 
arms race in Asia is inevitable� Currently 
dormant, it is waiting for a spark� See Paul 
Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian 
Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999)�
 23� Estimates of Chinese dominance over the rare 
earth elements vary, but U�S� Director of Na-
tional Intelligence James Clapper estimated 
in 2013 that it had a 95 percent market share� 
See Jeff Nesbit, “China’s Continuing Mo-
nopoly over Rare Earth Minerals,” U.S. News 
& World Report, April 2, 2013, www�usnews 
�com/�
 24� A discussion of economic responses to the 
South China Sea scenario is in Babbage, 
Countering China’s Adventurism in the South 
China Sea, pp� 29–30, 52, 58–61� Of course, 
business opposition to such a move would be 
extreme� As Michael Mandelbaum notes, “By 
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1994 the American business community had 
mobilized in opposition to using trade with 
China as leverage for the pursuit of politi-
cal goals� � � � China’s remarkable economic 
growth since the beginning of reforms in 
1979 had created an American political 
constituency for preserving economic ties 
between the two countries�” Michael Mandel-
baum, Mission Failure: America and the World 
in the Post–Cold War Era (New York: Oxford 
Univ� Press, 2016), pp� 28–29�
 25� The argument that extrinsic events ensure the 
success of antiaccess strategies is developed 
in Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare, pp� 20–22, 
104–105, 114–15, 122, 128�
 26� These “methods” are my own terminology, 
adopted for the sake of simplicity� There are 
many more-specific and more-erudite terms 
that could be used to describe the models, 
and the terms used in this article are certainly 
not official� Detailed definition and descrip-
tion are beyond the scope of the article� 
 27� This description is admittedly a simple out-
line of the NSC and its staff� A recent detailed 
discussion is R� D� Hooker Jr�, The NSC Staff: 
New Choices for a New Administration, INSS 
Strategic Monograph (Washington, DC: 
National Defense Univ� Press, 2016)�
 28� These deputies and special assistants have 
their own ministaffs of two to ten personnel 
seconded from government agencies� Hooker 
reports that during the Obama administra-
tion there were over four hundred people on 
the NSC staff, although this included those 
who supported the White House Situation 
Room and performed other ancillary func-
tions� Ibid�, p� 10�
 29� Hooker maintains that NSC staff offices “with 
cross-cutting responsibilities” have invited  
internal “conflict and competition�” “Without 
a very limited and clearly defined charter, 
such offices will tend to stray across the  
policy landscape, often leading to in-fighting 
and intramural clashes�” Ibid� Avoiding this 
would require an assignee with a strong  
sense of cooperation and tact—qualities that 
Hooker suggests are necessary for all NSC 
staff members�
 30� In a bitter statement posted on the White 
House website, President Obama’s director 
of communications Anita Dunn attacks the 
use of the term czar, portraying it as partisan� 
However, she does admit that there were 
“jobs that involved coordinating the work 
of agencies on President Obama’s key policy 
priorities�” Anita Dunn, “The Truth about 
‘Czars,’” The White House (blog), September 
16, 2009, obamawhitehouse�archives�gov/�
 31� Use of the term access is meant to parallel the 
concepts of operational access, assured access, 
and access to the commons used in DoD, 
particularly in the JOAC and JAM-GC�
 32� On the Argentine case, see Tangredi, Anti-
access Warfare, pp� 149–56�
 33� For example, Robert O� Work [Col�, USMC 
(Ret�)], The Challenge of Maritime Transfor-
mation: Is Bigger Better? (Washington, DC: 
CSBA, 2002), pp� 22–30�
 34� A fine example of academic alarmism 
concerning air/sea battle is Amitai Etzioni, 
“Who Authorized Preparations for War with 
China?,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 
8, no� 2 (Summer 2013), pp� 37–51, www2 
�gwu�edu/�
 35� Tying the concept of antiaccess to force-
structure decisions seems to provoke accusa-
tions that the whole concept (and the former 
Air-Sea Battle Office) is merely a method for 
the U�S� Navy and Air Force to grab a greater 
share of the defense budget away from other 
services and agencies� However, one hopes 
that all strategies are designed to be imple-
mented, requiring force-structure choices�
 36� An example of the discussion of a particu- 
lar gap in the context of A2/AD is Sam J� 
Tangredi [Capt�, USN (Ret�)], “Breaking the 
Antiaccess Wall,” U�S� Naval Institute Proceed-
ings 141/5/1,347 (May 2015), pp� 40–45, 
available at www�usni�org/�
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Exploiting a Vital Maneuver Space
Kevin Rowlands
There was usually too much water for the soldiers, but not enough for 
the sailors.
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RIVERINE WARFARE
 Despite a long history, riverine operations have received only scant attention from the academic community and military analysts. The little writing that 
exists on the topic tends to be either personal memoir or tactical instruction, with 
serious analyses few and far between, and then often hidden away in more-general 
texts on amphibious warfare. This article sets out to explore this unfamiliar yet 
vital territory to determine the relevance of riverine operations to contemporary 
and future military campaigns. It is pertinent now, as budget allocations once 
again are reviewed and NATO’s amphibious doctrine is refreshed.
The article approaches the subject in three parts, each building toward an un-
derstanding of riverine operations in the modern context. First, the nature of the 
riverine environment itself is discussed, using a classical geopolitical approach to 
explain where the world’s major riverine areas are and why they are important in 
security terms. Second, a historical review of military operations in the riverine 
environment is presented, using case studies that range from the earliest recorded 
naval battle, in the thirteenth century BCE, to the present day. The case studies 
highlight numerous applications of military power, and consequently they help 
to build a general understanding of what riverine 
operations are. (It is worth noting at this juncture, 
however, what riverine operations are not. This 
article investigates naval and military operations 
from and on rivers; it does not consider the meth-
ods land forces use to cross riverine obstacles, and 
these purposely are omitted from the commen-
tary.) The third part combines the earlier findings 
with contemporary commentary.
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A final section offers some conclusions� In particular, riverine environments 
have the potential to become a critical maneuver space in the twenty-first cen-
tury� Global strategic trends, from globalization to population migration and 
urbanization, place these riverine systems at the forefront of likely zones of con-
flict� Therefore it is simply prudent militarily to possess the ability to operate and 
maneuver effectively in such areas�
UNDERSTANDING THE RIVERINE ENVIRONMENT:  
THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITY
To understand the importance of the riverine environment, one first must un-
derstand the river’s place within the global context� Geopolitics had its genesis 
as a serious discipline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
among its first and most important writers—although he did not use the term 
geopolitics himself—was Sir Halford Mackinder� Mackinder presented an analy-
sis of the world very different from the views prevalent at the time� He made 
continent-wide sweeping generalizations, and in doing so emphasized the “physi-
cal control, rather than the causes of universal history” in his conceptual think-
ing�1 In 1904, he published a seminal paper entitled “The Geographical Pivot of 
History,” in which he argued that the world had become a closed political system 
and that taking a broad, global view was necessary to understand it� In the politi-
cal geography of the time, the key area, which Mackinder called the “heartland” or 
“pivot,” was thought to be the sparsely populated center of the Eurasian landmass, 
around which were the marginal coastal states and islands, which he placed in an 
“Inner Crescent” and an “Outer Crescent�” To Mackinder, the heartland was the 
region of strategic importance, and he is remembered best for his later statement 
that “[w]ho rules the heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World 
Island commands the World�”2
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great American naval strategist and historian who 
wrote at around the same time as Mackinder, also can be considered a geopo-
litical commentator� Contrary to Mackinder’s hypothesis, a central strand of 
Mahan’s work was that not territorial control but access to and control of stra-
tegically important areas was the ultimate requirement for national growth� To 
Mahan, the heartland was less critical than the coastal areas on its periphery�3 
This grand, global analysis was developed further by later scholars of realist 
geopolitics such as Nicholas Spykman, who coined the term rimland for those 
areas on the maritime fringes� In common with Mahan, Spykman considered 
these areas to be the most significant geopolitically because they contained the 
greatest concentration of human and physical resources and lay at the junction 
of the continental and maritime worlds� As such, they were the key to the balance 
of world power�4 Therein lay their security problem: they had to “fend off threats 
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from both land and sea�”5 The figure below shows Spykman’s map of the primary 
rimland, which he also termed the Eurasian conflict zone� Interestingly, this con-
flict zone, first identified in the 1940s, is striking in its similarity to Mackinder’s 
inner or marginal crescent� Contemporary readers will not be surprised to find 
that it is almost identical to the new “arc of instability” to which U�S� Secretary 
of Defense James Mattis referred in a speech to the Munich Security Conference 
in February 2017�6
The relevance of grand geopolitical theory in the context of this article, of 
course, is that this contested rimland, this arc of instability, the strategic and 
tactical focus for Western defense planners, is also the home of the world’s great 
riverine systems� It was out of the alluvial basins of four great rivers—the Tigris-
Euphrates in Mesopotamia, the Nile in Egypt, the Indus in the subcontinent, and 
the Yellow River in China—that the great civilizations arose�7
For much of human history, rivers provided the only means of transport for 
exploration and commercial exploitation of land; the colonization of Africa in the 
nineteenth century, for example, would not have been possible without navigable 
rivers� The British expanded their empire in the west via the Niger and Gambia 
Rivers, and the Belgians used the Congo to bring European control to much of 
central Africa�8 As the colonial powers spread their influence around the world, 
rivers commonly were used as boundaries, often because they were the only 
geographical features marked on maps� Today, approximately 30 percent of the 
Figure 1: Mackinder’s “Seats of Power” map 
Source: First published in 1904 and reproduced in Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of 
History,” in The Geopolitics R ader, ed. Ó Tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge, p. 38. 
FIGURE 1
MACKINDER’S “SEATS OF POWER” MAP
Source: First published in 1904 and reproduced in Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” p. 38.
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world’s 158,554 miles of land borders are made up of waterways—and these can 
be the cause of dispute.9
It would be wrong to assume that the importance of rivers as a means of 
communication has lessened in the twenty-first century. The Amazon remains 
navigable by oceangoing ships for 2,300 miles, the Chang (Yangtze) for 620 miles, 
and the Saint Lawrence for 1,300 miles, and all are vital to the flow of trade.10 
And clearly, not all riverine trade is legitimate; for example, it was estimated just 
over a decade ago that rivers carried over 80 percent of drug-related traffic in 
Colombia.11
The water from rivers provides a vital life support for the populations living 
near them. Millions of square miles of land globally are permanently irrigated by 
river waters; much of this expanse is in the densely populated regions of East and 
Southeast Asia.12 Rivers also provide the source for much energy generation; hy-
droelectric power plants currently supply 13 percent of the total annual electricity 
needs of the United States.13 However, this degree of successful exploitation is not 
universal, and significant potential exists in the untapped resources of central and 
southern Asia, Africa, and South America. The extensive use of rivers and riv-
erine areas has led to very significant environmental degradation in some cases, 
and the potential for more. Commercial navigation and dredging have affected 
rates of erosion and have impacted agriculture; pollution has resulted in severe 
risks to health; and the industrial use of rivers, from the taking of cooling water to 
the discharge of effluent, has led to changes in ecosystems that affect the ecologies 
and food chains of entire regions.
FIGURE 2
SPYKMAN’S “RIMLAND” MAP
Source: Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, pp. 51–52.
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The geopolitical reality is that the riverine environments of the world tend 
to be the areas that are susceptible to the greatest shock in security terms� They 
are very highly populated; they rely heavily on the river waters for agriculture, 
industry, power, and transport; and they are both potential sources and victims of 
severe environmental impacts, with the accompanying risks to individual human 
health and societal sustainability� They also are located in strategically relevant 
areas—areas in which the international community has an interest in maintain-
ing stability�
OPERATIONS IN THE RIVERINE ENVIRONMENT— 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In the preindustrial age, when the world was in large part subject to the dominion 
of empires, wars tended to be fought for control of territory� Navies extended the 
influence of their political masters to places inaccessible by other means, and in 
so doing they long have fought on inland waters� Probably the first recorded naval 
battle in history was that between the Egyptians and the invading “Sea Peoples” in 
the thirteenth century bce� The invaders used various routes into Egypt, includ-
ing an attack through the tributaries in the Nile delta, but were defeated on the 
rivers and on land by the defending Egyptian forces�14 The two sides came face-
to-face on the waters of the Nile and engaged in battle; in today’s phraseology, this 
early example of riverine warfare between two opposing armies can be classified 
as a major combat operation�
In the American War of Independence (1775–83), extensive riverine opera-
tions took place�15 In 1775, American forces conducted river patrols around Lake 
Champlain in the New England–Canada border region and gained control of the 
waterways, preventing British forces from maneuvering in an area without roads� 
The Americans then used the waterways as a means of transportation for land 
forces in the invasion of Canada; the multiple axes of advance bested the British 
defenses, Montreal was taken, and the Continental forces under the command 
of Benedict Arnold reached as far as Quebec�16 Area control was exercised and, 
logistically, the use of the riverine environment for troop transportation was 
entirely successful�
The operational movement of armies by river was a significant feature in the 
American Civil War (1861–65) as well� General Ulysses S� Grant used established 
river networks to place his army of 18,000 men close to Petersburg in 1864, 
gaining a “tremendous advantage” over General Robert E� Lee’s opposing forces� 
Both Union and Confederate forces deployed significant numbers of ships and 
boats on the rivers and deltas of the states, including well over a hundred vessels, 
some of them ironclads, on the Mississippi alone�17 The city of New Orleans fell 
to Union naval forces attacking from the river and, for the first time in riverine 
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warfare, the Confederate navy put significant emphasis on denying its enemy the 
use of the riverine environment by irregular means, including mining and the 
use of barrages and other obstructions�18 Ultimately, however, Union riverine 
forces gained the upper hand and achieved control of the major waterways—with 
long-lasting strategic effect� Their control of the Mississippi effectively cut the 
Confederacy in two and severed its vital supply lines from the West and South�19 
The American Civil War showed the utility of riverine forces in major combat 
operations, troop transportation, the denial of enemy maneuver space, and the 
disruption of supplies�
British riverine operations followed a similar pattern in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century� A Royal Navy flotilla accompanied Lord Kitchener on his 
expedition up the Nile during the 1898 reconquest of the Sudan after the Mahdist 
Revolt, performing a number of functions in support of the land forces� The flo-
tilla was used first in a logistical capacity, transporting men, weaponry, and provi-
sions from Egypt, and then very effectively as field artillery, bombarding dervish 
positions near the river�20 Because of its asymmetry and relatively low-intensity 
nature, the Mahdist Revolt cannot be classified as a major combat operation� 
However, it is perhaps indicative of a shift along the spectrum of conflict toward 
counterinsurgency, as the preindustrial age merged into the industrial�
FIGURE 3
AN IRONCLAD ON THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Source: “USS St. Louis in 1862,” Steamboat Times, steamboattimes.com/.
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Riverine operations did not feature to a significant degree in the primary the-
aters of World Wars I and II, the two major interstate conflicts of the industrial 
age� There could be a number of reasons for this, not least the descent into trench 
warfare during the 1914–18 conflict in Europe and the greater use of improved 
motorized vehicles for transport in 1939–45� In addition, in the major combat 
operations of the industrial age, air superiority was essential; in general, riverine 
operations took place only in areas in which air superiority had been won or, at 
least, where it was denied to the enemy� The trend, therefore, was for operations 
on rivers to be increasingly on the periphery of conflicts, in terms of both geog-
raphy and intensity�
However, there are good examples of riverine operations taking place during 
and between the world wars, and Vice Admiral Wilfred Nunn gave an excellent 
personal account of the British action against Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia 
during the First World War in his memoir Tigris Gunboats�21 Although geograph-
ically disconnected from the main battleground of Europe, the war in the Middle 
East was of strategic importance to all sides, with “Turkey, Iraq and Britain � � � 
[in] � � � a battle for the control and ultimate utilization of not only the waters of 
the [Tigris and Euphrates] rivers but � � � for virtually all the natural resources of 
the region�”22
The complex theater of the Middle East was one in which major interstate war, 
colonial liberation movements, and the protection of key economic infrastruc-
ture were conducted side by side; in effect, the war in Iraq oscillated between 
major combat and a series of running skirmishes� Nunn explains how oceango-
ing warships, redirected from India, operated in the rivers of Iraq during the 
Mesopotamia campaign� They were used in a variety of tasks, from the insertion 
of advanced forces for covert operations, such as cutting Turkish communication 
lines, to the landing of the main British expeditionary force in 1914, and subse-
quent patrols along the main thoroughfare of the desert�23 Analysis of Nunn’s 
account shows riverine operations used for prelanding and amphibious assault 
operations, support to land forces, and assistance to the anti-Ottoman insurgency 
conducted by the indigenous Arab populace�
Although riverine operations did not become divorced completely from ma-
jor combat operations, they clearly were trending from higher to lower intensity 
along the spectrum of warfare� One important aspect of Nunn’s book is the em-
phasis he gives to the necessity for close cooperation between land and maritime 
elements operating in a riverine environment�24
As predicted by the geopolitical overview outlined earlier, many of the armed 
independence movements that arose in the aftermath of the Second World 
War took place in the rimland, the regions of the world with extensive riverine 
Winter2018Review.indb   59 11/1/17   9:56 AM
65
College: Winter 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 6 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
environments, none more so than Southeast Asia� During the decade of the 
Malayan Emergency (1948–58), naval operations deep into the jungle by river 
provided both fire support to and transport for members of the predominantly 
land security forces and were of considerable importance in this classic counter-
insurgency campaign�25
Similarly, during the Indonesian “Confrontation” (1962–66) rivers often 
provided the only means of access through difficult terrain� Riverine opera-
tions there ranged from routine logistical resupply to opposed amphibious raids 
against rebel groupings and “hearts and minds” patrols to demonstrate the pres-
ence of the legitimate authority in difficult-to-reach areas�26 In both Malaya and 
Indonesia there was little or no direct threat from the air, and the operations the 
riverine forces conducted formed an integral part of what became British coun-
terinsurgency tactics�
Perhaps the zenith of industrial-age riverine operations came in the French 
and American campaigns in Vietnam from the late 1940s until the mid-1970s; it 
was certainly the period that produced the greatest volume of written accounts� 
The commentators, be they servicemen who experienced the operations them-
selves or academics analyzing the period, tell essentially the same story� Japanese, 
French, Vietnamese, and American activity on the waterways of Southeast Asia 
Figure 4: USN Craft in Operation {SC} Game Warden, ca.1968 
Source: “Game Warden Support,” USS Duncan Reunion Association, www.ussduncan.org/. 
FIGURE 4
USN CRAFT IN OPERATION GAME WARDEN, CA. 1968
Source: “Game Warden Support,” USS Duncan Reunion Association, www.ussduncan.org/.
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was fundamentally the same, differing only in scale according to the require-
ments of the time�27 Perhaps the role that riverine forces performed is explained 
best by the varied types of vessel employed: patrol boats, assault craft, troop car-
riers, flamethrowers, minesweepers, and command-and-control units�28
The necessity for riverine operations in Vietnam becomes clear when its geog-
raphy is considered� The Mekong Delta took up one-fifth of South Vietnam’s area, 
and there were few roads but over 2,500 miles of man-made canals and natural 
waterways�29 Writing in 1973, Major General William B� Fulton, USA, stated that 
it was “not possible for a land force to operate in the Mekong Delta in 1965 with-
out some means of maneuver on water�”30
Fulton, who was instrumental in the establishment of the U�S� riverine force 
in the mid-1960s, explains that the initial concept was to use its craft as a mobile 
base for troops, capable of maintaining a brigade-sized formation in the delta 
for up to six months�31 He goes on to describe some of the wider utility of such a 
joint capability: “This Army and Navy force of approximately 5,000 men capable 
of combat and containing within itself combat service support could be moved 
from 100 to 200 km in a 24-hour period and could then launch a day or night op-
eration within 30 minutes after anchoring; its true potential is apparent�”32 Fulton 
gives numerous examples of the effectiveness of a low-footprint force, from fire 
support to strike operations against enemy bases that “in some instances had not 
been penetrated for two or three years�”33
However, others have argued that the true potential of the riverine force in 
Vietnam was not in its offensive capability but in its ability to prevent Vietcong 
supply operations� The coastal patrols of Operation MARKET TIME, by the U�S� 
Coast Guard and Navy, and the river patrols of Operation GAME WARDEN in 
the late 1960s were not mounted merely to clear the delta of enemies but to deny 
them use of it�34 This distinction between destroying an enemy and curtailing its 
activities points to a niche role that riverine operations can fulfill in the wider 
prosecution of a campaign�
After the Tet Offensive in 1968, GAME WARDEN and MARKET TIME were 
amalgamated and became the Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River, and Delta Strat-
egy, known as SEALORDS� The emergence of a tactical doctrine of interdiction, 
pacification, and area clearance through limited offensive action started in the 
early days of the Vietnam engagement and its evolution continued through the 
later stages of the war and, by default, into the postindustrial era to today�
Despite the importance of the joint action in the Mekong Delta to the over-
all campaign, little effort went into analyzing the lessons of Vietnam riverine 
operations and formulating them for application to future conflicts�35 The 
capability that had been built up in time of need largely atrophied during the 
final fifteen years of the Cold War� However, a period of increased international 
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interventionism and a surge in peacekeeping operations following the demise of 
the Soviet Union led to a renewal of interest in the riverine environment in the 
early 1990s� To some, the peacekeeping experience was an indication of the likely 
shape of future conflict, and the subsequent bias of attention meant that certain 
capabilities were “rebranded” to fit the new requirement� James D� Kiras, for 
instance, was one of a very few writers in the immediate post–Cold War period 
to undertake a review of the American riverine experiences in Vietnam, but he 
did so to draw lessons from the “wealth of tactical and operational experience” to 
show that the riverine capability could be applied to peacekeeping�36
A good example of the early post–Cold War peacekeeping effort, and one 
that involved a significant riverine contribution, was the UN Advance Mission 
in Cambodia, 1991–92, and UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 
1992–93� UNTAC was born out of the Paris Peace Accords of 1991–92 and aimed 
to bring order to Cambodia after years of civil war�37 One part of the military ef-
fort was the water-based patrolling of the coast and rivers, which involved fifteen 
coastal vessels, eleven landing craft, and over fifty small boats�38
Kiras states that “those navies which maintain substantial riverine forces are, 
not surprisingly, those with internal security problems and major waterways�”39 
Clearly, internal security problems can take many forms, and a different appli-
cation of riverine operations has been seen in Colombia’s counternarcotic and 
counterinsurgency campaigns� Developed since the 1950s, Colombia’s riverine 
force has grown to be the largest in the world� It was designed to combat both the 
drug cartels operating in the country and the insurgent Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia, known as FARC�40 The Colombian marines built a doctrine 
based on the core roles of riverine assault, surveillance, interdiction, and support, 
which has provided a high degree of success in their long-term efforts�41 The Co-
lombian model, founded on the lessons of others, has developed into an example 
of best practice for nations looking to grow such a capability� However, Kiras’s 
assertion that riverine forces are built by those with internal security problems 
is due a reassessment� Postindustrial, post–Cold War focused intervention by 
the Western democracies, particularly the United States, has altered the shape of 
contemporary conflict, and there is ample evidence that riverine capabilities now 
are employed more broadly, as a study of Iraq shows�
The experiences of the U�S�-led coalition in Iraq from 2003 until 2010 were 
the catalyst for another renewal of interest in riverine operations�42 Major combat 
operations commenced in March 2003 but lasted just a few weeks, until the col-
lapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime; thereafter the occupation of the country was 
met with sporadic cycles of relative peace, resistance, criminality, insurgency, and 
terrorism� The military mission in the country quickly became one of stabiliza-
tion, with subsidiary operations across virtually the whole spectrum of conflict�
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From the outset riverine forces were required; when hostilities commenced, 
the U�K� Royal Marines were involved intimately in the initial assault on the al- 
Faw peninsula and the subsequent patrols of the riverine environment in south-
ern Iraq� They conducted thirty-one days of continuous boat operations over 
ninety miles of inland waterways, accomplished three opposed landings, and 
fired in excess of ten thousand rounds of ammunition�43 The extensive marsh-
lands in southeastern Iraq had to be cleared of enemy combatants while the main 
ground forces progressed north through the country� Inshore raiding craft and 
hovercraft were used to good effect, providing means of maneuver in an environ-
ment unsuitable for road vehicles and over which the safety of helicopters could 
not be guaranteed�44
Early stabilization tasking for the riverine forces after the initial combat phase 
ended focused on countering burgeoning criminality� A clear picture of activi-
ties on the river was built through patrol, reconnaissance, and engagement with 
local traders, with the result that river traffic suspected of smuggling contraband 
could be stopped and boarded; the mission lent effective support to the legitimate 
economy of the region�45 Other countertrafficking operations took place farther 
inland, in the Maysan province in eastern Iraq� Riverine forces were the only 
coalition contingent able to operate in the reeds and marshes of the province, 
which was used as a major supply route for munitions and insurgents crossing 
the border from Iran�46
In the north of Iraq, the U�S� Marine Corps Small Craft Company (SCCO) pro-
vided the initial riverine capability after the invasion� Again operating primarily 
on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, the SCCO’s role increasingly became one of 
counterinsurgency, but the force’s limited numbers meant that its personnel were 
spread thinly throughout the country, and their opponents exploited the gaps� 
In 2004, U�S� forces attempted to retake the cities of Samarra’ and Fallujah, but, 
as one American officer explained at the time, the insurgents effectively were 
operating at will on the waterways� “The rivers are enemy territory and still un-
contested� � � � Several different intelligence summaries indicated that the enemy 
forces were using the river as a primary avenue of reinforcement, resupply and 
egress�”47
The U�S� Army and U�S� Marine Corps were able to set up traffic-control 
points to interdict insurgent movement on the roads and highways, but they had 
no capability for routine interdiction on the water� The Army’s First Infantry 
Division tried to procure riverine craft, specifically to employ in its sector north 
of Baghdad�48 However, as General Mattis, the commander of the First Marine 
Division during the battle for Fallujah, stated, “The enemy has exploited the lack 
of U�S� dominance in inland waterway warfare�”49
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The capability shortfall in the U�S� armory was acknowledged and addressed 
through the creation of a dedicated USN riverine group, consisting of three 
squadrons, as part of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command� The naval 
squadrons took over for the stretched SCCO in 2007�50 The Expeditionary 
Combat Command listed the tasks that its riverine units were expected to fulfill, 
ranging from support to a landing force in an opposed amphibious assault at one 
end of the spectrum, to security assistance, interdiction, and casualty evacuation 
at the other�51 However, the riverine groups were rebranded as coastal riverine 
groups in 2012, with one located on each coast of the United States, but with only 
one riverine company per squadron�52
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN RIVERINE OPERATIONS
The vignettes above show that during the preindustrial age riverine operations 
primarily were a feature of major war fighting, and that river forces were used 































































































RIVERINE OPERATIONS ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
Source: The categorization of the intensity of the conflict (the y axis) is adapted from the spectrum of war as described in Benbow et al., Renewal of Navy’s 
Riverine Capability, p. 65. The division of conflict into traditional war and stabilization is the author’s own.
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engagement of opposing land forces in battle from the waterways, own-forces 
transportation, and denial of the enemy’s transportation�
As tactics developed in the industrial age, the intensity of action necessar-
ily drove riverine operations from the main theaters of interstate war, and their 
employment became centered on counterinsurgency and support to land forces 
where little or no air threat was present� Counterinsurgency remained a theme 
into the postindustrial era, but the riverine environment also has seen increasing 
security-assistance efforts aimed at peacekeeping and anticriminality measures�
Although not perfectly linear, there has been a definite progression along the 
spectrum of conflict from traditional war fighting and major combat operations 
toward what is now called stabilization� The diagram in figure 5 illustrates this 
trend in graphical form� It does not situate each campaign exactly; rather, it at-
tempts to show where the scope of each riverine operation sits along the spec-
trum of war� As such, it is a subjective assessment, but one generally supported 
by a historical analysis of riverine operations�
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE
As the examples provided show, the operations in which riverine forces have been 
involved display common, enduring characteristics, such as control of waterways, 
interdiction, transportation, logistics support, and presence in difficult-to-reach 
areas� Each of these types of operation requires similar and transferable skill sets, 
and each of these skill sets is useful across the spectrum of operations, from ma-
jor combat to stabilization and peace support� There is therefore high potential 
for the broad use of riverine forces in the future, particularly in Mattis’s “arc of 
instability,” with the Gulf of Guinea and parts of South America as additional hot 
spots in which they could operate�53 An inability to maneuver effectively in these 
geographical spaces would render them no-go areas for intervention�
Activities need not require the use of force, however, and humanitarian as-
sistance / disaster relief operations, such as facilitating the delivery of food and 
water to a distressed population, may be an immediate priority that civilian 
agencies are, for whatever reason, unable to meet� For instance, when Hurricane 
Katrina hit the U�S� Gulf Coast in 2005 it wreaked havoc across a wide area, flood-
ing roads and making low-lying ground inaccessible� In an operation involving 
5,600 Coast Guardsmen, the U�S� Coast Guard provided an immediate response 
that saved over thirty thousand people�54 Within hours the U�S� Navy’s Special 
Warfare Special Boat Team 22, based in Mississippi, was activated and was able to 
conduct search-and-rescue missions to deliver essential aid to stranded people�55 
Other governmental and nongovernmental organizations were to follow, but the 
immediate response to the emergency fell to the armed forces�
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In a very different context but equally vitally, Bangladesh formed a riverine 
force in 2015 to protect UN barges delivering aid to beleaguered South Sudan on 
the river Nile—there was no other way to get through�56 In security sector reform, 
riverine forces can engage in countercriminality work, assisting in ensuring the 
proper conduct of elections, as they did in Cambodia, and helping to train and 
mentor indigenous security forces, as the coalition naval advisory training teams 
did in Iraq� The development of the local economic infrastructure in a region of 
instability is primarily a civilian undertaking, but, as with all military deploy-
ments, there are circumstances in which riverine forces have a role to play� This 
might be in a direct manner, such as the management of harbors and waterways, 
or indirectly, by creating the stable conditions in which enterprise and growth 
can flourish�
Military operations for the Western powers over the last two decades unques-
tionably have been land-centric and, as Colin S� Gray warned with his concept 
of the “sin of presentism,” it is all too easy to assume—and all too easy to get 
wrong—that the future will look much like today� However, “if maps of popula-
tion spread and conflict are laid upon each other, it is evident that the littoral, 
estuaries, rivers, and lakes are vital arteries of life and thus foci of conflict�”57 If 
this geopolitical assertion is accepted, then it is logical to conclude that the pos-
session of an ability to operate and deliver effect in these environments is merely 
a practical expression of prudent military judgment�
The strategic importance of the world’s littoral areas is fast becoming accepted 
wisdom� The similarity among Mackinder’s marginal crescents, Mahan’s coastal 
periphery, Spykman’s rimland, and the contemporary arcs of “crisis,” “concern,” 
or “instability” is striking� Even a cursory glance at an atlas shows that the major 
river systems sit in the marginal regions between the continental and maritime 
worlds and are, and historically always have been, centers of population, com-
merce, and transportation, as well as boundaries between states and cultures� 
They also are a prime breeding ground for those sources of instability that the 
interdependent core of the international community has to tackle in defense of its 
own self-interest; human migration, environmental degradation, and economic 
stagnation are just some examples of processes that can lead to failed states and 
fragile regions�
There is clear evidence of naval warfare on rivers from the very earliest re-
corded battles to the present day� Examination of the nature of riverine opera-
tions through the ages makes it possible to identify several common denomina-
tors� In particular, the employment of riverine forces has been largely consistent, 
whether in war, counterinsurgency, or security assistance� Their utility has 
been demonstrated time and again in the areas of transportation, especially in 
difficult-to-reach areas; logistical support to land forces; and the denial of vital 
Winter2018Review.indb   66 11/1/17   9:56 AM
72
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/12
 R O W L A N D S  6 7
maneuver space to an enemy� Although there is not a perfectly linear progression, 
there has been a definite trend toward riverine operations being conducted at 
the lower-intensity end of the conflict spectrum� Historically, riverine operations 
have a distinguished pedigree, and there is no evidence to suggest this has come 
to an end�
However, although navies long have undertaken riverine operations, the 
maintenance of such a capability on inland waterways has been inconsistent and 
episodic, especially during the era of industrial warfare� In most cases, riverine 
operations have been mounted on an ad hoc basis and the capability has been dis-
established on completion�58 Choosing to break this cycle by maintaining a base 
level of capability available to be employed whenever required is clearly a policy 
decision, and one dependent on numerous factors, not least perceptions of threat, 
the level of existing commitments, and the availability of resources�
The principal conclusion therefore must be that riverine operations have a 
fundamental relevance to contemporary and future campaigns� They may not 
be the only maritime contribution, but they have the potential to provide very 
significant contributions to military involvement—in particular, stabilization 
and development� Some countries, such as the United States, have invested in 
the maintenance of a rudimentary riverine capability, clearly seeing the riverine 
environment as a likely and critical maneuver space in the future� Those other 
Western, liberal democracies that actively continue to pursue interventionist 
foreign and defense policies in the interdependent world would be prudent to 
review the evidence and do likewise�
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THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN INDIAN NAVAL 
DOCTRINE
n October 2015, the Indian navy released a document entitled Ensuring Secure 
Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMMS-2015)�1 In contrast to its more 
conservative predecessor, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strat-
egy, published in 2007, the new strategic document propounds a more assertive 
role for the Indian navy over the next ten years�2 To that end, New Delhi seeks to 
build up a force structure centered on three aircraft carriers, each of which would 
form the nucleus of a carrier battle group (CBG)�3
IMMS-2015 does not delineate what roles Indian carriers would fulfill dur-
ing wartime, other than that they will be a key contributor to sea control, which 
is “a central concept around which the Indian Navy will be employed�”4 The 
carrier traditionally has been regarded as a use-
ful platform for this endeavor, as it is essentially 
a mobile, territorially independent air base from 
which aircraft can be deployed to fulfill various sea 
control–related roles� Historically, the three main 
tasks for which the aircraft carrier has provided 
significant utility during a conventional war have 
been (1) attacking the enemy’s maritime assets, (2) 
projecting power ashore, and (3) protecting one’s 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs)�
How effective would Indian aircraft carriers 
be in these areas during a future war with India’s 
I
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strategic rivals? This is a question worth exploring, yet no previous literature has 
dealt with it explicitly� Moreover, addressing this subject would contribute to the 
richness of the overall carrier debate that has been going on since the platform’s 
inception in the 1920s�5
To contextualize the issue, an Indo-Pakistani war scenario will be discussed, 
given the historical enmity between the two South Asian states�6 The level of hos-
tility is such that Shashank Joshi believes that “India’s single most probable mili-
tary contingency remains a limited war with Pakistan�”7 A series of border clashes 
occurred in the disputed region of Kashmir between the two nations in 2014–15� 
More recently, in September 2016, militants ostensibly linked to Pakistan killed 
twenty soldiers during a raid on a military outpost in Indian-held Kashmir, 
which led to Indian special forces purportedly crossing the Line of Control to 
carry out a reprisal attack�8 Border tensions have continued to simmer since then, 
so conflict between India and Pakistan cannot be ruled out� Such a confrontation, 
should it take place, is highly likely to be a conventional one, given that both sides 
have nuclear weapons and crossing the atomic Rubicon—even to use low-yield 
tactical devices—could escalate the conflict into an utterly ruinous war�
In a notional Indo-Pakistani war, the modest size of Indian carrier wings will 
give rise to what is known as the “small-deck carrier quandary�” In this case, that 
quandary restricts an Indian carrier’s utility for going on the offensive, whether 
focused at sea or ashore� This dilemma revolves around what proportions of such 
a ship’s relatively small fighter complement—barely two dozen aircraft—should 
be allotted to defense and to attack� This will be a key consideration for a CBG 
commander as he faces Islamabad’s burgeoning antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) 
complex�
On the other hand, the small-deck carrier conundrum would not be felt as 
acutely with regard to the SLOC-protection role, as Indian flattops would be able 
to devote their aircraft mainly to defense� Furthermore, carriers are particularly 
well suited for this task, as sea-based airpower has a number of operational ad-
vantages over its land-based counterpart�
To date, no academic publication has dealt specifically with the likely useful-
ness of Indian carriers during a possible contingency involving Pakistan� Some 
journal articles have covered carriers in relation to India in a general sense, but 
not regarding an Indo-Pakistani scenario per se�9 While a number of works 
discuss the Indian navy as a whole during a notional war with Pakistan, they 
do not discuss the functions that carriers would perform�10 The one academic 
source that does cover the subject to any significant degree is the book Sea Power 
and Indian Security, by Rahul Roy-Chaudhury� In a section entitled “An Indo-
Pakistani Naval War: A Scenario in the Future,” the author alludes to the likely 
missions of Indian carriers, but he does not assess the ships’ likely effectiveness�11 
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What is more, the book was published in 1995, and naval developments in the 
two decades since then necessitate a fresh look at the issue� There also seems to be 
a misconception that the Indian aircraft carrier is a potent naval platform solely 
by virtue of its organic airpower� To illustrate, one commentator states rather 
sweepingly that INS Vikramaditya’s “powerful air wing is capable of executing 
air superiority, anti-surface, anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare” during a war 
with Pakistan—without explaining in detail how it would do so�12 Thus, there ex-
ists a lacuna in the existing literature on a key aspect of the Indian navy�
This article therefore seeks to answer the following central research question: 
How useful would the Indian aircraft carrier be during a hypothetical conflict 
against Pakistan in the medium and long terms? To address the issue, this article 
will extrapolate from existing, open-source information to the likely dynamics 
of Indian carrier operations against Pakistan� The time horizon discussed will 
extend to 2025� (Going beyond that time frame would not be prudent, as tech-
nological developments over the longer term might render conclusions invalid, 
on the basis of extant dynamics�) While there has been much talk about China’s 
fledgling naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it is unlikely to constitute a genuine 
strategic threat to New Delhi within the time frame discussed herein, consider-
ing Beijing’s current preoccupation with its own “back yard” within the so-called 
first island chain�13 Limiting the discussion to Pakistan is therefore sound, as the 
country always has been a clear and present threat in the eyes of India’s security 
managers�
The next section provides current background information on India’s aircraft 
carriers� An assessment of the platform in the offensive mode (attacking sea- and 
land-based targets) with reference to the small-deck carrier quandary follows, 
succeeded by an analysis of the use of Indian carriers for SLOC defense� The final 
section puts forth a number of recommendations for Indian naval planners, fol-
lowed by concluding remarks�
INDIA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
India has only a single carrier, INS Vikramaditya, in active service today, with 
another, INS Vikrant, scheduled to be commissioned in late 2018�14 The table 
below captures the key features of these two vessels, both of which are classified 
as “small-deck” carriers by virtue of their size and aircraft complement�15
During operations, each carrier and its several destroyer and frigate consorts 
constitute a CBG, and one or two such entities make up a carrier task force (CTF)� 
IMMS-2015 states that each CTF is “a self-supporting force capable of undertak-
ing the full range of operational tasks in all dimensions � � � [including] Anti-Air 
Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), ASW [antisubmarine warfare], 
Maritime Strike, [and] Electronic Warfare (EW),” adding that “[d]edicated forces 
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may be attached to the CTF as per mission requirements, such as for conduct of 
Expeditionary, Out-of-Area, or Amphibious Operations.”16 The key question is 
as follows: If India were to have a conflict with Pakistan in the 2020s, how could 
Vikrant and Vikramaditya contribute to the war effort?
Although the 2015 maritime strategy devotes an entire chapter to war fighting, 
it is not clear on the specifics of Indian carriers’ role in a conflict, other than that 
they are to wrest sea control from the adversary.17 The same can be said about 
earlier maritime strategic documents, such as the 2009 maritime doctrine and the 
2007 predecessor to IMMS-2015.18
A retired Pakistani naval officer believes that implementation of the Cold 
Start doctrine, which was devised specifically to deal with India’s western neigh-
bor, would see the Indian navy taking a forward posture and imposing a distant 
blockade of Pakistani ports.19 Similarly, Roy-Chaudhury opines that an Indo-
Pakistani conflict is likely to see CBGs attacking the enemy’s naval forces, striking 
at military-economic targets inland, interdicting the enemy’s SLOCs, and defend-
ing friendly merchant shipping.20 The first three functions involve Indian CBGs 
operating in an offensive mode—which brings the small-deck carrier quandary 
to the fore.
THE SMALL-DECK CARRIER QUANDARY AND ITS IMPACT ON  
OFFENSIVE MISSIONS
Studies have been conducted on the American large-deck carrier and the capa-
bilities of its relatively large (seventy-odd) aircraft complement. Dean Mathew 
maintains that
a near majority of the [American carrier] air wing gets tied down with the compul-
sions of self-protection. The same logic extended to the case of a medium carrier 
(20,000 to 40,000 tons and 20 to 35 aircraft) . . . will point towards a worse situation. 
Name Displacement Length Flight-Deck Configuration Air Wing
Vikramaditya 44,500 tons 283 m STOBAR Up to twenty-four MiG-
29K attack fighters and  
six ASW and AEW  
helicoptersa
Vikrant 40,000 tons 262 m STOBAR Around thirty aircraft, 
comprising MiG-29Ks and 
ASW and AEW helicoptersb
TABLE 1 
Notes: 
  AEW = airborne early warning; ASW = antisubmarine warfare; STOBAR = short takeoff but arrested recovery.
 a. R. Sukumaran, “Operationalising the Gorshkov: An Appraisal,” Strategic Analysis 28, no. 1 (2004), p. 40.
 b. “Vikrant-Class Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC).” 
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� � � Hence, once that minimum force required for the various tasks of self-defence is 
subtracted, there will not be anything substantial left over in the air wing for “true 
carrier missions�” It must also be mentioned that these predictions assume a near 100 
percent availability of the air wing and optimal management of the launch/retrieve 
windows, which is very unlikely in a war�21
 Therein lies the dilemma that small-deck carriers face: how to juggle their 
already limited complement of planes between offensive and defensive purposes� 
The raison d’être of the aircraft carrier is its air wing, and the latter’s size dictates 
the operations the vessel can execute� Force projection, whether against land or 
maritime targets, is one of the key doctrinal roles of the carrier, and being able to 
carry out strike missions is thus the vessel’s sine qua non� However, carriers, even 
small-deck flattops such as Vikrant and Vikramaditya, are large, multibillion-
dollar platforms, and thus protecting them would be of utmost importance to 
commanders� INS Vikrant and Vikramaditya are both in the forty-thousand-ton-
displacement category� Furthermore, Vikrant is slated to cost over U�S�$2�2 bil-
lion, while the cost of refitting Vikramaditya, currently the Indian navy’s flagship, 
is about U�S�$2�9 billion�22 In view of the carrier’s capital-ship status and hefty 
price tag, as well as its symbolizing of national power, protecting such ships from 
enemy threats would be critical, and a good portion of their aircraft complements 
invariably would be dedicated to this�
The challenge thus is for the CBG leadership to strike a judicious balance 
between offense and defense—an uphill task� Bearing in mind the threats that 
modern A2/AD systems present, how likely would a commander be to set aside 
more aircraft for offensive purposes—and risk having a crown jewel of his navy 
attacked and hit? Nevertheless, setting aside too many aircraft for defense adds 
credence to the contention of various carrier critics that the ship and its escorts 
are a “self-licking ice cream cone”—that is, an entity that exists solely to sustain 
itself�23 The CBG leadership hence would be placed in a catch-22 situation: al-
locate more fighters to strike missions, and the task force’s susceptibility to aerial 
threats increases; conversely, set aside more aircraft for defense, and the carrier’s 
ability to project power declines� Having a sizable air wing on the ship would 
mitigate this dilemma, but neither Vikramaditya nor Vikrant does� After all, each 
of them can carry only about twenty fixed-wing aircraft, and at least half of those 
invariably will be assigned to provide fleet air defense, leaving not even a dozen 
available for strike duties�
The operational history of light carriers bears this out� To illustrate, of the forty- 
two Harrier jets deployed on HMS Hermes and Invincible during the Falklands 
War, twenty-eight—a substantial two-thirds—had fleet air defense as their pri-
mary role�24 Just as tellingly, of the 1,300-odd total sorties that Harriers flew dur-
ing the Falklands conflict, about 83 percent of them were for combat air patrol�25
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Matters are not helped by the fact that less than 100 percent of any air wing 
will be available for service� In fact, one informed observer of naval matters 
contends that around 80 percent of a carrier’s air wing is mission capable at 
any time�26 Assuming this to be true, twenty or fewer of the fighter jets aboard 
Vikramaditya or Vikrant will be flyable� It bears consideration that a recent scath-
ing report revealed that some 21 to 47 percent of INS Vikramaditya’s MiG-29Ks 
were nonoperational�27 Needless to say, such a low serviceability rate would have 
a tremendous impact on carrier operations, especially during combat, and India 
would do well to remedy this problem promptly and decisively� In any case, an In-
dian carrier’s small fighter constituent means that if it were to attempt to partake 
in operations against an adversary with credible A2/AD capabilities, the vessel 
would be hard-pressed to protect itself, let alone project power�
Therefore, it is doubtful that any attack force launched from an Indian carrier 
would pack a significant punch� With aircraft available for strike duties barely 
numbering into the double digits, the Indian carrier simply cannot deliver a 
substantial “pulse” of combat power against its adversary� Given that the pulse an 
American supercarrier delivers with a full deck-load launch of over forty fight-
ers may not constitute enough combat power, a big question mark hovers over 
the effects the Indian small-deck carrier could achieve with its meager strike 
packages�28
In addition, a typical strike package, besides the main attack component, 
usually comprises elements filling the roles of achieving air superiority and 
suppressing enemy air defenses� A notional strike force from Vikramaditya will 
consist solely of MiG-29Ks, and hence either it must devote its assets solely to 
the two aforementioned supporting roles or the attacking aircraft must give over 
a number of their hard points to carry air-to-air/antiradiation missiles, or elec-
tronic countermeasures pods, or both� Either choice would reduce the ordnance 
that could be brought to bear on the enemy� Critics may contend that mass is 
not needed in the current age of precision-guided munitions, but this argument 
ignores the fact that it may take saturation attacks to overcome modern air-
defense systems�29
Making matters worse is the limited performance of Indian carrier planes� 
Both the Vikramaditya and Vikrant platforms are configured for short takeoff 
but arrested recovery (STOBAR), so can launch aircraft only via their ski jumps� 
This point is crucial, as planes taking off in this manner must carry less ord-
nance, fuel, or both� Notably, the mainstay MiG-29K has a relatively short com-
bat radius of about 850 kilometers if it flies on internal fuel alone�30 That figure 
could be increased to 1,300 km with external fuel tanks, but this too reduces the 
number of hard points available for ordnance�31 During the Falklands War, the 
danger posed by Argentina’s Super Étendards armed with Exocet antiship cruise 
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missiles (ASCMs) resulted in the two British STOBAR-configured carriers be-
ing deployed far to the east of the Falklands� This reduced Britain’s Harrier jets’ 
payloads and their loiter time in the combat zone�32 A similar situation vis-à-vis 
Indian carriers is likely to ensue in an Indo-Pakistani conflict, considering Islam-
abad’s burgeoning access-denial capabilities (which will be delineated below), 
that undoubtedly would dilute the effectiveness of Indian carrier airpower� In 
summation, a typical strike package launched from an Indian carrier not only 
would be small in size but would have relatively limited combat radius and pack 
only a modest combat punch�
Operating Vikramaditya and Vikrant together would not alleviate the above-
mentioned limitations to a significant degree� Walter C� Ladwig III notes that 
the offensive capability of such a combined entity would not match even that of 
the French small-deck carrier Charles de Gaulle, let alone that of an American 
supercarrier�33 Indeed, he believes that New Delhi’s decision to build Vikrant and 
Vishal indigenously “suggests India places a higher priority on enhancing domes-
tic shipbuilding capacity than immediately acquiring naval airpower projection 
capability�”34 Moreover, having the two carriers available for service at the same 
time is not a given� India needs to have at least three flattops to ensure that two 
are operationally ready at any one time, and this would not be practicable until 
INS Vishal enters service, projected for the mid-2020s�35 Vishal, with its fifty to 
sixty planes on board, could mitigate the small-deck carrier problem to some 
extent by sailing with one or more of its predecessors� Joshi compared the pur-
ported daily sortie-generation rate of a Vikramaditya-Vikrant task force with that 
accomplished during prior combat operations and hypothesized that such a force 
would be capable of delivering decent firepower� To illustrate, he argues that the 
number of sorties this task force supposedly could launch is comparable to that 
of the Indian air force (IAF) during the 1999 Kargil War�36
This argument is contentious� Land-based planes tend to accomplish higher 
numbers of sorties than carrier-based ones� Whether the carrier-based planes 
could achieve what Joshi asserts also is open to question, as Indian carriers have 
never partaken in operations against a near-peer opponent such as Pakistan�37 
The idea of deploying carriers together surfaces another conundrum, which 
naval commanders have faced since World War II: whether to disperse or con-
centrate these high-value units� While concentration increases combat power, it 
also raises the issue of whether “too many eggs are placed in one basket,” thereby 
handing the tactical initiative to the adversary�38
With these considerations in mind, it arguably would be foolhardy for India 
to use its carriers to seek “decisive military victory,” as IMMS-2015 states, against 
Pakistan during the initial stages of a conflict, when Islamabad’s A2/AD edifice 
still would be intact�39 In any attempt to impose sea control in the northern 
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Arabian Sea and to interdict Pakistani seaborne commerce by enforcing a block-
ade of major Pakistani maritime nodes, Indian carrier forces would have to 
devote a portion of their already meager airpower to attacking Pakistani vessels, 
thereby exacerbating the conundrum alluded to earlier� What is more, Pakistani 
ships are likely to operate relatively close to their nation’s coast, to be protected 
by Islamabad’s considerable access-denial barrier�
At this juncture, it is worth noting that a blockade led by the original Vikrant 
contributed to New Delhi’s success in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict� Carrier 
aircraft provided the surveillance capabilities that enabled detection of enemy 
ships from a distance, as well as the antisurface capabilities to interdict these ves-
sels� In addition, naval aircraft destroyed riverine craft and bridges across strate-
gic rivers, which prevented Pakistani troops from reaching the Bay of Bengal for 
an evacuation�40 However, notwithstanding the success of the Vikrant task force, 
it must be noted that its operations took place in an area in which only insignifi-
cant Pakistani forces were available to contest Indian naval dominance� The aerial 
threat was limited, as the Pakistani air force had to contend with its Indian coun-
terpart�41 And the Pakistani submarine sent to attack Vikrant was sunk early in 
the conflict� Had this not been the case, Vikrant might have found its work much 
more difficult and its contribution to the war effort diluted� In a future conflict 
with Pakistan, such virtually uncontested Indian operations against Pakistan’s 
maritime assets might not be the order of the day�
Indian carriers inevitably would invite attacks from Islamabad’s A2/AD 
platforms during a war� Aircraft and submarines are the most likely means by 
which Pakistan would attack Indian forces at sea� To be sure, the Pakistani navy 
surface combatant force, with its various frigates and patrol craft, is not insignifi-
cant, but such units are neither as fast in response as aircraft nor as stealthy as 
submarines�42
Most experts argue that Pakistan’s undersea capabilities are particularly omi-
nous�43 Diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), such as Pakistan’s two Hashmats and 
the three newer Khalids, can operate virtually undetectably, thereby representing 
a grave threat to surface forces� However, this is provided the submarine manages 
to detect and track its target in the first place� Owing to their limited speed, SSKs 
will act essentially as mobile minefields, and in this capacity it will be a tall order 
for Pakistani submarines even to find the Indian CBG, unless cued exogenously� 
This is because the northern Arabian Sea is a vast area for a few relatively slow-
moving vessels to cover� While cues provided by Islamabad’s maritime patrol or 
airborne early warning (AEW) planes certainly might help locate the enemy car-
rier, communications and coordination between aircraft and a submerged plat-
form tend to be difficult� Furthermore, while Pakistani submarines could lie in 
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wait along the Indian carrier’s route, successful positioning is highly contingent 
on accurate intelligence�
On the other hand, Pakistani aerial antiship capabilities are arguably more 
ominous for Indian carriers� For one, it is decidedly easier to find and maintain 
contact with the enemy from the air than from under the waves� Pakistan’s mili-
tary aviation arm has a credible antisurface capability, in the form of a dedicated 
antiship squadron of Mirage fighters that have a combat radius of about 1,200 
km and are armed with the Exocet ASCM�44 Islamabad also plans to equip its 
newly acquired JF-17 attack fighters, which have a combat radius of over 1,200 
km, with the Chinese CM-400 AKG ASCM, which can hit targets 180–250 km 
away�45 Modern ASCMs are difficult to detect and shoot down, even for sophis-
ticated warships such as Kolkata- and Visakhapatnam-class destroyers, which 
would be part of an Indian carrier force� The introduction of the supersonic and 
standoff CM-400 AKG into Pakistani service would complicate the protection of 
an Indian CBG�
While the Indian carrier would be vulnerable to the aforementioned threats 
while enforcing a blockade of Pakistan, at least it would be free to exploit its 
mobility to evade detection and attack on the high seas� In contrast, operations 
against land targets would render Indian carriers even more exposed to attack� 
First, the relatively short legs of carrier-based aircraft mean that the carrier would 
have to operate closer to the enemy coastline, making it more vulnerable to A2/
AD threats� Pakistan also can bring more aircraft to bear on an Indian CBG 
when the group operates nearer the Pakistani coast� Furthermore, the Pakistani 
submarine threat would be accentuated, as SSKs are harder to detect in waters 
nearer land� While the carrier could operate farther from land, this would be at 
the expense of its strike-aircraft payloads�
Hence, the Indian carrier force commander would have to weigh the greater 
likelihood of taking hits against the utility, if any, of attacking Pakistani targets 
ashore� As discussed earlier, any such carrier-borne strike package would be 
relatively limited in size and combat power� Indeed, John Mearsheimer has de-
rided naval bombardment of enemy assets ashore as “pinprick warfare,” and this 
description applies well to any Indian carrier-launched attack on Pakistani land 
targets�46 Given that one of the traditional rules governing the employment of 
a fleet is that it should not become “decisively engaged with land forces unless 
decisively superior,” the Indian CBG would be exposing itself to hits, especially 
should it carry out “first day(s) of war” operations against land targets, when 
Islamabad’s A2/AD complex presumably still would be intact�47
Matters are not helped by the ongoing nuclearization of the Pakistani navy— 
in particular, the challenge this may pose regarding Indian naval concentration in 
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the event of war� Islamabad has refused to adopt a no-first-use policy on nuclear 
weapons, and its navy sees nuclear arms as a means to negate Indian superiority 
at sea�48 Pakistan’s naval nuclearization and its lowering of the threshold for use 
of nuclear weapons could face Indian naval planners with another conundrum� 
Should they concentrate their ships, as conventional naval doctrine dictates? Or 
should they disperse them, so a Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon would not wipe 
out, or at least incapacitate, an entire Indian naval task force in a single swoop?49 
Choosing the first option would protect the Indian CBG better against Pakistan’s 
A2/AD threats; choosing the second option would protect better against the 
nuclear threat�
With that said, various observers have maintained that long-range missile 
strikes might be one way to kick down the proverbial access-denial door before 
forces less able to tolerate A2/AD threats, such as carriers, are deployed to the 
area of operations�50 This argument is applicable to the American carrier strike 
group (CSG), given that its Ticonderoga- and Arleigh Burke–class surface war-
ships can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets nine hundred nautical miles 
away�51 In stark contrast, U�S� carrier strike fighters, such as the F/A-18E/F Super 
Hornet currently in service and the upcoming F-35C Lightning, have a combat 
radius of five to six hundred nautical miles�52 With regard to the kicking-down-
of-the-A2/AD-door argument, the American CSG can use its Tomahawks to 
breach enemy defenses during the opening stages of a conflict� The American 
carrier therefore can maintain a greater distance between itself and the enemy, 
then move closer in to deploy its aircraft only when it is safer to do so� The Indian 
CBG, however, cannot hew to this concept of operations in the near future, as its 
escort ships are armed with the relatively short-range BrahMos cruise missile� In-
dian carrier aircraft far outrange this weapon’s 290 km striking reach�53 The main-
stay of the Indian submarine force is its Kilo-class platforms, and they too lack a 
long-range missile capability equivalent to that of their Russian counterparts�54 
Even if they were to have such a capability, their lack of a vertical launch system 
(VLS) precludes the launching of the mass missile attacks needed to overwhelm 
enemy air defenses�55
WHITHER THE OFFENSIVE UTILITY OF THE INDIAN  
CARRIER FORCE?
Going forward, with Indian CBGs hamstrung by various operational limitations, 
is there an offensive role for them to play during a high-intensity conflict?56 Per-
haps not as “first day(s) of war” platforms, when the adversary’s access-denial 
capabilities still would be strong� However, the CBG may have a part—albeit a 
supporting one, at best—once the A2/AD barrier has been breached� As Vice 
Winter2018Review.indb   80 11/1/17   9:56 AM
86
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/12
 H O  8 1
Admiral Pradeep Chauhan (Ret�), a former commanding officer of the decom-
missioned carrier Viraat, once said: “[In the event of a war,] Indian sea control 
would complicate Pakistan’s defence dilemma� In addition to defending 2,900-
odd kilometers of land border, Pakistan would then have to defend an additional 
1,046 kilometers of coastal boundary�”57
Nonetheless, Indian sea control (or at least a working level of it) in the north-
ern Arabian Sea remains contingent on weakening the enemy’s A2/AD edifice; 
only after this was attained could Indian carrier forces play a more prominent 
role in the war� They then could exploit their mobility to carry out the hit-and-
run attacks that would complicate Pakistani defense plans ashore� Indeed, mobil-
ity is one of the key advantages of carrier aviation over its land-based counterpart� 
As Andrew T� Ross and James M� Sandison put it, in history “[t]he mobility of 
aircraft carriers could frequently place them in positions to menace many dif-
ferent targets at once, whereas there was little of this ambiguity surrounding the 
use of land-based aircraft, as they flew from known fixed bases� So, provided the 
enemy knew what types of aircraft were stationed there, he would know what 
range of targets could be menaced and attempt to take adequate precautions�”58 
While Indian carrier-borne raids against shore targets would have limited utility 
(as discussed earlier), such operations could exert a strategic effect, as Islamabad 
might have to divert forces from other fronts to defend against seaborne threats� 
It is worth noting that, deployed in this “cavalry” role, the Indian carrier would 
play a merely supporting role in the overall scheme of things�59
Hence, it may be time for New Delhi to rethink the centrality of the “queen 
of the waves” in its naval planning� It bears consideration that before World War 
II, U�S� naval planners deployed carriers merely to support the battle fleet: naval 
aircraft were to search for enemy battleships, attacking them only if a good op-
portunity arose, so as to weaken them for one’s own battle fleet to deliver the coup 
de grâce� However, over the course of World War II, the flattop came to upstage 
the dreadnought, and the former has been the primus inter pares of warships 
ever since, with surface combatants largely acting as its consorts� However, some 
commentators have argued that the advent of the long-range Tomahawk cruise 
missile and its deployment on the American cruiser/destroyer force could upset 
the current carrier–surface ship nexus in the U�S� Navy� If cruise missile shooters 
were to overshadow carriers during an actual conflict, the relationship will have 
come full circle since World War II�60 If this dynamic materializes, during the 
initial stages of a high-intensity conflict the carrier will act only as an enabler—in 
the surveillance, the air-superiority, and other supporting roles—to enable the 
missile shooters to breach the A2/AD door�
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Missile-armed platforms seem to be the way ahead in maritime warfare, as 
they are highly suited for the access-generating role� As Andrew F� Krepinevich 
puts it, aircraft carriers will “run a high risk of detection and damage or destruc-
tion in a mature maritime precision-strike regime” characterized by robust A2/
AD edifices, adding that “[u]nder these conditions, smaller surface platforms 
with longer-range, survivable strike elements may be attractive for a fleet in a ma-
ture maritime precision-strike regime�”61 Indian naval strategists would do well 
to bear that in mind and make such platforms more central� While one scholar 
makes the case for unmanned systems to alleviate India’s A2/AD problem, just as 
important is the need for more, and deadlier, missile shooters�62
However, the Indian navy currently does not possess a long-range cruise mis-
sile like the Tomahawk� (See table 2�) As discussed earlier, the much-vaunted 
BrahMos missile can hit targets at most 290 km away—well within the Pakistani 
access-denial bubble� (India’s counter-A2/AD dilemma would be mitigated 
should the six-hundred-kilometer-range BrahMos be introduced�)63 To com-
pound matters, currently only surface combatants in the Indian navy are armed 
with cruise missiles, and these are the BrahMos� New Delhi would do well to 
incorporate existing missiles with a greater striking reach, such as the Dhanush 
(range: 750 km) or equip its existing cruise missile–capable assets with new ones, 
such as the Nirbhay (range: one thousand kilometers), currently under develop-
ment�64 It also would be an astute move for India to introduce cruise missiles onto 
Notes:
  ASCM = antiship cruise missile; LACM = land-attack cruise missile.
 a. “BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile.”
 b. “3M-54 Klub/SS-N-27,” GlobalSecurity.org.
 c. “Uran-E,” Rosoboronexport, roe.ru/.
 d. “Nirbhay.”
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its submarines, which arguably are the ideal counter-A2/AD platforms, owing to 
their stealth characteristics�
INDIAN CARRIERS FOR SLOC DEFENSE
While Indian carriers may not be suitable for taking the fight to Pakistan, the fit 
is better in the trade-defense role� This mission would not require their meager 
aircraft complements to be split between attack and force protection�65
New Delhi depends heavily on seaborne trade for its economic well-being, and 
Islamabad therefore would do well to target Indian SLOCs during a conflict�66 
Over 90 percent of India’s global trade by volume and more than 70 percent by 
value is seaborne�67 Most notably, some 75 percent of New Delhi’s crude oil needs 
are imported, of which 58 percent are obtained from Middle Eastern, particularly 
Gulf, sources, according to the U�S� Energy Information Administration�68
The SLOCs linking these sources to India sit astride key Pakistani naval nodes 
in the northern Arabian Sea, which is the maritime domain where combat most 
likely would take place in another major Indo-Pakistani war� There are three such 
nodes: the Pakistani navy’s headquarters in Karachi; the Jinnah submarine base 
in Ormara, 240 km west of Karachi; and Gwadar, another 215 km farther west�69 
In fact, Gwadar is practically coterminous with the entrance to the Gulf of Oman, 
through which much of India’s oil imports pass�70 While there has been much talk 
about India imposing a maritime blockade on Pakistan, the aforementioned geo-
strategic realities mean that Islamabad actually would be in a better position to do 
the same to its adversary� Therefore, the Indian military will find it operationally 
challenging to safeguard its critical Arabian Sea SLOCs in the event of another 
Indo-Pakistani conflict�
However, a CBG can mitigate this problem, and arguably is the best hedge 
against the multidimensional threats that Pakistan poses to India-bound com-
mercial shipping� To ameliorate the threat of Pakistani interdiction of Indian 
SLOCs in the Arabian Sea, a CBG could be deployed to cover the safe passage of 
the convoys most crucial to the Indian war effort� The carrier’s AEW helicopters 
effectively extend the “eyes” of the convoy much farther out, providing advance 
warning of the presence of adversarial elements� How far a naval force is able to 
“see” in the battle space is highly dependent on two key attributes of its AEW as-
sets: combat radius and service ceiling� The Ka-31 AEW helicopter deployed on 
Indian carriers is decent in the aforementioned areas, with a range of six hundred 
kilometers and a service ceiling of 3,500 m�71 Furthermore, the Ka-31’s radar has 
360-degree azimuthal coverage and can detect aircraft and ships up to 150 km 
and 200 km away, respectively�72 Taking their cues from the AEW assets, the car-
rier’s fighters can counter enemy air attacks better�73 Similarly, carrier-borne Ka-
28 ASW helicopters, with an operational reach of up to two hundred kilometers, 
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would enhance significantly the convoy’s defense against hostile submarines by 
detecting them much farther out�74 Indeed, an enemy helicopter deploying its 
dipping sonar is said to be one of the submariner’s worst nightmares�75 All in 
all, modern submarines and their standoff weaponry necessitate the detection 
of undersea threats at a considerable distance from friendly forces� As Ross and 
Sandison put it, “[b]ecause of the huge detection zones involved, it is not a practi-
cal solution to rely exclusively on surface escorts for detection, as an enormous 
number would be required� Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft are the cost-
effective means of performing this function, supported by surface escorts where 
necessary�”76
Although it can be argued that land-based fighter aircraft also can provide 
air cover for convoys in the Arabian Sea, this is valid only to a certain extent, as 
their coverage is limited by their combat radius from their base locations� A CBG 
would be a superior candidate over land-based planes for providing air cover 
for, say, a convoy of tankers carrying much-needed oil for India’s war machine 
that was transiting through the Gulf of Oman and the northwestern part of the 
Arabian Sea� This is because the convoy would be too far away to come under the 
effective aegis of most India-based aircraft� Indeed, a notional India-bound con-
voy at the fringes of the Gulf of Oman is some eight to nine hundred kilometers 
away from the nearest IAF base, at Naliya in western Gujarat State�77 Only the IAF 
platform with the longest legs—the Su-30MKI multipurpose fighter, with a useful 
combat radius of up to a thousand kilometers—can cover that distance comfort-
ably, and even this assumes that the Su-30MKIs are operating from Naliya and 
are flying unopposed in a straight line�78 Moreover, while the Su-30MKI is the 
most numerous tactical aircraft in the IAF inventory, there still are only about 
230 of them, and a significant portion of them would be deployed in other roles 
against Pakistan�79 Although the range of land-based planes can be extended via 
midair refueling, tanker aircraft are essentially defenseless, so would need escorts 
—which would divert yet more assets from other missions� Any Indian navy P-8I 
Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft deployed for submarine-hunting duties in de-
fense of a convoy are similarly vulnerable to Pakistani fighters—and that is where 
Indian carrier airpower would come in very handy�
In addition, even if long-range, shore-based airpower is available for SLOC de-
fense, its effectiveness could be stymied by a lack of the coordination between the 
air force and navy� As Arun Prakash puts it, “Any navy which has operated with or 
tried to orchestrate shore-based tactical air support for naval units will know that 
the command, control, and communication problems at even slightly extended 
ranges can be mind-boggling� The consequences of tying down a fleet to oper-
ate within shore-based air support range cannot be anything but disastrous�”80 
Granted, Prakash was an admiral in the Indian navy, and a carrier aviator at that� 
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However, his words do have merit, considering that the Indian armed forces still 
struggle to achieve jointness, despite having taken steps to do so. As Bernard Cole 
puts it, jointness is “much more a goal than a reality.”81 In the same vein, Joshi 
observes that “Indian institutions remain very far from the inter-service integra-
tion seen in other power-projecting states.”82
Sea-based aviation is more suitable for SLOC defense than its land-based 
counterpart for two additional reasons. First, the loiter time of carrier planes in 
the area of operations (AO) would be significantly longer, as they need not transit 
from land bases.83 Indeed, having a flattop in the AO enables sustained coverage 
of friendly forces at sea. To illustrate, during World War II carrier aircraft could 
be back in action within a short period after combat, as the process of refueling, 
rearming, and aircrew debriefing could take as little as seven minutes.84 In con-
trast, land-based aircraft would have to make a longer journey back to base after 
depleting their ordnance and fuel in combat. As a corollary, owing to the longer 
transit time involved in flying from airfields ashore to the AO, crew fatigue could 
reduce the combat effectiveness of land-based airpower.85 To be sure, convoys 
would be just as vulnerable to the threats delineated earlier; however, the aircraft 
on board whichever carrier was assigned to convoy protection would be devoted 
mainly to defense—hence the offense-versus-defense dilemma presented earlier 
would be less acute. This would increase the survivability of the convoy.
All in all, the defense of Indian convoys in the Arabian Sea—the maritime 
domain in which combat almost certainly would take place in a conflict with 
Pakistan—is undertaken best by a CBG with its organic airpower, as the critical 
western and northern portions of the body of water are, for the most part, bet-
ter covered by naval than by land-based aircraft. It is noteworthy that this role is 
akin to that routinely performed by the unglamorous and often overshadowed 
escort carriers of World War II. During the Battle of the Atlantic, such vessels of-
ten were deployed with Allied convoys to fend off attacks from German U-boats 
and bombers.86 This conclusion is rather paradoxical, in that it leaves the largest 
and most expensive platforms in the Indian military arsenal performing less-
prestigious defensive duties during a major war. Tellingly, the same could be said 
about China’s carriers. Liaoning and the slightly more capable Type 001A that 
currently is undergoing sea trials are STOBAR configured, and thus would suffer 
from the small-deck carrier affliction during a high-intensity fight against a foe 
of considerable A2/AD capability.87 Much like Indian carriers, the two Chinese 
flattops simply do not have a large and capable enough aircraft complement to 
project force like American supercarriers.88
If a fifth Indo-Pakistani war breaks out within the next several years, the Indian 
aircraft carrier is likely to be of limited usefulness in offensive roles. This is 
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because the small aircraft complement of either Vikramaditya or the upcoming 
Vikrant brings to the fore the light-carrier quandary that afflicts Indian carrier 
forces� If Indian flattops were to be deployed in traditional offensive roles— 
striking at the enemy’s maritime and land targets—they also would be rendered 
more vulnerable to Pakistan’s increasingly potent A2/AD complex� With this 
complex looming large, would the Indians be even more cautious in their de-
ployment of carriers? Indeed, would the Indians put their carriers totally out of 
harm’s way, like when they deployed Vikrant to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 
conflict because of the threat that Pakistani submarines posed in the Arabian 
Sea?89 The answer remains to be seen, but—bearing in mind the points raised in 
this article—it probably is yes�
This article has put forth a number of recommendations that could alleviate 
the Indian navy’s A2/AD problem, such as focusing more on missile-armed plat-
forms� To be sure, moving away from a carrier-centric force would not gain trac-
tion with many Indian defense planners, but the alternative—Indian CBGs being 
rendered less survivable and less combat effective during wartime—is much 
worse� Militaries are often hidebound entities that resist far-reaching change, 
and the Indian navy is likely to be no exception� In the light of the challenges that 
not only could limit severely the utility of India’s much-vaunted carrier force but 
could endanger it as well during a war with a near-peer adversary such as Paki-
stan, India should do some serious evaluation and consider measures to address 
the issue�
An observer once described U�S� carriers as “little more than political instru-
ments, not real war fighters�”90 This statement has an element of truth, to the 
extent that carriers of any nation have not been tested in the crucible of high-end 
combat since 1945� After all, during the postwar period even the mighty U�S� 
supercarrier has been deployed only in highly permissive operational milieus 
against third-rate adversaries that could not contest control of the sea�91 One also 
must bear in mind that the aforementioned observer was referring to a platform 
that is decidedly superior, in terms of capabilities, to its Indian counterpart� 
Would a similar, or even more hard-hitting, statement be heard in the future in 
the context of an Indo-Pakistani (or, in the more distant future, a Sino-Indian) 
naval confrontation? One hopes we will never find out�
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astride the Arabian Sea AO, and any Indian 
air force assets providing air cover for their 
brethren at sea would have to grapple with 
the full gamut of Pakistani resistance along 
the coast as well as the “tyranny of distance�”
 88� It is believed that the Type 001A carrier 
can deploy perhaps a handful more aircraft 
compared with Liaoning’s thirty-odd-strong 
air wing� “What Do We Know (So Far) about 
China’s Second Aircraft Carrier?,” China- 
Power, chinapower�csis�org/� Commenting on 
Liaoning, a number of defense experts con-
tend that it will “confer prestige on a rising 
great power, help the Chinese military master 
basic procedures, and project a bit of power 
[emphasis added]—perhaps especially against 
the smaller neighbors on the periphery of 
the South China Sea�” Andrew S� Erickson, 
Abraham M� Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, 
“Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’ and Future Steps: 
Alternatives and Implications,” Naval War 
College Review 65, no� 1 (Winter 2012), p� 28�
 89� Mathew, “Aircraft Carriers,” p� 2149�
 90� Quoted in Martin van Creveld, The Age of 
Airpower (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011),  
p� 167�
 91� One commentator even describes the U�S� 
supercarrier as a “flat-track bully that domi-
nates an inferior adversary who cannot really 
fight back�” Ho, “The Combat Utility of the 
U�S� Fleet Aircraft Carrier,” p� 82�
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FROM A PRESTIGE FLEET TO THE JEUNE ÉCOLE
 The latter half of the mid-nineteenth century was a period of tremendous and continuous naval transformation—much like the current time� In many 
ways, twenty-first-century politicians and admirals are arguing in a climate of 
uncertainty reminiscent of that surrounding the debates that took place in those 
earlier years� As today, authorities then sought to conciliate conflicting views 
shaped by the rapid introduction of expensive technologies at sea, the rise of 
new contenders seeking to challenge the dominating naval power through direct 
competition or asymmetric warfare, and the ongoing competition for funding 
among military services that could not agree on a common strategy to face dif-
ferent enemies�
These parallels are not a new idea, and several authors have explored this 
theme in past years, such as renowned British historian Paul M� Kennedy, who 
recently published an updated version of his 1976 
classic, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 
with a lengthy foreword that links past with pres-
ent most effectively�1 Other works often compare 
the travails of Great Britain then and the United 
States today, and replace Germany with China as 
the rising competitor� Much can be gained from 
the study of this analogy; but it also can be overly 
reductionist, as others have argued�2
It is in this context that the study of France’s 
naval experience during that period, somewhat 
neglected in the English-language literature in 
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recent years except for Norwegian author Arne Røksund’s 2007 volume on the 
Jeune École, offers an alternative source of relevant insight�3 Napoleon III pro-
claimed an egotistical Second Empire in 1852, only to see it go down to humili-
ating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71� From the ashes of empire 
arose the Third Republic, but the latter would suffer its own dramatic loss of face 
as a result of France’s last major diplomatic confrontation with Great Britain, the 
Fashoda crisis of 1898�
Within that time span, France initially proved capable of leveraging the 
extraordinary technological revolution then under way to assemble a potent 
naval force, second only to that of its nemesis, the Royal Navy (RN)� Even as the 
French force grew in size and complexity, it often was described as the emperor’s 
“prestige fleet”; without a defined strategy, it seemed unable to contribute to 
the defense of the nation in 1870� Under the Third Republic, proponents of the 
Jeune École first formulated a strategy founded on these same technological 
advances to shape a different fleet, one trumpeted as being capable of under-
mining Great Britain’s superiority at sea through what would be labeled asym-
metry today� This policy also proved flawed, as the Marine nationale failed to 
make a difference during the 1898 confrontation on the upper reaches of the 
Nile River�4
The period in question illustrates the requirement for naval policy and strat-
egy to be coordinated closely and founded on a realistic appraisal of a country’s 
security and foreign policy needs; an objective assessment of the technologies 
available; and the careful acquisition of naval advice whose independence from 
national politics and party affiliation is preserved, so that enduring political sup-
port for a single, long-term shipbuilding program can be secured� This article 
will show that the naval policy pursued under the Second Empire generated a 
viable, balanced fleet, but lack of a clearly formulated strategic purpose seemingly 
left it irrelevant during France’s hour of greatest need� The Jeune École then put 
a narrow strategy ahead of the practical limitations that any viable policy must 
take into account when funding the building of a fleet� Both approaches failed, 
leaving a bitter legacy that greatly affected France’s ability to leverage sea power 
to mitigate its difficult position on the eve of the First World War�
First, though, this article must review earlier naval developments, shaped 
as they were by those same effervescent technological developments at sea and 
contrasting geopolitical ambitions on land that would continue to affect French 
naval thought for the remainder of the nineteenth century� In the wake of the 
Napoleonic Wars, technical achievements and developments on the international 
scene quickly persuaded the country’s leadership of the importance of sea power, 
but debates over the shape this instrument should take endured through the 
remainder of the century�
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FROM ONE EMPEROR TO THE NEXT
French inventors of varied backgrounds often took the lead in developing the 
technologies that came to revolutionize war at sea in the decades that followed 
the downfall of Emperor Napoleon I� By far the most transformational element 
during that early period was the use of steam for propulsion, to escape the vaga-
ries of wind power� In 1824, engineer Jean Baptiste Marestier traveled overseas 
to study this potent tool and published a monograph that was well ahead of its 
time, A Memoir on Steamboats of the United States of America�5 The naval budget 
of 1826 included funds for building four vessels to experiment with steam pro-
pulsion, and France’s first successful steam warship, the 910-ton paddle steamer 
Sphinx, was launched in 1829�6 Inventor Pierre Sauvage then patented the propel-
ler, whose placement below the waterline at the stern of the vessel alleviated the 
disadvantages of having large paddle wheels affixed to a ship’s sides; the concept 
was tested with the construction of the dispatch vessel Le Corse in 1843�7 Such 
tremendous progress led to the launch of Napoléon in 1850, the first purpose-
built steam battleship in the world and the lead ship of a class of nine such ves-
sels built over the following decade� Napoléon carried ninety guns and used the 
combination of steam and propeller to reach a speed of fourteen knots (while 
keeping a sail and rigging as a secondary means of propulsion for economical 
long-distance cruising)�8
In parallel with these technological advances, events on the world scene fol-
lowing the Bourbon Restoration of 1815 convinced France’s political leadership 
of the necessity to rebuild a credible navy� Spikes of instability and low-level 
conflicts flared up frequently as a result of the slow decay of the Ottoman Empire 
and of Spain, necessitating intervention by warships to defend French interests in 
Europe and overseas� A military revolt in Cádiz prompted Paris to dispatch army 
and naval forces to Spain in 1823 to support the Bourbon king Ferdinand VII, 
while taking the side of the insurgents against the Ottomans during the Greek 
War of Independence in 1821–30�9 France maintained naval forces in the Levant 
throughout these years, even forming a combined fleet with Great Britain and 
Russia that destroyed a Turkish-Egyptian force anchored in the Bay of Navarino 
in 1827, the last major naval battle of the sail era�10 Paris also dispatched naval 
vessels in 1831 during civil unrest in Portugal and to Ancona, on Italy’s Adriatic 
coast, because of fighting among Italian nationalists, Austrian troops, and the 
Papal States�11
Spanish withdrawal from South America and the Caribbean, as well as the 
degeneration of Ottoman influence in North Africa, led to repeated naval ex-
peditions to tame virulent piracy through the reigns of French kings Charles X 
(1824–30) and Louis Philippe (1830–48)� These often included punitive raids 
against cities and local potentates who provided safe havens to the pirates�
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In the case of Algeria, such raids failed to provide a permanent solution to the 
threat the Barbary corsairs posed, leading to the occupation of Algiers in 1830 
and the eventual annexation of the entire Algerian coast over the course of the 
following decade� The expedition against Algiers was especially noteworthy, as it 
constituted the largest amphibious operation conducted during the age of sail� A 
fleet of thirty-five major warships and three hundred transports (including seven 
steamships used to tow smaller vessels to shore) landed an expeditionary force 
of 37,000 men near the coastal town of Sidi Ferruch (now Sidi Fredj) on June 14, 
1830� This action, and the effective naval bombardment delivered to support the 
attack against Algiers two weeks later, as well as the considerable logistical effort 
required to sustain the expeditionary force from the sea through the following 
months, showed the impressive level of professionalism and growing reach of La 
Royale�12
Such reach was demonstrated further as French explorers continued map-
ping out the Indian and Pacific Oceans and annexing new possessions along the 
way, from the Comoros off the eastern coast of Africa to the islands that would 
become French Polynesia, while securing a foothold in Madagascar and greater 
access to China through the Treaty of Whampoa in 1845�13
Nevertheless, the limits of French sea power in that era were exposed clearly 
whenever it clashed with British benevolence, as would be demonstrated in 1839 
and again in 1840� In the first instance, a French merchant had claimed prop-
erty damages incurred during the civil unrest that plagued the early years of the 
Mexican Republic, but failed to obtain compensation� Using this as a casus belli, 
France dispatched a naval force to occupy Veracruz in December 1838; French 
ships also enforced a blockade of the ports on the Gulf of Mexico� However, the 
local authorities still refused to pay compensation� As the crisis dragged into 
1839, Great Britain grew concerned about the resulting instability and the true 
extent of French ambitions in the region� An RN squadron arrived on the scene 
that March and soon forced a diplomatic resolution through an implied threat to 
both parties� Mexico blinked first and agreed to pay�14 This apparent success of 
France on behalf of its aggrieved citizen proved misleading, as it was British sea 
power that actually resolved the standoff, while the French squadron would not 
have been able to resist effectively had London favored Mexico in the dispute�
The limit of French influence was again in evidence the following year, during 
the so-called Near East crisis of 1840� Although nominally subservient to the Ot-
toman Empire, Muhammad Ali Pasha had consolidated his personal power over 
Egypt through the previous decades� He then undertook a military campaign to 
move into those territories corresponding to today’s Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, 
and Syria� These actions benefited from the support of France, which provided 
naval and military instructors to the budding Egyptian army and navy in a bid to 
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grow French influence in the Middle East� This scheme backfired dramatically 
when Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed the Convention for the 
Pacification of the Levant (known as the Convention of London) in July 1840 to 
guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire� When Muhammad Ali refused to 
recognize the treaty, the European powers dispatched a naval force that blockad-
ed Egypt, neutralized his fleet, and expelled his troops from Syria and Lebanon, 
leaving him in control of only the province of Acre (Israel and Palestine)�15 With 
France isolated within the Concert of Europe and unable to mobilize sufficient 
naval strength to support its Egyptian protégé, Paris could only acquiesce in the 
fait accompli, despite considerable outcry from the French public�
The thirty years following the Bourbon Restoration thus had witnessed a re-
surgence of the French navy, a renewal that provided successive French monarchs 
with a potent instrument that often succeeded in influencing events in Europe 
and overseas, within the larger framework of Pax Britannica� Nevertheless, the 
events of 1839 in Mexico and 1840 in the Middle East had shown clearly the lim-
its of that same fleet, particularly in view of Great Britain’s continued superiority 
in traditional ships of the line� The trauma of the Near East crisis gave renewed 
impetus to those who perceived that fast-evolving technologies should be lever-
aged to circumvent the Royal Navy’s supremacy at sea�16 Instead of attempting to 
narrow the gap in terms of the classical sailing man-of-war, France perhaps could 
initiate new building plans to launch increased numbers of steam-propelled war-
ships that would make the British fleet obsolete at once and allow France to seize 
the lead�
The proponents of such views came to be called the “Modernists” or the 
“Materialists�” They claimed that material superiority of technical means would 
trump simple quantity in numbers of ships of the line and those strategic factors 
that historically had conferred an undue advantage on Great Britain, the island 
nation, over France, the continental power with exposed coastlines and vulner-
able colonies�
This discourse was particularly timely in view of France’s frail economy at 
the time; it was in no condition to subsidize the building of capital ships on a 
scale that would threaten Britain’s numerical lead� The failing monarchy of Louis 
Philippe actually had to cut naval estimates in 1837 and directed that twenty of 
the navy’s forty ships of the line be kept in reserve, as their timber would stay 
preserved better ashore on the building ways than afloat� The experiences of 
1839 and 1840, though, demonstrated that readying the ships for sea, mustering 
and training the required crews, and acquiring the necessary stores to support 
them could not be completed in a timely manner when faced with an unexpected 
crisis�17
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Following the fall of the government of Adolphe Thiers over the Near East 
crisis, further public outcry led to the convening in 1844 of a special commission 
to study the use of steam technology at sea�18 This venue provided great impe-
tus for the Materialists to promote their views, openly seeking “near equality to 
England in number of ships and superiority in technical skills�”19 The commis-
sion endorsed such ambitions and King Louis Philippe agreed to subsidize this 
plan through a large increase to navy estimates in 1846–47� This led to a “French 
naval scare” in Great Britain and its rapid construction of new steam warships to 
remain ahead of France�20
Although the February 1848 revolution in Paris and the ensuing instability 
under the short-lived Second Republic impeded the growth of the French navy, 
important resources continued to be dedicated to the construction of warships, 
including the previously mentioned Napoléon, launched in 1850�21 By the time 
Napoleon III proclaimed the Second Empire in December 1852, he already had 
encouraged the growth of La Royale and gained important support in promoting 
a modern navy capable of rivaling Great Britain’s�22 It remained to be seen what 
use France could make of such an instrument as the emperor set about reassert-
ing French influence in Europe and overseas�
NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE SECOND EMPIRE
Intent on renewing France’s imperial glory but aware of the limits of military 
power for achieving a dominant stature in Europe, Napoleon III embarked on a 
bold program structured around three pillars�23
First, despite the economic recession of the previous decade, France grew 
prosperous through the 1850s as domestic industries were driven to modern-
ize and leverage new efficiencies gained through the advances of the industrial 
age� Although he proclaimed an imperial regime, the new monarch was careful 
to nurture a free economy based largely on the liberal tenets of the time� This 
made goods from France increasingly competitive on world markets, leading to 
the development of considerable economic interests overseas as French business 
acquired larger market shares around the world�24
This economic growth paralleled a renewed interest in colonial expansion, the 
second pillar of the emperor’s program�25 France may have lost its most prized 
possessions during the Napoleonic Wars but had managed to retain footholds 
around the periphery of the British Empire and gained new possessions during 
the following decades, from North Africa to the Pacific� Napoleon III sought 
further expansion through the 1850s and 1860s, carefully encroaching on those 
territories that did not involve direct confrontation with other European powers, 
such as in Southeast Asia and western Africa� Public support for such endeavors 
grew through these years as successive governments emphasized the community 
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of interests between the economic gains the Right sought and the noble purpose 
of France’s mission civilisatrice, which was more palatable to the Left�
This imperial renaissance required a third pillar: naval forces to protect French 
territories and interests around the world� Stability on the European continent 
left the country’s land borders momentarily secured, allowing Napoleon III to 
dedicate much attention to his navy as he sought the next opportunity to dem-
onstrate that France had regained a place of influence within the Concert of 
Europe� Another crisis related to the decline of the Ottoman Empire provided 
just that� A seemingly insignificant dispute between France and Russia over the 
responsibility to be “Protector of the Christians in the Holy Land” left Ottoman 
leaders equivocating about which of the two countries would retain this nominal 
title� Tsar Nicholas I used the opportunity simultaneously to challenge the grow-
ing influence of France in Constantinople and to raise anew a long-standing 
demand for access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits� A first ulti-
matum conveyed from Saint Petersburg in February 1853 demanded the ceding 
of all provinces between the Danube and the Dardanelles, free access through 
the straits, and the protection of all Turkish Christian minorities� Confident 
of the support of the other European powers, the Ottoman rulers ignored this 
challenge—and the diplomatic crisis led to war�26
While England and France did not join the conflict immediately, they were 
sufficiently concerned about Russian ambitions to dispatch naval forces to the 
Levant once again� The ships made their way up to Constantinople in a show 
of force, but Russia was undeterred, having already destroyed the Turkish Black 
Sea fleet anchored in the Anatolian port of Sinope in November 1853 while Rus-
sian armies advanced across the Danube and into eastern Anatolia�27 Napoleon 
III grew increasingly strident about an intervention to succor the “sick man of 
Europe,” and Great Britain agreed to join France in declaring war against tsarist 
Russia in April 1854� Additional naval squadrons were dispatched promptly and 
expeditionary forces were embarked in British and French transports� Within 
months, the coalition had secured control of the Black Sea, blockading the Rus-
sian squadron in the fortress of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula and repeat-
edly bombarding the city of Odessa�28
After a first foray ashore in June to stop the Russian offensive through Bul-
garia, the combined expeditionary force was reembarked and landed in Septem-
ber 1854 to lay siege to Sevastopol itself� The remainder of the land campaign 
became bogged down, and poor logistics combined with dismal sanitary condi-
tions ashore to inflict a dire cost on the expeditionary force� The reputations of 
both the French and British armies suffered greatly as a result of their lackluster 
performance�29
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Nonetheless, after hostilities came to an end in March 1856, La Royale could 
boast of several achievements�30 Napoleon III’s navy had acted as an equal to the 
Royal Navy during several naval and joint operations, from securing command 
of the Black Sea to transporting an expeditionary force of 28,000 men to the 
theater of operations, successfully landing it first in Bulgaria and then outside 
Sevastopol� The French navy was able to supply this force from the sea for two 
years while keeping the tsarist fleet bottled up in port and providing effective fire 
support to troops on land� Naval operations also took place along the periphery 
of the Russian Empire, with smaller squadrons deployed in the Baltic and the 
Pacific�31 These operations may not have affected hostilities in Crimea directly, 
but they did result in Russia dispersing forces that were needed badly on the main 
front� European politicians and strategists, especially in Great Britain, took note 
of the French ability to operate large naval forces globally�32
The war left the French navy in an enviable position� It was the object of impe-
rial pride for Napoleon III, while political circles and public opinion supported 
continued investment in the fleet� Increased budgets were approved, allowing 
naval architects to integrate lessons from the Crimean War into new ship de-
signs that reflected the trinity of steam, the explosive shell, and armor plating� 
France again took the technical lead and began work on the first oceangoing 
ironclad, La Gloire�33 The new line of ships that followed was but one element 
of a balanced force that was funded through the unprecedented naval estimates 
of 1857� This milestone measure provided for “three fleets: one of battleships to 
uphold France’s position in Europe, one of ships for foreign stations to make her 
respected abroad, and one of transports and gunboats either to conduct colonial 
expeditions or to land and support troops in another Crimean War�”34 This pro-
gram envisioned the building of forty ironclads; twenty armored frigates; ninety 
corvettes, gunboats, and other auxiliary units; and seventy-five troop transports 
capable of embarking forty thousand men and twelve thousand horses�35
However, this naval renaissance came to naught over the course of the follow-
ing decade� It remained shaped by preparations for a confrontation with Great 
Britain� The French navy continued to seek near equality in numbers, superior 
fighting efficiency, and the bold adoption of every technical innovation at sea 
to gain even a limited advantage over the Royal Navy�36 Although France was 
successful in repeatedly achieving technical superiority in the areas of steam 
propulsion, naval gunnery, and ship’s side armor, each instance only gave rise to 
another race—which the Royal Navy set about winning� Once Britain’s leaders 
abandoned their affiliation with sail and the government allocated the required 
funds, the country easily achieved a commanding lead in new construction by 
the mid-1860s� Even the vainglorious Napoleon III had to admit that maintain-
ing near parity was beyond French means, and the 1857 plan was scaled down in 
Winter2018Review.indb   100 11/1/17   9:56 AM
106
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/12
 C A N U E L  1 0 1
1863 and again in 1865�37 As for the fighting efficiency of French sailors over their 
British counterparts, their grit was never tested during the years of the Second 
Empire� Although La Royale continued preparing for a decisive engagement with 
the Royal Navy, this did not come to pass, as a much more dangerous threat took 
shape on the Continent, making the French navy seemingly irrelevant during the 
country’s hour of greatest need�
1870: NEITHER VICTORIOUS NOR DEFEATED
The French amirauté (admiralty) was ill prepared for the coming war� Focused 
on the competition with Great Britain and expansion overseas, it had dedicated 
little intellectual effort to figuring out how to leverage sea power against Prussia� 
The Marine impériale benefited from an overwhelming preponderance over the 
fledgling Norddeutsche Bundesmarine (North German Confederation Navy), 
formed in 1867� France could deploy some four hundred vessels (including 
thirty-four ironclads) crewed by 28,000 men, while Prussia and its allies could 
muster only 6,200 sailors manning thirty-four vessels, of which only five could 
be considered seagoing ironclads�38
Such superiority would be of little use, however, unless it could be employed 
effectively against the enemy, and the French quickly elaborated naval plans to do 
just that� They sought to defeat ironclads at sea, raid the naval bases at Wilhelms-
haven on the North Sea and Kiel in the Baltic, blockade commercial ports and 
destroy shipping overseas, and land an army corps on the northern coast of the 
North German Confederation to relieve pressure on the main land front�39
Such objectives may have appeared sound at the time, but they were based 
on flawed assumptions� Once war came, the Confederation Navy stayed in port, 
denying French admirals the opportunity to destroy enemy capital ships—the 
ironclads—through battle at sea� Raids against Wilhelmshaven and Kiel were 
considered, but new technologies such as marine mines and torpedoes launched 
from shore, combined with formidable coastal batteries, made such expeditions 
too risky� French ships were more successful in blockading enemy cruisers iso-
lated in neutral ports overseas, but the interdiction of commercial shipping was 
undermined greatly by France’s reluctance to stop those ships that sailed under 
the red ensign (flown by British merchant vessels), fearing to alienate Great Brit-
ain� Lastly, prewar studies had concluded that amphibious operations against the 
enemy coast could take place only in the Baltic, in view of the extensive shallows 
along the North Sea shore� Such an expedition, in turn, would require an active 
alliance with Denmark, or at least its benevolent neutrality—neither of which was 
forthcoming during the hostilities�40
Worst, though, was that all these contingencies presupposed the readiness 
of the French fleet to undertake such operations at the beginning of hostilities 
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in 1870, but this was not the case� When Prince Otto von Bismarck, minister- 
president of the Kingdom of Prussia and chancellor of the North German Con-
federation, succeeded in goading Napoleon III into declaring war on July 19, 
French naval leaders were caught unprepared to launch large-scale operations� 
Many ships were in refit, while others remained deployed overseas; large num-
bers of reservists were unavailable, as they already had sailed for the summer 
Newfoundland fisheries; and orders for the required stocks of coal, food, and 
other supplies had yet to be fulfilled� These challenges, compounded by the deci-
sion to maintain large forces in the Mediterranean to guard transports ferrying 
troops from Algeria to the métropole despite the obvious absence of a German 
threat in that theater, directly led to the failure to intercept enemy ironclads re-
turning home that summer after an extensive maintenance period contracted to 
British firms�41
The French fleet eventually conducted two large-scale demonstrations off the 
German coast, but they achieved little, and the single naval battle of the war was 
an inconclusive engagement between two small gunboats (the French Bouvet and 
the German Meteor) near Cuba in November�42 As the French army crumbled 
and Napoleon III surrendered at Sedan, the fleet was ordered back to Cherbourg 
in September to land its heavy guns for the defense of Paris� This was an inglori-
ous end to the naval war, although French sailors would distinguish themselves 
ashore in the following months�43
FROM THE SECOND EMPIRE TO THE THIRD REPUBLIC
Following an armistice in January 1871, the French government agreed to the 
terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt on May 10� The Second Empire already had 
given way to the Third Republic by then, following a populist coup in September 
1870, but the monarchist Adolphe Thiers—the premier who had resigned in the 
wake of the Near East crisis of 1840—eventually formed a provisional cabinet of 
conservative, rural, middle-class politicians in February 1871� Priority went to 
repaying the war indemnity, to put an end to the German occupation�44
Meanwhile, a climate of revanchisme quickly seized France, so the military 
leadership set about rebuilding the French army—and studying the lessons from 
the preceding conflict�45 Despite the exceptional performance of the navy’s of-
ficers and sailors ashore, the service’s future and its very raison d’être came under 
close scrutiny at the time� In the wake of the navy’s inability to contribute to the 
defense of the nation, many denounced the fleet as a mere instrument of imperial 
prestige and challenged the legitimacy of continued investment in ships� Even 
Thiers’s ministre de la marine, retired admiral Louis Pothuau, lamented that “[a]ll 
our efforts must be concentrated on land� Indeed, what good will a navy be to 
us now?”46 This context gave rise to several radical proposals� Some promoted 
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the liquidation of all naval assets except those required for close coastal defense� 
Others sought to retain just a few sailing ships to train personnel who would be 
mobilized in the event of war to man a fleet of commerce destroyers improvised 
from existing merchant vessels�47
Nevertheless, Pothuau was able in 1872 to deliver naval estimates along 
more conservative lines, shaping the Marine nationale for the next two decades� 
Although the budget was cut dramatically from 210 to 146 million francs and 
severely curtailed the original building plan of 1857, the program of 1872 still 
envisioned a fleet of 215 ships—namely, twenty-six ironclad battleships, thirty-
four cruisers, twenty coastal-defense ships, eighteen corvettes, thirty-two gun-
boats, twenty-five troop transports, and sixty auxiliary vessels�48 While a pale 
reflection of Napoleon III’s ambition to build a navy of 430 ships, this mix did 
reflect a remarkable continuity in seeking a balanced force that encompassed 
units of the line for fleet engagements, cruisers and gunboats for overseas work, 
and troop transports for amphibious operations� Such a construct was required 
to pursue the obligations that Minister Pothuau envisioned in 1872: maintain a 
battle and training fleet at home (the Squadron of Evolutions), defend stations 
overseas, renew the fleet’s material readiness, and sustain schools ashore to con-
tinue generating officers and sailors trained in the technical skills that modern 
warfare required�49
This plan showed some willingness to take into account lessons learned from 
past conflicts, such as the continued requirement for troop transports that had 
become evident during the Crimean War, and to acknowledge contemporary 
practicalities, such as the necessity for a colonial power with worldwide interests 
to deploy long-range cruisers and smaller gunboats� Nevertheless, most senior 
officers continued to posit that any future confrontation at sea would take the 
shape of a Nelsonian engagement between massed fleets in a replay of Trafalgar, 
regardless of the technical innovations that had occurred since 1805� Some earlier 
authors—namely, Baron Pierre-Barthélémy Portal (minister for the navy and the 
colonies, 1818–21) and Vice Admiral Jean-Baptiste Grivel, in the 1830s—had 
professed their belief in guerre de course (commerce warfare) as a viable alterna-
tive to seeking an engagement with the Royal Navy’s main battle fleet, but few 
championed this approach in the early days of the Third Republic�50
After the Thiers government relinquished power in 1873, the program of 1872 
was pursued haphazardly even as the British navy was gaining strength from the 
building plans initiated in the 1860s�51 Meanwhile, Russia as well as Germany 
and newly unified Italy launched extensive shipbuilding programs that sought 
to incorporate the latest technological innovations and lessons learned from the 
recent American Civil War; they all rapidly whittled away at France’s advantage 
in modern warships�52
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The context was ripe for a new strategy that sought to move beyond the Nelso-
nian tradition by leveraging technological innovations to allow France to resume 
its position as an influential continental power even as it faced an array of new 
opponents at sea� But it remained to be seen who would seize this opportunity�
THE RISE OF THE JEUNE ÉCOLE . . .
The French Materialists of the 1840s had sought but failed to define a strategy 
that would shake Great Britain’s command of the sea through technological 
advances� One author eventually commented on the potential for technology 
to undermine such numerical superiority in a new way, promoting a form of 
asymmetric warfare and laying the foundation for what would mature into the 
Jeune École in the following decades� Captain Baron Richild Grivel, son of the 
previously mentioned Vice Admiral Grivel, in 1869 published an important essay 
built on two fundamental assertions� First, the French historical experience had 
shown that great encounters between battle fleets represented a severe danger to 
the weaker naval power� Second, the French navy did not face one kind of enemy 
but two, in that in the future it likely would be called on to confront a powerful 
Great Britain on the one hand and continental powers, weaker in terms of naval 
strength, on the other� Building a fleet solely dedicated to challenging RN com-
mand of the sea was futile� The Marine nationale should be organized to confront 
the navies of those weaker powers through fleet engagements and undermine 
England’s command of the sea through commerce raiding�53 Such a proposition 
was not that revolutionary in and of itself, but it did underline a critical vulner-
ability for Great Britain, as Arne Røksund covered so well in his 2007 study, The 
Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak�
Grivel concluded that, instead of attacking Britain’s strongest point—the twenty 
thousand cannon of the Royal Navy—France should aim for its weak spot—the 
fifty thousand merchant vessels transporting the riches on which British prosper-
ity depended� He argued that this was a form of warfare in which France would be 
able to engage for an indefinite period; however, it was not likely that this cruiser 
warfare would have to last longer than a couple of years, since most certainly it 
would lead to a substantial rise in insurance rates, and after two or three years 
no one would entrust goods to British ships� Britain’s principal source of national 
wealth would dry up�54
In the 1870s, this proposal was explored further by another serving naval of-
ficer, Captain Théophile Aube, who would rise to the rank of admiral and imple-
ment his ideas as ministre de la marine a decade later� He took Grivel’s emphasis 
on commerce warfare one step further by dethroning the ship of the line as the 
foundation of naval power� He described a future when technological advances 
would slow down and fleets would mature to a steady state, somewhat akin to the 
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latter part of the age of sail� All naval powers eventually would achieve the same 
level of technological development and qualitative readiness, reaching a stage 
in which in any given conflict one fleet’s superiority would be obvious solely on 
the basis of numbers� As the weaker side then would not risk its battleships, the 
guerre d’escadre (fleet engagement) would be obsolete�55 Aube was also a fervent 
colonialist who believed that the strength of nations would depend on their 
overseas possessions� Hence, while accepting, in the wake of the Franco-Prussian 
War, the requirement to rebuild the army to secure the country’s land borders, he 
proposed that guerre de course would be key to maintaining access to colonies 
and severing an enemy’s link to such resources overseas, be it a maritime or con-
tinental power� This train of thought eventually caused Aube, unlike Grivel, to 
posit that commerce warfare would constitute the strategy of choice against both 
superior and inferior naval powers, and that the humble torpedo boat would be 
the new “capital ship�”56
This approach came to be known as the Jeune École, the “Young School,” 
as its proponents were often those younger officers willing to challenge their 
seniors who appeared to stand for the status quo and the primacy of the ship 
of the line� The debate grew through the late 1870s and into the 1880s as most 
navies, including those of France and Great Britain, acquired torpedo boats and 
fast cruisers that prioritized speed and quick-firing armament over armor and 
heavy guns� Advocates of the torpedo boat were encouraged greatly by the initial 
success of these craft during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, especially when 
a Russian force conducted the first recorded engagement of enemy vessels with 
ship-launched, self-propelled torpedoes in January 1877�57 Further success en-
sued when two torpedo boats joined France’s Far East Squadron, commanded by 
Admiral Amédée Courbet, then engaged in the Sino-French War of 1884–85�58 
The hostilities (resulting from the clash of influence between the two powers over 
Vietnam) were marked by several engagements in which torpedo boats played 
some role and inflicted actual damages on modern Chinese ironclads acquired 
from European yards�
Proponents of the Jeune École seized on these isolated episodes as they took 
the debate over the future of the French navy to the public� Publicists and radical 
pamphleteers, such as journalist Gabriel Charmes, built on the academic work of 
serving and retired officers to vilify the naval hierarchy for the apparent short-
comings of 1870� They also denounced the reluctance of the powers that be to 
endorse new technologies and fashion a revolutionary doctrine that would sup-
port French policies better on the Continent and overseas�59
The Concert of Europe had crumbled in the wake of the Franco-Prussian 
War and Germany’s imperial ambitions signaled a renewed scramble for colo-
nies� The race for territories greatly increased tensions between France and its 
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continental neighbors (particularly Germany and Italy), as well as with Great 
Britain� Public debate in France reached such a crescendo that it again caused a 
naval scare across the Channel� The British government resigned itself to another 
round of expensive shipbuilding in 1884—including that of a large number of 
torpedo boats to fill the gap with France—and in the Naval Defence Act of 1889 
announced its intention to maintain a two-power standard�60
The naval debate in France took on a unique dimension as it became com-
plicated by the political fractures that plagued the Third Republic� During the 
1870s, as the presidency passed from Thiers to army marshal Patrice de Mac-
Mahon (in power from 1873 to 1879), successive cabinets had grown increasingly 
conservative and promonarchical� However, the Left ultimately rebounded and 
gained sufficient seats in the National Assembly to govern for most of the 1880s, 
engaging in a wide range of reforms that affected all facets of French society�61 
The reformist wave eventually reached the Marine nationale through the as-
sembly’s Budget Committee, where republican deputies, led by Étienne Lamy, 
militated for remodeling the navy’s administration, its personnel policies, and 
eventually its overall strategy�62 Officers of the Jeune École saw this as an opportu-
nity to promote their views� They allied themselves with radical deputies, passing 
on position papers and selective information on technological advances, often 
covertly� Meanwhile, Charmes and other publicists attended meetings of the 
committee to promote their views� The discourse from the Left became increas-
ingly strident, to the point of identifying the battleship as a symbol of a timorous 
naval leadership that was repressive of sailors, while painting the torpedo boat 
as an instrument better suited to promote republican ideas at home and abroad� 
Senior naval leaders reacted by moving closer to politicians of the Right�63
Several of the Budget Committee’s reforms were implemented under Auguste 
Gougeard, a retired naval captain with republican views who was appointed 
minister in 1881�64 It was under Aube, however, that the Jeune École reached its 
zenith� Ministre de la marine from January 7, 1886, to May 30, 1887, the retired 
admiral immediately ordered that all work be stopped on the construction of four 
battleships so as to concentrate on the alternative fleet he had been promoting for 
the previous fifteen years� He submitted estimates for a renewed “building pro-
gram that included six large and ten small cruisers, twenty large torpedo boats for 
use against other torpedo boats, fifty bateaux-canons, one hundred regular torpe-
do boats, and three armored coast-defence ships for use as torpedo boat mother 
ships�”65 The fleet was redistributed into three groups: the aging battle fleet was 
concentrated at Toulon, as an offensive force against the growing Italian navy; 
older torpedo craft and coastal-defense ships were assembled in Cherbourg, as 
a defensive force covering the Channel against Great Britain and Germany; and 
commerce-raiding cruisers were based at Brest, to wage guerre de course in the 
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Atlantic and beyond� In addition, funds were sought for the establishment of a 
major naval base at Bizerte, Tunisia, as well as a string of coaling stations in the 
colonies to support those commerce raiders that would deploy around the world 
in any conflict with Great Britain�
. . . AND ITS FALL
As the recognized father of the Jeune École, Aube left the department in 1887 
with his head high, having done more than anybody else in a very short time to 
lay the foundations for a renewed fleet� These foundations, though, would crum-
ble almost immediately, leaving the French navy a dysfunctional entity right up to 
the First World War� This resulted from the practical limitations of torpedo boats, 
the continued fracture of the French naval leadership along political-affiliation 
lines, and the hard realities of international relations in the 1890s�
Despite these difficult circumstances, the radicalization of his supporters, 
their more extravagant claims, and the demonization of those opposed to his 
ideas, one must recognize Aube’s intellectual probity� While dramatically alter-
ing the navy’s building plans, he ordered the conduct of les grandes manœuvres 
(large-scale exercises at sea) to test the ability of torpedo boats under realistic 
conditions and to develop doctrine and tactics for their employment, whereas 
such issues previously had been confined largely to the realm of the rhetori-
cal� He instructed the senior leadership to draft extensive lessons learned from 
these exercises, and allowed naval officers who wished to make public their first 
impressions—positive or negative—to publish them in civilian journals�66
Minister Aube first dispatched torpedo boats on a long and arduous transit 
under rough winter conditions from Cherbourg, Lorient, and Brest in the Atlan-
tic to Toulon in the Mediterranean� Summer maneuvers then were organized to 
set the torpedo boat fleet against the battleships of the Squadron of Evolutions� 
Although the government resigned in May of the following year, forcing him 
from office, Aube already had ordered for the summer of 1887 an even more 
ambitious exercise—in which groups of torpedo boats would have attempted to 
intercept a battle fleet traveling from Toulon to Brest—but his successor canceled 
it� There were no follow-on maneuvers, as objective study of such experiments 
at sea quickly was distorted to suit both supporters and opponents of the Jeune 
École along the political lines that were dividing the Marine nationale�67
It was admittedly very difficult to analyze the results of such exercises in 
any case�68 They seemed to confirm both the potential of the torpedo boat—its 
ability to use its maneuverability to close the battleship to weapon-engagement 
range—and its fundamental flaws when compared with larger units better suited 
for long-range cruising, with better sea-keeping qualities and autonomy beyond 
the few days for which a torpedo boat realistically could be expected to sustain 
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itself� As well, the maneuvers did not explore fully the potential countermeasures 
against such new craft, nor did they attempt to determine how torpedo boats 
could detect and intercept enemy warships beyond their very limited visual 
range, as the maneuvers had been controlled to ensure contact between oppos-
ing fleets�
As successive governments in Paris grew more moderate over the following 
years, the influence of the Jeune École rapidly waned, but did not disappear al-
together� The technology existed, and several of its proponents were now senior 
officers who still believed the torpedo boat offered some potential for use, on 
the basis of their interpretation of the 1886 maneuvers� Cabinet instability also 
greatly complicated the formulation of enduring policies, as no fewer than twenty 
navy ministers were appointed between December 1887 and February 1906� Each 
tried to impose his imprimatur on the institution, but seldom was in office long 
enough to secure lasting reforms�69
Meanwhile, the competition for influence in Europe and the race for colo-
nies overseas continued unabated� New coalitions took shape on the Continent 
to replace the Bismarckian order, and the powers of the Triple Alliance (Ger-
many, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) engaged in sizable shipbuilding programs� 
The growth of European battle fleets was fueled in part by the teachings of an 
American sailor and scholar, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who gathered a 
very large and enthusiastic following in the United States and Europe following 
the publication in 1890 of his classic, The Influence of Sea Power upon History�70 
This book marked the resurgence of the “historical school” and sought to affirm 
the primacy of the battleship, a concept immediately endorsed in most European 
capitals—with the exception of Paris, where controversy continued between the 
Jeune École and the partisans of the main battle line�
While domestic and international politics grew increasingly complex, the 
readiness of the French fleet declined� By 1889, eleven older, wooden-hulled, 
armor-plated ironclads still were part of the battle line, while only one cruiser 
could achieve a speed of eighteen knots; the others—legacies from the Second 
Empire shipbuilding program—could maintain fourteen knots at best, well below 
the capability of other European powers’ modern construction� Similar inferior-
ity also applied to the characteristics of endurance, range, gun caliber and rate of 
fire, and armor strength�71
This state of confusion was evident in the landmark program of 1890� Al-
though the measure annulled many of the projects Aube had promoted in 1886 
and aimed at responding to Britain’s Naval Defence Act of 1889 as well as the 
threat of the Triple Alliance, it still paid lip service to the Jeune École through 
an eclectic mix of platforms: twenty-four battleships, thirty-six cruisers, forty 
high-seas torpedo boats, fifteen coastal-defense ships, 220 smaller torpedo 
Winter2018Review.indb   108 11/1/17   9:56 AM
114
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/12
 C A N U E L  1 0 9
boats, and a foreign-station fleet of thirty-four cruisers� But the construction of 
ten battleships, forty-five cruisers, and over one hundred torpedo boats over the 
next decade would have been required to bring the fleet up to such strength—and 
even this was well beyond the capacity of French shipyards� The incoherence of 
the plan was obvious, as funds for the development of a naval base at Bizerte; the 
provision of coaling stations overseas; and the construction of torpedo boat tend-
ers, or mother ships—essential elements for the conduct of commerce warfare 
overseas and torpedo boat operations beyond the coasts of France—were not in-
cluded�72 Such confusion continued in another plan crafted in 1894; in the words 
of one historian, it intended to make everybody happy, with “a few scout cruisers 
and some battleships for the admirals and a lot of torpedo craft and some special 
commerce-raiding cruisers for the Jeune École�”73
Great Britain also regained its place as France’s most likely enemy in the late 
1880s, ranking above even Germany as a result of the ongoing competition for 
colonies�74 When France’s Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand reached the isolated 
post of Fashoda (now Kodok) in southern Sudan in 1898, he soon faced a much 
larger force under British major general Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener, and 
France and Great Britain prepared for war�75
Had the confrontation turned into an armed clash on the shores of the White 
Nile, the final decision likely would have been determined at sea� The British 
strategy would have leveraged an overwhelming advantage in modern battle-
ships and cruisers simultaneously to annihilate the aging French battle fleet in the 
Mediterranean, had it dared to come out; intercept and destroy any expedition-
ary force sent from the métropole to Africa; blockade France’s ports; destroy the 
country’s commercial shipping; and mop up isolated French colonies�
In return, even under the most optimistic prognosis, while the Marine na-
tionale could have inflicted damage on those British ships blockading French 
ports close to shore and undertaken a campaign of commerce warfare overseas, 
the latter would not have exercised a real impact until well after the face-off at 
Fashoda had concluded� As for French torpedo boats, they could have conducted 
small-scale raids against the coasts of England, but these actions likely would not 
have threatened British ability to sustain forces on the upper Nile through Egypt�
Unable to support Captain Marchand in Fashoda, and fully conscious of the 
Royal Navy’s superiority in terms of numbers, matériel, and strategic disposition, 
France could only accept a humiliating diplomatic retreat� As Germany’s Kaiser 
Wilhelm II reportedly commented, “Poor France� She acknowledges herself 
beaten without a shot having been fired� That is abdication on the sea� They have 
not read their Mahan!”76 France withdrew its forces from Sudan, and Paris and 
London agreed that the watersheds of the Congo and Nile Rivers henceforth 
would divide their countries’ respective spheres of influence�77
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There followed a period of intellectual introspection� The Jeune École rapidly 
lost ground, leading to the appointment of Jean Louis de Lanessan as minister in 
1899 and the promulgation of the 1900 shipbuilding program, in which the big-
ship navy once again came to the fore� The measure mandated the construction of 
a first tranche of six modern battleships and five armored cruisers over the course 
of the following eight years�78
Lanessan did not deny the importance of smaller, faster cruisers and torpedo 
boats for specific tasks, and he promoted the establishment of “flying squadrons” 
of fast armored cruisers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to support com-
merce raiders breaking out of French ports during an enemy blockade� He also 
encouraged the growth of a fledgling submarine capability—the 1900 program 
included requirements for twenty-six of the vessels, along with twenty-eight de-
stroyers and 112 torpedo boats�79
However, Lanessan’s promotion of a balanced fleet centered on the battleship 
took the navy back toward the time of the Second Empire, when it had cultivated 
the ability to challenge any other navy at sea� In the words of historian Arne 
Røksund, “Lanessan’s insistence on organizing the French Navy for a possible 
conflict with Great Britain was, however, not solely based on threat assessments� 
He pushed the argument one step further� He insisted that by using the most 
advanced and powerful navy of the world as a standard against which to measure 
itself, the French Navy would have nothing to fear from the navies of the Triple 
Alliance�”80
FROM FASHODA THROUGH THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Fashoda did not mark the final passing of the Jeune École in France� Indeed, a 
more left-leaning cabinet came to power in 1902 and the radical Camille Pel-
letan was installed as ministre de la marine� Until the end of his tour in office in 
1905, he canceled orders for large ships and asked for more torpedo boats�81 The 
fracture of the naval officer corps into deeply resentful factions whose members 
sought to sabotage each other’s careers and who brought their conflicting views 
to the public also continued into the decades leading to the First World War�82 
Worse, even though Pelletan’s successor, Gaston Thomson, reinstituted the fun-
damentals of the 1900 program, French shipbuilding had fallen behind in the 
naval arms race among the other European powers and the United States, which 
was proceeding at full speed� Then, even as French contractors struggled to de-
liver the ships ordered in 1900, Great Britain fundamentally revolutionized naval 
warfare by launching the “all big gun” Dreadnought in 1906� France ordered its 
first equivalent only in 1910�83
This confused state of affairs would leave France by 1914 with an inferior fleet 
that included only four dreadnoughts, compared with thirty-one for the Royal 
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Navy, twenty-one for Germany, four each for Italy and Austria, seven for Russia, 
and nine for the United States� The remainder of the French fleet amounted to 
an unsystematic assembly of disparate classes of ships limited in their ability to 
cruise and fight at sea as coherent units� Again France’s navy made only a limited 
contribution to a war, even as the nation was waging a fight to the end on the 
western front�84
Despite such strategic confusion at sea, naval policy eventually matured as a 
reflection of a more realistic appraisal of the country’s security and foreign policy 
needs, an objective assessment of the available technologies, and independence 
from the prevailing party affiliation so as to secure enduring political support� 
Accepting peaceful coexistence with Great Britain after centuries of intermittent 
conflict and relentless rivalry, France agreed to the terms of the Entente Cordiale 
in April 1904�85 The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 seemed to confirm the 
continued dominance of the battleship, especially after the Nelsonian confronta-
tion at Tsushima�86 The importance of the battle fleet and the requirement for 
interoperability with the Royal Navy came to the fore when France, with active 
support from England, handily won its diplomatic confrontation with Germany 
during the First Moroccan Crisis over the status of Tangier in 1905–1906 and 
the Second Moroccan Crisis over Agadir in 1911�87 Such developments led to the 
Anglo-French Naval Convention of 1912, whereby the two powers agreed to a 
division of labor at sea� While Britain concentrated its fleet in the North Sea and 
guaranteed the French coast against naval attacks from Germany, France based 
its main fleet in the Mediterranean and assumed responsibility for the defense of 
British interests in the region, including the Suez Canal�88
France supported this commitment with an ambitious shipbuilding plan that 
the National Assembly approved in 1912� That program envisioned the construc-
tion by 1920 of twenty-eight dreadnought battleships, ten éclaireurs d’escadre 
(battle cruisers), fifty-two torpilleurs d’escadre (destroyers), ninety-four subma-
rines, and ten bâtiments pour stations lointaines (unarmored cruisers for service 
overseas)�89 France ran out of time for delivering this balanced fleet prior to the 
German offensive of August 1914, but the precedent had been set and a focused 
shipbuilding effort resumed after the First World War�
Wartime operations at sea did not negate all the precepts that the Jeune École 
had put forward during the ironclad era� As naval historian Theodore Ropp 
notes in his masterful study The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval 
Policy 1871–1904, Admiral Aube had predicted—quite presciently, in an 1882 
article—the course of a future war, elaborating that (1) the weaker fleet would 
refuse combat and remain in port, (2) the stronger one also would remain in port, 
owing to a fear of torpedoes, (3) and the only real activity at sea would be guerre 
de course, (4) under which offensive actions against merchant shipping would be 
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merciless� Ropp argues that “it is possible to view the events of the war of 1914–18 
under exactly those four points�”90 Jutland and the Dardanelles notwithstanding, 
the Hochseeflotte (German High Seas Fleet) and the British Grand Fleet stuck 
to their bases, one as a “risk fleet” in Wilhelmshaven, the other moored in Scapa 
Flow to preserve its numerical superiority� The torpedo finally came into its own 
as a strategic weapon when married with the “submersible torpedo boat,” which 
Germany unleashed in a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare�
Aube and his contemporaries were right in their intuition that technology could 
provide for the rise of a form of asymmetric warfare that would benefit the 
weaker navy, threatening the supremacy of the battle fleet and strangling vital 
lines of communications� The torpedo eventually would constitute such a threat, 
but the Jeune École erred in focusing on a delivery vehicle meant to make the 
battleship obsolete before the technology was available and proven� It was the 
German submarines of the Great War that carried the torpedoes that directly 
threatened Great Britain’s supremacy at sea, not the French torpedo boats of the 
1880s� France’s famed student of strategy Hervé Coutau-Bégarie indeed mused 
that “the fault of Aube was perhaps to be right too early�”91
Another flaw was the strident militancy of the Jeune École disciples� They 
strenuously refused to listen to their opponents, neglecting to admit that tech-
nological advances would spur not only the rise of asymmetric warfare but the 
development of defensive measures against such means, just as during the iron-
clad era the development of the explosive shell had been followed closely by that 
of armor plating� To promote their views, the disciples allied themselves to radi-
cal politicians, which deeply fractured the naval officer corps amid the cabinet 
instability that was a hallmark of the Third Republic, preventing the formulation 
and sustainment of a single, long-term shipbuilding plan� This may have been the 
greatest, if unintended, harm that the Jeune École caused, as the debate initiated 
in the 1870s contributed to the country’s poor state of readiness at sea up to the 
First World War�
This marked a very important departure from the tradition of political neu-
trality that had been observed throughout previous decades: “Ever since the 
great purges of the Revolution [of 1789], the navy had not taken part in national 
political life� The sole aim of the naval chiefs, regardless of their private political 
convictions, was to keep the navy intact, not to preserve or support a given politi-
cal order�”92 This largely explains the strength of France’s navy under Napoleon 
III� From the Bourbon Restoration through the July Monarchy and the Second 
Republic to the Second Empire, political neutrality assured continued support 
from those in power, despite the social turmoil of the early nineteenth century� 
With political will and public support in hand, French naval leaders set about 
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creating a balanced and effective force� This continuity in purpose crested with 
the 1857 shipbuilding program, which laid the foundations for Napoleon III’s 
fleet� Still derided by some historians today because it seemingly failed to make 
a viable contribution during the Franco-Prussian War, La Royale nonetheless 
served France well through the 1860s—as long as the emperor adhered to real-
istic objectives overseas and viable policies on the Continent� Even the lack of 
results at sea in 1870 cannot be blamed squarely on naval leaders� They had com-
pleted a modicum of operational planning for war with Prussia, but they could 
not have foreseen that their emperor’s diplomatic rashness and the disastrous 
land campaign would deprive the fleet of any opportunity to execute those plans�
Study of this period remains relevant today for those involved in military 
transformation during a time of geopolitical and strategic uncertainty set against 
a background of spiraling and ostensibly unaffordable technological innovations� 
Naval policy under the Second Empire proved correct, but it failed to explain 
itself to politicians and the public alike, as no cogent theoretical and doctrinal 
framework supported it� This greatly facilitated the opening of a path for “tech-
nological determinists,” such as Richild Grivel and Aube, who laid out such a 
discourse, one that promoted future technological developments to undermine 
the position of proponents of the status quo� A large part of that vision would 
prove correct in the longer term, but the immediate adoption of such a strategy 
to shape contemporary naval policy failed France because it did not provide the 
means to support the country’s current objectives� The situation was made only 
worse when the debate assumed political overtones, introducing a stridency that 
left the Marine nationale deeply divided� Shipbuilding programs repeatedly were 
altered as governments came and went, resulting at the turn of the century in an 
assembly of disparate “sample ships” in lieu of the balanced fleet achieved previ-
ously under Napoleon III�
The Second Empire and the Third Republic demonstrated in their very dis-
tinct ways that naval policy and strategy must remain closely aligned to deliver af-
fordable means in support of a country’s realistic objectives at home and abroad� 
This is an enduring lesson for today, when the future of modern navies remains 
cloaked in uncertainty and controversy�
N O T E S
This article is an update of a paper submitted 
in support of my doctoral studies at the Royal 
Military College of Canada, in Kingston, 
Ontario� It has been greatly improved thanks 
to feedback from my professor at the time, 
Dr� Andrew Iarocci (now assistant professor 
at Western University in London, Ontario), 
as well as three anonymous reviewers from 
the Naval War College Review� Any remaining 
shortcomings are mine alone�
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SEA POWER IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
 The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) was one of the defining conflicts of the ancient Greek world� It involved almost all the Greek city-states, aligned 
with one of the two main protagonists, Athens and Sparta� Conventionally it is 
seen as a war between a great land power, Sparta, and a great sea power, Athens� 
The effect of viewing the war in this way is to give less prominence to the place 
of sea power in the conduct of the war, with that element viewed as relevant to 
only one side� Many scholars acknowledge that Athenian war strategy was pri-
marily a maritime strategy and that Sparta only defeated Athens once the former 
had embraced the use of sea power against the latter� This is the basic narrative, 
and it is essentially correct� However, there is little appraisal of how sea power 
was used in the conduct of the war� This is unfortunate, since the Peloponnesian 
War is an excellent example of the uses and effectiveness of sea power� A more 
thorough examination of the thirty-year war be-
tween Sparta and Athens and their respective allies 
reveals a conflict in which sea power was of critical 
importance�
Sea power in the Peloponnesian War is visible 
along the full spectrum of maritime operations� 
Following Ken Booth and Eric Grove, modern 
naval operations commonly are divided into three 
main categories—the “span of maritime tasks,” in 
current Australian maritime doctrine: military, 
diplomatic, and constabulary (policing)�1 An 
examination of naval operations during the Pelo-
ponnesian War makes clear that, even at that time, 
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naval forces conducted operations that spanned these three basic categories in 
ways that are recognizable to the modern observer�
These categories are not intended to be prescriptive, and naval operations of-
ten span several different tasks; current Chinese antipiracy operations in the Gulf 
of Aden can be seen as both constabulary and diplomatic in nature, for instance� 
What these categories aid in illustrating is the many and varied operations that 
navies conduct and how sea power is used, and used differently, by various pow-
ers and with different strategies in place�
The strategy of Athens under the leadership of the statesman Pericles was con-
spicuously and unambiguously maritime in nature� Under his leadership, Athens 
would import all its required foodstuffs, avoid land battle with the dreaded 
Spartan phalanx, and conduct amphibious operations against Spartan territory� 
Athenian war strategy changed significantly in the second half of the Pelopon-
nesian War (413–404 BCE), but it nevertheless remained a maritime strategy�2 
This portion of the struggle commonly and misleadingly is referred to as the 
Decelean War, but the Ionian War is a more appropriate term� The fortification 
of Decelea in Attica did separate Athens from a large part of its countryside and 
cut off the land route to the critically important island of Euboea, and this forti-
fication did define to a strong degree Athenian and Spartan strategy for the final 
years of the war� However, the actual conduct of the war was carried out almost 
entirely in the eastern Aegean and up to the Hellespont (Dardanelles) region� It 
was a war defined by maritime operations: the interdiction of trade; diplomatic 
coercion; amphibious operations; and pitched naval battles, on both a small and 
a large scale� Examining these operations provides a better picture of how the war 
was conducted and brings its truly maritime nature to the fore, allowing the value 
of studying this period to be appreciated fully�
SEA POWER AND TECHNOLOGY
Before examining maritime and naval operations in the Peloponnesian War, it is 
important to address the issue of technology and the limitations imposed on na-
val forces of the period� Too many scholars, of both classical history and modern 
strategic thought, consider technology to have been so primitive as to render the 
study of maritime strategy in ancient history pointless� Chapter titles found in 
some works clearly demonstrate the poor regard in which some hold the naval 
operations of this era (e�g�, “The Pre-naval Era” [James Cable]; “Land Warfare 
Afloat: Before 1650” [Michael A� Palmer])�3
Palmer especially makes sweeping statements about the technological effec-
tiveness of ancient fleets, most notably that it was only with the advent of Euro-
pean sailing navies that states sought to command the seas by destroying enemy 
fleets�4 Yet the fifth-century BCE naval battles of Salamis, Mycale, Arginusae, and 
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Aegospotami involved fleet actions aimed at removing the opposing fleet from 
the sea—with some or a complete measure of success� Also worthy of mention 
are the numerous battles fought during the third-century BCE First Punic War 
between Carthage and Rome, most notably the battle of the Aegates Islands, a 
naval battle that effectively decided the outcome of the war in Rome’s favor, with 
widespread and long-lasting consequences, especially with regard to the Second 
Punic War� Roman sea power ensured that the general Hannibal had to walk to 
Italy rather than go by sea�5 Palmer’s assertion is limited severely in both time and 
space, seeming to posit sea command theory as a European, Enlightenment-era 
phenomenon� An assertion as sweeping as Palmer’s is not backed by historical 
evidence, and the Peloponnesian War example is an effective corrective�
As the debate raged over whether Sparta and its allies should go to war with 
Athens, the historian Thucydides has the Corinthians pushing for war, writing, 
“A single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their [Athens’s] ruin�”6 Whether this 
was a genuine Corinthian view or an Athenian fear that Thucydides projected 
through a speech is immaterial to this particular argument� Irrespective of view-
point, the idea that the war in general, not just the war at sea, could be resolved 
in one great fleet action was clearly in evidence 2,500 years ago� The historian 
Diodorus Siculus states that late in the war, in approximately 410, the Spartans 
thought that for them to lose at sea constituted no more than a setback, since they 
were still supreme on land, but that defeat at sea for Athens would result in that 
city fighting for its very survival�7 Indeed, by that stage of the war the Athenians 
were clinging on to a fragile empire, with their resources severely depleted, while 
Sparta’s “center of gravity,” the Peloponnese, was safe from the depredations of 
the Athenians�8
This line of thinking on decisive battle has a striking parallel in the early 
twentieth century and the First World War� It is reminiscent of the German naval 
strategy under Admiral Tirpitz of a “risk fleet”: the idea that the inferior German 
High Seas Fleet could catch a portion of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet and defeat 
it, thus—with one grand battle—altering the balance of naval power in favor of 
Germany�9 The Athenians in 480 were able to erode the Persian fleet’s fighting 
ability at Artemisium, admittedly with the help of a storm, and soon after at Sala-
mis were able to defeat the Persians at sea, making the decisive land battle at Pla-
taea possible and thus saving Greece�10 The aforementioned Corinthian speech is 
an explicit expression of decisive naval battle as a conscious strategy� Taken with 
the Persian Wars example, the Corinthian and Spartan examples show that over 
a 2,500-year period, the concept of a “Mahanian” battle at sea to determine the 
outcome of a war remained an appealing and viable strategy with roots in the 
classical Greek era�11
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The purpose here is not to disregard technological limitations or minimize 
the importance of technology, but to illustrate the enduring nature of some basic 
tenets of naval warfare and maritime strategy� Technological limitations often are 
used to justify a view that navies of the time could not participate in any contest 
for control of the sea� Cable criticizes Mahan’s exploration of sea control during 
the Second Punic War, writing that Mahan does not mention the very limited 
sea-keeping capacities of Roman galleys or their dependence on coast hugging as 
almost their sole mode of navigation—as if these aspects had any bearing on the 
concept of sea control�12 The basic fact of the matter was that the Romans could 
do what they wanted at sea and the Carthaginians were restricted severely in their 
ability to use the sea for their own purposes—as clear an example of control of 
the sea as any other throughout history�13 Sea control should be thought of as a 
relative concept, not an absolute one�
SEA CONTROL
The concept of sea control is certainly in evidence during the Peloponnesian War, 
despite the restrictions of technology� In the second year of the war, Thucydides 
has Pericles console the people of Athens, telling them that there are two do-
mains, land and sea, and that the Athenians hold sway over the sea—not only 
as they are doing so at present, but to whatever extent they think fit� Moreover, 
“your naval resources are such that your vessels may go where they please, with-
out the [Persian] king or any other nation on earth being able to stop them�”14 
This was a bold assertion, and one made in the context of a political speech to the 
Athenian population; yet the basic premise was correct� Events of the year had 
demonstrated that the Athenians could sail where and when they wanted� There 
were some exceptions, such as the virtually unopposed Spartan raid on Salamis, 
which caused a panic in Piraeus, but this helps demonstrate a basic tenet of sea 
control: it is limited in time and space�15 While technological considerations pre-
cluded what might be called “sea command” from being exercised, this is true of 
most times in the history of naval warfare�16 The state of sea control throughout 
the war passed from Athenian control of the sea, to a contested sea, and finally 
to Spartan control of the sea� Moreover, as Pericles’s speech illustrates, the idea 
of navies being able to establish sea control at this time was a conscious strategic 
concept� Again, that these changes in sea control are readily apparent invalidates 
arguments that such concepts were not present in the classical world�
The ultimate role of navies, both past and present, is to fight and win at sea� 
Although naval battles may occur infrequently, all other roles that navies under-
take are dependent on the ability to fight and win against an enemy� There is little 
possibility of conducting amphibious operations, diplomatic coercion, or trade 
protection if a naval force cannot prevail over an enemy in battle� This principle 
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is demonstrated amply throughout the Peloponnesian War� Athens’s ability to 
prevail in battles at sea allowed it to gain and maintain sea control�
THE STRATEGY OF PERICLES AND HIS SUCCESSORS
Athenian strategy under Pericles has been the source of much debate and mis-
conception� It was a maritime strategy and it was a defensive strategy� Athens was 
fortified with walls, both those around the city itself and the long constructions 
that ran down to the port of Piraeus� This effectively sealed off Athens from en-
emies; siege warfare of the time relied primarily on a besieging force starving the 
city out or being let in by forces within the city� It was not until the era of Philip of 
Macedon in the fourth century that siege weapons developed to a point at which 
besieging forces could threaten the walls of a city directly� Able to import all the 
food it required, Athens was a metaphorical island—a concept pushed by Pericles 
and the unidentified author referred to as “the Old Oligarch�”17 With the safety of 
the city almost guaranteed and its supply lines assured, Athens could strike out 
at Sparta and Spartan allies using superior sea power�
The strategy of Pericles was an evolution of the strategy developed by 
those who had come before him, back to Themistocles and the Persian Wars� 
Thucydides sees Themistocles as the one who spurred Athens into becoming 
a sea power, thereby laying the foundations of the Athenian empire� This was 
because Themistocles in 478 had the Athenians rebuild their city walls, as well as 
the long walls connecting the city to the town and port of Piraeus� He allegedly 
advised the Athenians that if they were ever to find themselves hard pressed by 
land, they should go down to Piraeus and defy the world with their fleet� Before 
the battle of Salamis in 480, a Corinthian delegate attacked Themistocles’s coun-
sel, dismissing him because Athens had been evacuated and thus he did not even 
have a city to his name� Themistocles replied that not only did he have a city, but 
he had one even greater than the Corinthians—so long as the Athenians had 250 
ships fully manned�18 Athens’s decision to rebuild the city’s walls caused anxiety 
in Sparta, although it was Sparta’s allies that allegedly instigated the Spartans to 
confront Athens, because they feared the Athenian navy and the valor the Athe-
nians had displayed against Persia�19 It is noteworthy that Thucydides maintains 
that it was Sparta’s allies who were most concerned, for these allies were nearer to 
the coast than Sparta itself, and therefore more vulnerable to Athenian sea power� 
Plutarch put it bluntly in his biography of Themistocles, writing that he “fastened 
the city to the Piraeus and the land to the sea�”20
The walls of Athens were important to defense against Spartan and other 
hoplites, but, as Themistocles supposedly made clear to the other Greeks, it was 
the fleet that formed the basis of Athenian power from the Persian Wars onward� 
At this early stage, it was a defensive strategy, although the Athenians engaged 
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in various overseas campaigns before the Peloponnesian War� However, with the 
Delian League slowly morphing into the Athenian empire, the Athenians found 
themselves able to draw on vast resources� This solidified Athenian strategy, 
which is illustrated clearly in the fifth-century work of the Old Oligarch� The 
first point he makes is about Athenian hoplites: although they may be no match 
for their enemies, they are still stronger than their tribute-paying allies—and 
that was sufficient�21 It is a strong indication that the Athenians did not intend 
to use their land forces to confront their enemies directly in pitched battle— 
making it all the more clear that Athens’s grand strategy was a maritime one�22 
The city-state’s land army need only be stronger than that of any of the allied 
states� Even so, if the need arose the Athenians could use this inferior force in 
a superior way: their navy could land a superior force of troops wherever they 
wished� The author notes that “it is possible for the rulers of the sea to sometimes 
do as land powers do, to ravage the land of the stronger; for it is possible to sail 
about wherever there is no enemy or wherever they are few, and to embark to sail 
away as the enemy approaches�”23 During the Peloponnesian War, Athenian raids 
on the Peloponnese demonstrated this many times� The author is highlighting 
the mobility of Athenian land forces� There was no need for them to engage in a 
futile and destructive hoplite battle to defend Attica�
As the Old Oligarch explains further, Athens exploited geography to its strate-
gic advantage� Land powers could band together easily, whereas the sea separated 
islands geographically� Athens controlled this sea, and even if it failed initially to 
prevent the islanders from coming together, it still could cut them off from out-
side supplies and starve them out�24 The infamous threat leveled against Melos 
during the Peloponnesian War was made with the understanding that Athens’s 
navy could cut off and invade the small island without outside interference� As 
for the mainland cities, Athens ruled over them by fear� This was not because of 
a superior land army, but through a combination of Athens being able to control 
the flow of imports and exports and the superior mobility granted by its strong 
navy�25 Athens’s sea power, in theory and practice, became primarily an offensive 
force in the lead-up to the Peloponnesian War�
The separation of the operational from the strategic level of war aids in clari-
fying Athenian strategy during the first part of the Peloponnesian War, known 
as the Archidamian War� This requires caution, as there are no definite lines 
between these two levels, and the Peloponnesian War has received no such 
examination from scholars of either the classical world or modern military 
theory�26 Nevertheless, it is a useful way to examine the war without conflating 
policy, strategy, and operations� At its core, strategy is about “maintaining a bal-
ance between ends, ways, and means; about identifying objectives; and about the 
resources and methods available for meeting such objectives�”27 Under Pericles’s 
Winter2018Review.indb   124 11/1/17   9:56 AM
130
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/12
 NA S H  1 2 5
strategy, Athens was a city protected from land attack, with a powerful navy ca-
pable of power projection and an empire that provided a huge amount of capital 
with which to fund a maritime war, which would end with the continuation of the 
status quo ante bellum. The campaigns that Athens launched against the Pelopon-
nese can be seen as the operational level of war: the precise ways in which Athens 
used means—sea power—to achieve its desired ends; in short, strategy in action� 
The strategy of Pericles did not, as Donald Kagan claims, fail; the successors of 
Pericles maintained essentially the same strategy, but pursued it more vigorously 
and more aggressively on an operational level�28 Pericles’s strategy was one of 
projecting maritime power as a means of coercing Sparta into peace, a strategy 
that ultimately succeeded in 421 with the Peace of Nicias, however imperfect 
Thucydides considered that peace to be�29
The opening of the war saw both Sparta and Athens initiate their war plans� 
Sparta invaded Attica in the hope of drawing out and defeating the incensed 
Athenian hoplites, while Athens gathered its allies and prepared a hundred ships 
for a raid on the Peloponnese�30 Kagan’s summary of the first year of the war has 
the Spartans doing widespread damage and the Athenians expending consider-
able time and money for little gain�31 Henry D� Westlake and John F� Lazenby 
also conclude that the Spartans inflicted more damage on Attica than the Athe-
nians did in return�32 These are poor assessments of the events of that first year, 
both overestimating the damage the Spartans inflicted and grossly simplifying 
and underestimating the damage Athens inflicted� There is little doubt that the 
Spartans’ invasion of Attica and their despoliation of the land upset Athenians 
greatly; Thucydides says so�33 However, the invasion and ravaging of Attica 
made the Athenians more angry and resolute than despairing, and it certainly 
demonstrated to the Spartans that their ravaging strategy would not induce the 
Athenians into any rash actions�34 It also assumes a negligible effort by Athens to 
defend Attica, which was not the case� As small as it might have been, Athens’s 
effort to defend Attica with cavalry both boosted morale and limited the dam-
age that the cavalry-deficient Spartan army could inflict�35 Many scholars have 
exaggerated the effects of Spartan efforts during the first year of the war, perhaps 
because the traditional nature of Spartan land invasion makes it appear more ef-
fective compared with the more unorthodox Athenian maritime strategy�
On the first point, instances of ravaging during this period appear to have been 
greatly exaggerated regarding their material effects� In his groundbreaking work 
Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece, Victor Davis Hanson quite convinc-
ingly argues that the systematic destruction of crops and the ravaging of land are 
extremely difficult� Grapevines and olive trees are extremely hardy and therefore 
difficult to destroy; doing so requires many hours� Further, grain is vulnerable to 
fire and other destruction only during a narrow time window� These conclusions 
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stem from practical experience in farming, as well as from close reading of 
the relevant literature� Of particular importance is a passage in the Hellenica 
Oxyrhynchia, in which the unknown author describes Attica before the Spartan 
fortification of Decelea as the most lavishly equipped part of Greece, having suf-
fered only slight damage from the Spartans in previous attacks�36 Thucydides too 
describes the fortification of Decelea as one of the prime causes of Athenian ruin, 
in stark contrast to the invasions of the Archidamian War�37 This should not be a 
surprise, since Hanson calculates that the Spartans spent a total of only 150 days 
in Attica during the entire Archidamian War�38 The idea that Sparta laid waste to 
Attica is hard to defend and the effectiveness of this Spartan strategy is overstated� 
Sparta’s original strategy was ultimately a failure, and it was only when Sparta 
embraced sea power that it defeated Athens—not in the fields of Attica, but on 
the seas from which Athens derived its power�39
In contrast, Athens’s accomplishments during the first year of the war were 
strategically significant, as it used sea power to strengthen its position greatly� 
The Athenians, along with a contingent of fifty ships from Corcyra and other 
allies, conducted their own ravaging of enemy territory� This raiding included an 
attack on the city of Methone in the helot homeland of Messenia, a strike into an 
area where the Spartans felt particularly vulnerable� Although the Athenians did 
not take the city, the attack clearly worried the Spartans� Concurrently with this 
operation, thirty Athenian ships raided farther north into Locris, taking hostages 
and defeating the Locrians who assembled there to resist them� Finally, the Athe-
nians secured the islands of Aegina and Cephalonia, the latter taken without a 
fight�40 Occupation of the former island ensured the security of the Saronic Gulf, 
and control of the latter helped secure a base off the west coast of the Pelopon-
nese and Acarnania�
It is arguable that by the end of the first year of the war the Athenians had done 
as much material damage to the Spartans as the Spartans had to the Athenians�41 
Plutarch goes so far as to write that not only did Athenian raids on the Pelopon-
nese cause more damage than the Spartan ones on Attica, but if the plague had 
not occurred the Spartans would have given up entirely�42 Far more important, 
and often overlooked by scholars, is the fact that Athens had accomplished far 
more than the Spartans in solidifying and improving its strategic position in 
Greece, as well as proving the capability and reach of Athenian sea power�
The offshore Greek islands were important strategic locations, and both sides 
targeted them� The Ambrakiots convinced the Spartans that conquering Acarna-
nia would lead to the taking of the islands of Zakynthos and Cephalonia, posses-
sion of which would make Athenian cruises around the Peloponnese much more 
difficult�43 Corcyra not only possessed a strong navy, but was situated on the best 
sailing route from Greece to Italy� Athens’s and Sparta’s respective interference in 
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Corcyrean affairs was aimed not at conquest but at establishing a friendly govern-
ment that would secure the island for their interests, especially control of the sea 
lines of communication (SLOCs)� An Athenian attack on the island of Kythera 
in 424 had a twofold purpose� First, the island was a landing place for merchant 
ships sailing from Libya and Egypt� Second, the island was in a position from 
which Laconia could be secured from attacks by “privateers,” which made it an 
excellent place for the Athenians to set up a base from which to raid the Pelopon-
nese�44 There is also the matter of money, as the Athenians were able to exact a 
tribute of four talents from Kythera, an important Spartan-allied city� This was 
not a departure from Athens’s original strategy, as Kagan claims, but a change in 
the operational conduct of the war�45 Athens still was using sea power offensively, 
attacking the Peloponnese and wearing down Sparta�
The culmination of the Periclean strategy was the Athenian success at Pylos 
and the capture of Spartan forces on the island of Sphacteria in 425� Thucydides 
labels the end result a stroke of enormous luck� Although luck certainly contrib-
uted to Athenian success, the matter should be seen not so simply, but as the 
fruition of Athenian maritime strategy�46 Once again Kagan is incorrect in call-
ing Demosthenes’s strategy a clear departure from previous Athenian strategy�47 
Although it is true, as he points out, that Pericles had mentioned establishing 
fortifications in the Peloponnese but never did so, Pericles’s death not long into 
the war means we cannot know whether the idea was only a vague and empty 
threat�48 Demosthenes’s decision to fortify Pylos demonstrates a continued, albeit 
belated, plan to increase pressure on Sparta through raids and attacks on its terri-
tory from the sea� Two modern scholars quite correctly interpret the Pylos cam-
paign as the logical corollary of the Periclean strategy�49 Although Thucydides 
writes that it was owing to a storm that the Athenians ended up at Pylos, he also 
states that it was the location where Demosthenes landed to “do what was wanted 
there” and to fortify the position, as that was the object of the voyage� This was 
not a random, deserted headland, as Thucydides has the two Athenian generals 
sneeringly say; it was territory in the heart of Messenia, among the helot popula-
tion that was such a constant worry to Sparta�50 The original Athenian plan, as 
Pericles had described it, was unchanged, merely pursued more aggressively at 
the operational level�
The Athenian decision to fortify Pylos quickly got the attention of the Spar-
tans� Once King Agis II and the Peloponnesians ravaging Attica heard the news, 
they marched back immediately, and once in Sparta they called together allies 
from around the Peloponnese�51 Once the Spartans attacked the Athenian gar-
rison on Pylos, they made the fateful decision to land a force of hoplites on the 
island of Sphacteria to prevent any Athenian relieving force from establishing a 
base nearby�52 The subsequent naval battle, in which Athens was victorious, also 
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had the effect of trapping the Spartan hoplites occupying Sphacteria� This situ-
ation was deemed so dire that the Spartan commanders resolved to conclude a 
truce on the spot� In fact, the Spartans felt the situation so serious that as part 
of the truce they temporarily surrendered to the Athenians all their warships in 
Laconia, sixty in total�53 The Spartans were willing to gut their naval power, weak 
as it already was, to retain their small contingent of men� This shows a lack of 
Spartan confidence with respect to naval matters, and it demonstrates clearly the 
Athenian amphibious capability� Athenian land and naval forces could be used 
in close concert not just to raid territory, but to deal a serious military blow to 
Sparta, one with severe political consequences�
The full magnitude of Athenian accomplishments during the Pylos campaign 
is evident in Spartan actions after the capture of their hoplites on Sphacteria� 
Thucydides calls the surrender of the (approximately) 120 Spartiates the most 
surprising thing to happen in the war�54 The most immediate result of the Spar-
tans being taken prisoner was the Athenian threat to execute them if the Spartans 
invaded Attica, thus ending the direct threat to Attica and freeing it up for full 
use�55 The Spartans sent envoys to Athens to recover both the prisoners and Py-
los, for they were seriously alarmed by the Messenian raids being conducted from 
Pylos into Laconia, as they stoked the age-old fear of widespread helot rebellion�56
The Athenians did not stop their naval operations of 425 with Pylos� They 
raided Crommyon in Corinthian territory and established a fortified base at 
Methana from which they could raid into the territory of Troezen�57 In the north-
west the Athenians based in Naupactus made an expedition against Anactorion, a 
Corinthian-controlled city, taking it and settling people from Acarnania there�58 
This meant that the entire north coast of the Corinthian Gulf from Naupactus to 
Ambracia, with the minor exception of Molycreion, was hostile to Corinth� These 
widespread amphibious operations demonstrate a powerful Athenian maritime, 
and especially naval, capability and a strategy that was aggressively expeditionary 
in nature�
Thucydides gives a very blunt assessment of the events described above, and 
of their effects on Sparta as well� The Spartans split their forces and stationed 
them throughout the most threatened areas of the Peloponnese, and took the 
unusual step of raising a force of cavalry and archers to act as a mobile reserve� 
Thucydides describes the Spartans as on the defensive, fearing internal revolu-
tion, afraid of another disaster like the one that had befallen them at Pylos, and 
lacking all confidence in themselves�59 The cause of this anxiety and outright fear 
was constant, unimpeded Athenian raiding along the Peloponnesian seaboard�60 
This scourge was made possible by a strong Athenian navy that could land a force 
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of troops in hostile territory, protect them from enemy naval intervention, and 
bring them off again safely or keep them supplied and protected so they could 
cause even greater damage�
Although Pericles’s strategy essentially remained in play throughout the first 
decade of the war, there were departures from it as the war expanded into new ar-
eas such as Sicily and the Chalcidice region� Nevertheless, these campaigns were 
also expeditionary in nature, relying heavily on naval force to project power into 
coastal and island regions� The first expedition to Sicily constituted a departure 
from Pericles’s strategy, although the ostensible aim was not conquest but the 
provision of aid to Athens’s Sicilian allies� Thucydides does give the Athenians a 
more sinister motive, calling the expedition a test of how vulnerable Sicily might 
be to Athenian conquest, but this interpretation should be viewed with caution�61 
The first Sicilian expedition was primarily diplomatic in nature, and Thucydides 
perhaps downplays the importance of the Athenians’ attempts at aiding their 
western allies� After all, the Peloponnesians had strong friends in the west too, 
and for Athens to ignore its allies’ call for help would have weakened its position 
in the west, if not in the other territories where it had allies� Because failure to 
aid its allies would have made Athens look weak, the dispatch of a naval expedi-
tion to Sicily in 427 can be seen as a response to external events rather than as a 
radical change in the conduct of the war and Athens’s strategy, if not policy� As 
the war dragged on, it became more complex, and these instances highlight the 
ever-important point that strategy is not practiced in a vacuum�
Spartan operations in the Chalcidice region in the later years of the Archi-
damian War mark a change in Sparta’s strategy that reveals the effectiveness of 
Athenian strategy up to that point� Thucydides explicitly states that Spartan op-
erations in the northwest Aegean were aimed at distracting Athens and relieving 
the pressure it was putting on the Peloponnese, Laconia in particular� Further 
and even more importantly, Thucydides writes that the Spartans were happy to 
have an excuse to send out helots from the Peloponnese, since the occupation of 
Pylos was thought to have increased the chances of a helot revolt�62 It also marks 
the point at which Sparta abandoned all hope of confronting Athens at sea until 
well after the Peace of Nicias, for it decided to avoid naval operations in favor 
of a purely land campaign� However, Spartan success in the northwest Aegean 
presaged a bolder and more successful strategy to be undertaken during the 
Decelean/Ionian War, when Sparta would use Persian money to build a fleet and 
conduct its own amphibious operations against the Athenians in the Ionian is-
land and Anatolian regions� Sparta recognized that the most effective strategy for 
victory was to separate Athens from its allies, by force or otherwise� This strategy 
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was tested and found to be successful during the campaigns in the Chalcidice 
region, but it could not be executed after the failure of the Mytilinean revolt and 
Pylos campaigns eroded and ultimately destroyed Spartan naval capabilities.
OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF BATTLE
Diplomacy
He [Pericles] displayed their power to the barbarian tribes living around 
and to the kings and lords the power and the confidence and impunity 
with which they sailed where they wished, having made all of the sea 
subject to their control.
PLUTARCH, LIFE OF PERICLES
Naval forces have many roles outside of war and combat operations, foremost 
among them in diplomacy. Diplomatic tasks range from furnishing allies with 
moral and physical support to coercion, and all these roles fell within the scope 
of action of Greek maritime forces during the Peloponnesian War. Navies were—
and still are—uniquely placed to act as diplomatic tools; armies are inherently 
intrusive, whereas navies can remain at a distance, threatening or reassuring as 
desired without instigating hostilities.
The Plutarch passage quoted above details an Athenian expedition that 
Pericles conducted in approximately 436 and that is an excellent example of the 
use of naval force for diplomatic purposes. The fleet’s presence off the coast of 
the Aegean Islands and Black Sea region demonstrated the Athenians’ potential 
power to friend and foe alike, without actually encroaching on any territory or 
engaging in a hostile act. The Peloponnesian War involved many different pro-
tagonists spread throughout the Mediterranean, and most of them were within 
reach of the sea, providing a city with the opportunity to aid or menace with its 
navy as it saw fit, exercising both soft and hard diplomacy.
Pericles’s show of force in 436 was aimed at Greeks and foreigners alike, 
powers with which they were at peace at the time. As Plutarch understands, it 
was more than a matter of simply sailing a large body of warships around; the 
real point of the exercise was to demonstrate Athenian sea control. The ships 
displayed naval and military power in a region distant from Athens, with the im-
plication that the Athenians could project this power anywhere and at any time, 
thus enjoying the power, confidence, and impunity to sail where they wished, 
“having made all of the sea subject to their control.”63 This was no idle threat, 
for the opening years of the Peloponnesian War demonstrated that the Athenian 
fleet indeed could sail where it wished and land troops in strategically significant 
areas. Further, Plutarch writes that Pericles did many things to please the people, 
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including “sending out sixty triremes each and every year, in which many of 
the citizens were sailing for eight months being paid.”64 This acted as an annual 
demonstration of Athenian sea power to the Aegean world. Some scholars believe 
that sixty ships is too large a number, pointing out that it would have incurred 
too great an annual cost; but, regardless of numbers, it remains an example of the 
frequent use of Athens’s navy for diplomatic purposes.65 Russell Meiggs suggests 
that the main function of the fleet in peacetime was as a police force, with the 
threefold duty of showing the flag, instilling confidence in the hearts of friends, 
and suppressing piracy.66 Although correctly identifying the roles, he mistakenly 
identifies the first two as constabulary operations, when they are in fact diplo-
matic ones—the two most prominent and important diplomatic roles that navies 
undertake. The ultimate goal of such posturing was to establish in the minds of 
friend and foe alike the Athenian capacity and will to control the seas. Athenian 
power and influence were extended across the regions through the use of naval 
forces in a diplomatic role.67
An episode that occurred at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War neatly 
demonstrates the diplomatic use of sea power. Athens decided to conclude a 
defensive treaty with the island state of Corcyra in 433; both Thucydides and 
Plutarch write that Athens needed to aid Corcyra, lest its naval power go over 
to Athens’s rival, Corinth.68 Athens sent ten ships to aid Corcyra. Especially 
noteworthy was the inclusion of three strategoi to command the contingent.69 
Considering that Athens elected ten strategoi for each year, three is a high level 
of command for such a small number of ships; a later raid on the Peloponnese 
during the first year of the war involving a hundred ships had the same number of 
strategoi.70 Indeed, the three commanders sent to Corcyra were under very strict 
instructions to do nothing that might provoke Corinth or lead to a violation of 
the treaty Athens had with it, but to prevent an incursion into Corcyraean ter-
ritory. Athens sent out a tightly controlled force of ships to aid an ally, Corcyra, 
while simultaneously making a show of force and a demonstration of Athenian 
resolve in the face of Corinthian aggression. Kagan puts it best when he describes 
this maneuver as less a military than a diplomatic one.71
The contention that the Athenian orders were unrealistic misses the point 
that it was a diplomatic rather than a military use of sea power.72 It was the pres-
ence of Athenian ships to begin with, as opposed to their number, that was the 
entire point, and the fact that three strategoi commanded them shows the delicate 
nature of the task. From the outset of political tensions, Athens employed naval 
force as a diplomatic tool. That Pericles did not go with the force is perhaps a 
good indication that the other Athenian leaders clearly understood his aims.
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Trade Protection and Interdiction
The protection and interdiction of trade have been among the prime duties of na-
vies throughout history, and the conduct of such operations during the Pelopon-
nesian War was critical to its outcome� Both sides engaged in the protection of 
their own and the interdiction of enemy seaborne trade, although it was Athens 
that had the most to lose from an interruption of trade� Operations ranged from 
the employment of “privateers” and direct attacks on shipping to the control of 
vital SLOCs� These operations are not as well documented as the other maritime 
operations undertaken during the war, either in the ancient sources or by modern 
scholars, but they remained vital, and it was Athens’s inability to protect trade, 
particularly in foodstuffs, that led to its surrender following blockade and starva-
tion by Sparta�
In the second year of the war the Athenians sent six ships under a certain 
Melesandros to the region of Caria and Lycia, located on the Anatolian coast� 
Melesandros’s tasks were twofold: to collect tribute and to prevent “the Pelopon-
nesian privateers” from attacking merchantmen�73 Both Richard Crawley and Rex 
Warner, translators of two of the most popular editions of Thucydides, translate 
leistikos in the above passage as privateer�74 However, leistikos usually is translated 
as pirate or bandit, as the term was equally applicable to such activities on land 
and sea� Labeling them privateers implies that the Spartans employed them to 
attack only the shipping of Athens and Athenian allies�
In the first year of the war Athens had fortified the island of Atalante off 
the Opuntian coast to prevent leistikoi from sailing out of Opus and the rest of 
Locris and attacking Euboea�75 It was only with the outbreak of war that Athens 
suddenly had found the need to fortify this particular position, suggesting that 
piracy was not an enduring regional issue of concern to Athens� In this case, it 
appears that Sparta engaged locals to privateer against the Athenians� Locris’s 
position near Euboea—an island important for the support of Athens—made it a 
good base of operations, yet the Spartans’ navy was so weak it was unlikely they 
could establish their own base there: thus the need to gain the support of leistikoi�
As for direct attacks on trade, there is a vague reference to the Spartans attack-
ing Athenian and allied traders at sea at the very beginning of the war, but the 
narrative is quite unspecific and stands out most for highlighting the brutality 
of the Spartans�76 A more detailed instance appears in 412/1, when the Spartan 
Hippocrates was sent out with one Laconian and eleven Sicilian ships to Cnidus 
on the Ionian coast� Half the ships were ordered to seize all merchant vessels 
sailing from Egypt�77 However, the Athenians became aware of this and sent out 
their own ships, which intercepted and captured the Peloponnesian ships� This 
negated the threat to the merchant vessels, which presumably were carrying grain 
to the Athenians in the region�78 In 410, the Spartan king Agis sent fifteen ships, 
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manned by allies, to Chalcedon and Byzantium, and en route three of them were 
destroyed in the Hellespont by the nine Athenian ships that were always present 
to watch over merchantmen�79 These examples show that the Athenians were on 
constant watch for threats to their merchant vessels and had mechanisms in place 
for the wartime control of grain throughout the Aegean�80
The final way in which trade was attacked or protected was through the con-
trol of shipping routes—the vital SLOCs� Having established supremacy over the 
waters of the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) after the victory at Cyzicus, Athens was 
able to control the flow of shipping via this route and collect a tax on all vessels 
sailing into the region from the Black Sea� King Agis summed up Spartan despair 
at the Athenian control of grain routes� “But Agis, seeing [from Attica] the many 
grain ships sailing into the Piraeus, was saying that it was of no advantage for 
them [Sparta] to shut out the Athenians from the land for much time already, if 
they could not hold back the grain imported by sea�”81
It was evident to the Spartans that, despite occupying Athenian territory in 
Attica year-round, they could win only by cutting Athens off from its overseas 
food supply� This was achieved best through control of Athens’s main SLOC, 
which by the end of the war ran through the Bosporus and Hellespont� Black Sea 
grain was critical to Athens, and had been possibly as far back as the late 430s� 
The loss of Euboea in 411 was a disaster for Athens, not just because of the loss of 
ships in the battle off Eretria, but for the loss of an important source of grain and 
other supplies; Thucydides held that the island was of more value than Attica�82 
Athens previously had imported grain from a range of different areas, but gradual 
Spartan pressure eventually forced the Athenians into relying on importations 
solely from the Black Sea region� By closing down the last available grain SLOC 
to Athens, Sparta finally was able to starve Athens into submission�
LESSONS
The Peloponnesian War of 431–404 BCE was a maritime war, one characterized 
by the constant use of sea power by Athens, Sparta, and their respective allies� The 
lands surrounding the cities of both protagonists were not the scenes of great, or 
even many, battles� From Sicily in the west to the Bosporus in the east, it was the 
littoral areas, and especially the islands, that saw endemic warfare throughout 
three decades of conflict� There were only two large-scale land battles during 
this period, and none in which the full forces of the Athenians and Spartans were 
involved� Soldiers certainly had their part to play in the Peloponnesian War, but 
it was the ability to project power at and from the sea that was the determining 
factor in the war�
At the core of Athenian strategy, from the very beginning of the war, was the 
capability to project power ashore from the sea� Athenian ships cruising by the 
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island or coastal city of a recalcitrant ally were effective diplomatically because it 
was understood that they could cause serious damage� When it came to fighting 
Sparta, the Athenians’ ability to raid the coast of the Peloponnese was central to 
their war strategy, and one to which the Spartans had no effective response� Athe-
nian attacks demonstrated that without a navy and in spite of Spartan attacks on 
Attica, Sparta could not protect its allies from Athenian naval forces� The walls of 
Athens protected the city from the vaunted Spartan hoplites, just as the seas and 
Athenian triremes protected Athens’s allies� Maritime power projection by the 
Athenians demonstrated the impotence of the Spartan land army, and raised the 
specter of helot rebellion as well� The Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria in 
425 is the starkest example of these facts and was the vindication of the Periclean 
strategy, regardless of how later politicians chose to exploit or throw away this 
important victory� The Sicilian expedition was the largest amphibious operation 
conducted to that time, and the operations conducted at sea had a critical impact 
on the fate of the expedition—in the Corinthian Gulf, off the coast of Italy, and 
in the Great Harbor of Syracuse� This outcome was of great consequence to the 
rest of the war because it enabled a Spartan strategy of confronting Athens at sea� 
The final years of the war were fought primarily in the eastern Aegean and saw 
both sides conducting maritime power-projection operations around the islands 
and the Hellespont region�
The use of maritime power for diplomatic and political purposes was cru-
cial, especially for the Athenians, who relied so heavily on a maritime empire 
for support� Sea power granted Athens the power to keep allies in line and dis-
suade them from rebellion� The Old Oligarch baldly states this as the case, and 
Thucydides’s narrative of the war supports this analysis� When Athenian naval 
power weakened, Sparta was able to draw away from Athens this base of support 
and compromise the Athenians’ ability to fight� Aside from tribute collection 
from allies, both sides used the threat of naval force to extort money out of third 
powers� Athens began the war with a firmly entrenched maritime consciousness 
that had seen naval force used for diplomatic means on a daily basis� Both sides 
used navies as tools of diplomacy, especially as coercive forces with great reach�
Maritime trade was a critical Athenian vulnerability that required protec-
tion, especially as Spartan actions in Attica deepened Athenian dependence on 
imports of food by sea� Athenian hegemony in the Aegean had helped suppress 
piracy, but clearly there were plenty of would-be pirates and opportunists who 
were willing and able to enlist with Sparta to attack Athenian shipping� This 
state-sponsored piracy, akin to privateering in modern legal terms, demonstrated 
Sparta’s recognition of the need to hit Athens at sea to damage its maritime trade� 
As the war dragged on and Athens became reliant on grain imports from the 
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Hellespont region and beyond, this theater became a crucial one in the conduct 
of the war as Sparta tried to close the strait to Athens� It was Athens’s inability to 
keep its SLOCs open and thereby feed itself that led to defeat�
The maritime operations that Greek forces conducted during the Pelopon-
nesian War would have been impossible without navies’ ability to fight at sea� 
Battle, on whatever scale, was of critical importance throughout the war� Posses-
sion of a strong fleet that was proven in battle allowed Athens to bully other states 
by merely sailing its fleet around the Aegean and beyond� Without establishing 
sea control with its fleet, Athens would not have been able to conduct a concerted 
campaign of maritime power projection against Sparta and its allies� The Athe-
nians certainly would not have gained a victory as stunning as the one at Pylos/
Sphacteria without the ability to defeat the Spartan fleet in battle� It was only 
when Sparta took to the seas with a fleet that it was able to cause serious harm to 
Athens, which caused the latter’s allies to rebel and threatened its maritime trade� 
Sparta’s eventual transformation into a naval power, no matter how short-lived, 
combined with Athens’s inability to counter this transformation effectively, was 
the defining factor in the war�83 Once Sparta confronted Athens in battle at sea, 
it directly threatened the Athenians with loss of the foundation of their power�
Far from being a sideshow of only secondary importance, the naval and 
maritime dimension of the Peloponnesian War was of critical importance to the 
conduct, and indeed the outcome, of the war� Too much has been made of tech-
nological limitations, prejudicing the proper study of maritime operations and 
their impact on the history of the period� The Peloponnesian War was fought 
primarily at and from the sea, and the outcome of the war was decided by the 
ability of Athens and Sparta to use sea power effectively�
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COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING THE “PERFECT STORM” HURRICANE 
IRMA AND THE ENSUING NATURAL DISASTERS DURING SEPTEMBER 2017 
WITHIN REGION 9, MARINE CORPS EMBASSY SECURITY GROUP
Joseph E. Galvin
In September 2017, the Caribbean basin and the state of Florida encountered 
Hurricane Irma—the most powerful and potentially the most devastating storm 
to impact the region since recordings began� This category 5 hurricane formed 
in the southern part of the North Atlantic Ocean and traversed to the Leeward 
Islands, smashing into Antigua, Barbuda, Saint Martin, and the U�S� Virgin Is-
lands, leaving them in a major state of peril� All the while, the forecasted path of 
the eye of the storm directly targeted the metropolitan centers of Miami and Fort 
Lauderdale, the latter the home of Region 9 Headquarters (HQ), Marine Corps 
Embassy Security Group (MCESG)� The hurricane continued on its path, grazing 
Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, fortunately sparing their people 
major desolation and their infrastructure major damage, but still wreaking havoc 
on those nations� The hurricane then slammed into the northern beaches of 
Cuba, where the U�S� embassy is situated� As Irma bounced off Cuba, the eye of 
the hurricane changed its projected track, shifting to bring the brunt of the storm 
to the Florida Keys and the western side of main-
land Florida� This extraordinary turn of events 
dramatically altered destruction forecasts and 
impacted command-and-control (C2) operations�
As if a category 5 hurricane rampaging among 
Region 9’s detachments and barreling directly to-
ward Region 9 HQ were not enough to disrupt C2, 
the storm threatened to produce ten- to fifteen- 
foot storm surges along multiple coasts, and actually 
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Galvin is the com-
manding officer of Region 9, Marine Corps Embassy 
Security Group. He is a graduate of Thomas M. 
Cooley Law School (juris doctor) and George Wash-
ington University (LLM in international law). He 
has served in numerous legal billets as prosecuting 
and defense attorney, and as staff judge advocate. 
Lieutenant Colonel Galvin hzas deployed in opera-
tional billets to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan.
© 2017 by Joseph E� Galvin 
Naval War College Review, Winter 2018, Vol. 71, No. 1
Winter2018Review.indb   140 11/1/17   9:56 AM
146
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 12
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/12
G A LV I N  1 4 1
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spawned numerous confirmed tornadoes throughout mainland Florida� Adding 
to the mix, during the height of hurricane command operations, Mexico expe-
rienced an earthquake measuring 8�1 on the Richter scale—breaking a century- 
old record—that triggered emergency reactions from Detachment Mexico City�1 
This earthquake brought threats of tsunamis off the coasts of Mexico, El Salva-
dor, and Guatemala, causing detachments there to consider emergency actions� 
Furthermore, during the aftermath, Detachment Havana experienced major 
flooding of the chancery that affected operational abilities and administrative 
routines� A pseudothreat of fire even challenged Region 9 HQ’s displaced opera-
tions center—a fire alarm forced evacuation for a period�
This lays out the situation that Region 9, MCESG—the command element for 
all the Marine security guards (MSGs) for embassies in the Caribbean, Central 
America, and Canada—was charged with controlling� As the regional headquar-
ters for the Caribbean MSG detachments in the embassies in Cuba, Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic, Barbados, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, Region 9 HQ ensures 
that assigned Marines are trained to coordinate with and follow the operational 
and emergency-action plans laid out by the regional security officer (RSO) for 
hurricanes and their aftermath� Additionally, the Region 9 HQ staff maintains 
direct administrative control over these detachments to ensure completion of all 
training and manpower matters�
C2 within the Region 9 HQ staff and with the MSG detachments during Hur-
ricane Irma focused on safety, communication, and accountability�
Safety
Safety was the theme—the main focus of effort—during Hurricane Irma� The 
number one command priority in a natural disaster, especially one as potentially 
devastating and unpredictable as a category 5 hurricane, is the safety of Marines 
and their families� No loss of material possessions, missed work time, or personal 
inconvenience can trump a well-contemplated decision that offers safety from 
death or serious injury� Decisions involving safety are made continuously and 
courses of action may be adapted or otherwise change, depending on the path 
of the hurricane and the trail of destruction it leaves� Safety is the priority not 
only during preparations and the actual weathering of the hurricane but also, 
and perhaps most importantly, during the cleanup phase, as this is when people 
are most likely to let their guard down, leading to accidents� A combination of 
full-blown and speedier operational risk management (ORM) plans provides 
outstanding assessments of courses of action contemplated during hurricane 
phases� Understanding the potential safety issues that hurricanes bring and how 
they can affect the well-being of Marines is crucial to exercising command with 
safety as a priority�
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During preparation, Region 9 HQ coordinated with the potentially affected 
detachments and the respective RSOs to determine whether additional support 
from the Marine Security Augmentation Unit (MSAU) at MCESG would be re-
quired� In two cases, those of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, such support 
was requested and provided� MSAU Marines arrived in those countries to assist 
with any safety and operational matters the RSOs deemed necessary� This sup-
port provided extra MSGs to protect the embassies’ compounds, add manpower 
to the detachments, and respond to operational incidents, thereby providing an 
extra layer of safety and security to the embassies� Region 9 HQ continuously 
preached safety to the detachments during the successive hurricane phases� Un-
derstanding the ORM for each plan of action and communicating that concept 
to every Marine were crucial to success in the campaign against Hurricane Irma�
Region 9 HQ employed another calculated safety measure by issuing a depar-
ture order for the HQ staff to evacuate southern Florida and put the continuity 
of operations plan (COOP) into effect� The prescribed evacuation safe haven was 
MacDill Air Force Base (AFB) in Tampa, Florida� This decision was not taken 
lightly, as the main thrust of the region strategic C2 takes place in HQ, where the 
infrastructure is in place� However, considering all the factors—Florida’s gover-
nor directing mandatory departure from parts of the county in which Region 9 
HQ is located and some Region 9 HQ Marines live, the Florida Regional Center 
(the physical location of Region 9 HQ) officially closing, and a category 5 hur-
ricane bearing down directly on the location—the order was sensible, logical, 
timely, and prudent�2 Bottom line: it was the right thing to do�
Marines are taught to adapt and overcome to accomplish the mission� The 
execution of the COOP at MacDill was a true testament to that ethos� However, 
Region 9 HQ would be tested again� After Region 9 HQ spent thirty-six hours 
conducting operations from the safe haven, the unpredictable hurricane curved 
westward around southern Florida, now severely threatening the Tampa coast-
line� At this juncture, the commanding general of MacDill AFB ordered the 
evacuation of all residents and guests� By all analyses, this was an astute decision, 
as Hurricane Irma’s new course endangered thousands� Reacting to this new 
chain of events, Region 9 HQ developed courses of action in a hasty planning 
process, then settled on a dispersion of forces to various safe locations through-
out South Carolina, Georgia, and northern Florida�3 The resultant split-forces 
operations required detailed coordination and a particularized communications 
plan (discussed later)�
This theme of safety applied not only to the Marines of Region 9 but also to 
their families� Where authorized departures were activated at the embassies, Re-
gion 9 HQ encouraged detachment commanders to send families out of harm’s 
way and helped coordinate logistical and administrative efforts to ensure a 
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smooth process� Similarly, when Region 9 HQ decided to put the departure order 
into effect, safety of the families was a critical factor� All courses of action hinged 
on the safety of the activity or preparation, whether that involved ensuring that 
Marines had approved safe relocation sites; planned travel itineraries (via flying 
or driving); or adequate food, water, other emergency provisions, and rest� Get-
ting the Region 9 family as a whole into the safest position possible to weather 
the hurricane allowed the Marines to continue to carry out their duties effectively, 
even when facing the dilemmas resulting from operating amid multiple natural 
disasters�
Communication
Safe operational courses of action are successful only when a sustainable and 
reliable communication structure allows a free flow of information� One of the 
tenets of the Region 9 commanding officer’s (CO’s) command philosophy is that 
effective communication entails ensuring that information is conveyed to all who 
need to know it in a timely manner� During Hurricane Irma, operations involved 
keeping a communication gateway among the affected detachments, Region 9 
HQ, and other MCESG HQs� A preestablished communication plan enabled con-
stant information flow throughout each event during this period of the “perfect 
storm�” For example, when the earthquake off the coast of Mexico threatened to 
produce devastating tsunamis and aftershocks that would impact Guatemala, 
Mexico, and El Salvador, the Region 9 CO, MCESG, and the detachments com-
municated up-to-the-minute status reports on Marines’ welfare, embassy dam-
age, and local weather�
These entities used a highly effective push-and-pull system of information 
gathering/producing that was effectuated by multiple media, including e-mail; 
web-based applications; and cell phone text and voice functions, as well as ap-
plications (specifically, WhatsApp)� An open, flat communication structure 
within which all parties were privy to real-time information dispensed with any 
communication lag, enabling those who required critical information to make 
efficient and knowledgeable decisions� For example, Region 9 HQ was able to 
produce multiple daily situation reports for MCESG HQ that offered insight on 
the overall status of the command and where the focus of attention needed to be 
as Hurricane Irma navigated through the region’s area of responsibility� Often 
these reports were completed via e-mail; however, when communication media 
did not work because of weather, other forms were employed as well�
In contingency operations communication is never perfect; this was true dur-
ing the Hurricane Irma event� Use of cell phones and the Internet during and 
after the hurricane proved to be troublesome, not only because of connectivity 
issues but also because almost the entire state of Florida and the Caribbean lost 
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electrical service for various periods� Conserving resources was key to allowing 
communications to continue to flow in an effective manner�
Instituting a multimedia communication structure provided significant insur-
ance against a total communication breakdown across the vast region� However, 
Region 9 HQ prepared for any anomaly by designating a special Hurricane Irma 
liaison officer who would assume the position of the Region 9 HQ and act as 
an intermediary between the detachments and MCESG HQ� The Region 9 CO 
appointed the Ottawa (Canada) detachment commander to this liaison position 
and established a protocol that provided set timelines, so if all communication 
from Region 9 HQ was lost the liaison officer automatically would follow a pre-
scribed plan� This “fallback” provision proved extremely beneficial� The liaison 
officer relayed information to detachments and MCESG, but more importantly 
provided stability within the region while the HQ element went through multiple 
evacuations and natural catastrophes� For example, when the tornadoes ripped 
through central Florida and temporarily cut off cell phone and Internet service, 
the liaison officer was able to keep up a continuous stream of communication 
with the detachments, providing assessments of embassy damage�
Accountability
Perhaps the most critical use of effective communication was to account for 
personnel and equipment� During Hurricane Irma, judicious and steadfast 
communicative processes enabled all detachments and HQ Marines to submit 
morning reports with 100 percent accountability, providing higher HQs with 
an assurance that all personnel were accounted for, uninjured, and safe� Region 
9 HQ mandated that all personnel report in each morning; prior to, during, and 
on completion of any prolonged movement; and when any commander-critical 
information requirements specific to the hurricane were triggered (e�g�, injury 
or power outage)� Prior to the hurricane’s arrival, all the detachments reported 
accountability via the Internet� However, as the storm traversed the region and 
destroyed electrical power grids and paralyzed Internet access, detachments 
switched to other methods, including cell phones� For example, Cuba lost power 
for more than a week owing to wind damage and the flooding of the embassy, but 
the detachment used cell phones effectively to provide morning and situational 
reports to Region 9 HQ� Similarly, when Region 9 HQ was forced to conduct 
operations from separate physical locations after the second evacuation, it con-
ducted internal accountability through the WhatsApp cell phone application, 
providing a flat-line communication method that allowed instantaneous distri-
bution of information to all�
Ensuring the whereabouts, condition, and safety of Marines and unit equip-
ment is the core of C2� Accountability comes as second nature to Marine 
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commanders—but it may not be truly tested until lives are at risk� MSG com-
mand naturally embodies a strong accountability requirement, given that regions’ 
detachments are dispersed throughout broad areas of the world; however, risk to 
life and limb is not always present�4 Accountability becomes even more vital when 
the lives of family members and friends accompanying Marines are entrusted to 
the Marine Corps family� Hurricane Irma and its accompanying natural disasters 
tested Region 9’s accountability procedures� Throughout the storms, Region 9 
accounted for all its detachment Marines and families; this included the Region 
9 HQ staff, family, and accompanying friends through two evacuations and hun-
dreds of miles of travel�
Accountability cannot be taken for granted or assumed at any time, but espe-
cially during times of peril� Accurate accountability allows for the timely mitiga-
tion of issues and quicker resolution of problems that might fester without due 
attention� As noted, during the hurricane, Region 9 conducted accountability 
procedures in response to multiple triggers� This enabled the command and 
higher HQ to have full faith and confidence that all Marines and family mem-
bers were uninjured and in safe locations� Because of the distances traveled and 
shortages of fuel, accountability was fundamental when Region 9 HQ Marines 
dispersed from Tampa to their various safe havens�
Command and control within the Region 9 HQ staff and the MSG detach-
ments during Hurricane Irma and the other natural disasters focused on safety, 
communication, and accountability� The interplay among these three elements 
highlighted the importance of establishing mechanisms to facilitate internal and 
external coordination� Ensuring the well-being of Marines and families when life 
and limb are at risk is paramount to leadership, and it was the priority in this case� 
Constant, effective communication that provided up-to-date information to and 
from all affected units and individuals established positive control and instilled 
confidence in command capabilities� Employing multiple media mechanisms 
safeguarded against potential communication breakdowns that would have 
crippled administrative and operational movements� Accountability of Marines 
and equipment was a core concept of control and ensured timely and accurate 
reporting� The unpredictable and challenging scenarios encountered during the 
“perfect storm” truly tested the tenets of command and control�
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N O T E S
 1� Joshua Berlinger, Mariano Castillo, and Ray 
Sanchez, “Mexico’s Strongest Earthquake in a 
Century Leaves Dozens Dead,” CNN, Septem-
ber 9, 2017, www�cnn�com/�
 2� Governor Rick Scott issued partial mandatory 
evacuations for sixteen counties and directed 
voluntary evacuations for thirteen other 
counties� Sarah Almukhtar et al�, “Maps: 
Tracking Hurricane Irma’s Path over Florida,” 
New York Times, September 11, 2017, www 
�nytimes�com/�
 3� Maintaining a regional HQ in one location 
and still accomplishing the mission was 
deemed impossible because no lodging was 
available within approximately five hun-
dred miles of Tampa� The course of action 
employed was for Region 9 HQ staff to stay 
with friends and family within the (relatively) 
immediate area of northern Florida, Georgia, 
and South Carolina�
 4� For some detachments, the threat of death or 
serious bodily injury is a daily peril (e�g�, in 
Afghanistan)� The hazards associated with a 
hurricane or other natural disasters do not 
compare to man-made threats; the point is 
that the dangers vary�
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the netherworld of geopolitics
George Michael
The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer “Educated” 
Hitler and Hess, by Holger H� Herwig� Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2016� 292 pages� $85�
Over the past several years, the field of geopolitics has regained popularity� 
More and more, scholars show an interest in the impact of geography on in-
ternational relations and political development� In his book The Revenge of 
Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against 
Fate (Random House, 2013), Robert Kaplan explains how factors such as ter-
rain, rivers, and weather have influenced the destiny of nations� In Russia, the 
political theorist Aleksandr Dugin counsels his nation’s leaders to adopt a geo-
political strategy to counter the U�S�-led world order� He draws on not only the 
rich Anglo-Saxon school of geopolitics but the more obscure German tradition 
as well� While the former is widely available to the English-speaking world, the 
latter is more difficult to access� But Holger H� Herwig, professor emeritus at the 
University of Calgary, has written an important 
book that examines arguably the most impor-
tant figure in the German school of geopolitics: 
the enigmatic Karl Haushofer (1869–1946)� 
Now, for the first time, an extensive English- 
language treatment of Haushofer is available� In 
The Demon of Geopolitics: How Karl Haushofer 
“Educated” Hitler and Hess, Herwig examines how 
Haushofer’s theories influenced German strategy 
in the years leading up to World War II�
George Michael received his PhD from George Ma-
son University’s School of Public Policy. He is an 
associate professor of criminal justice at Westfield 
State University, in Massachusetts. Previously he 
was an associate professor of nuclear counterprolif-
eration and deterrence theory at the Air War College 
in Montgomery, Alabama. He is the author of seven 
books, most recently Preparing for Contact: When 
Humans and Extraterrestrials Finally Meet (RVP 
Press, 2014). In addition, his articles have been pub-
lished in numerous academic journals. 
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The book is structured as a biography that cogently explains how Haushofer’s 
strategic weltanschauung (worldview) evolved over time� Herwig has carried 
out extensive archival research� Haushofer’s roots trace to Bavaria, where he was 
raised in a Catholic family� As a young man, he entered the Kriegsschule (Military 
College), passed his officer’s examination in 1889, and received a commission 
as a second lieutenant� Showing leadership potential, he was admitted to the 
prestigious Kriegsakademie (War Academy) just two years later, and excelled� In 
1904, he took up a three-year post as instructor of modern military history at the 
Bavarian War Academy�
Through his father, Haushofer met Professor Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), 
an ardent pan-Germanist and theoretician of geopolitics� Ratzel’s opus Political 
Geography had an abiding influence on Haushofer’s strategic outlook� Accord-
ing to Ratzel, geography and ethnography were the engines of world history� For 
that reason, educating Germany in the discipline of geopolitics was essential to 
long-term survival, in that nations declined to the degree they were unable to 
understand the necessity of expanding into new territories�
But it was in the Anglo-Saxon world that the field of geopolitics first gained 
broad currency� The English academic Sir Halford Mackinder (1861–1947) is re-
garded as the founder of the discipline� His noted 1904 article “The Geographical 
Pivot of History” exerted a great influence on Haushofer� For Mackinder, control 
of the area that corresponds roughly to Russia, Iran, and the central Asian repub-
lics (i�e�, the “pivot” or “heartland”), is necessary for attaining global hegemony� 
Ominously, Mackinder feared that someday Germany, with its dynamic industry, 
technology, and scientific knowledge, would be grafted onto the vast land and 
natural resources of Russia� A Russo-German alliance would dominate the heart-
land and, by extension, the world�
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), who went on to serve as Presi-
dent of the Naval War College, came to be regarded as geopolitics’ principal 
American proponent� For Mahan, securing vital sea-lanes was the foremost fac-
tor in achieving and maintaining national greatness� After World War I, Haus-
hofer integrated Mahan’s theories on sea power with his continental-oriented 
strategy of geopolitics�
Finally, Haushofer was influenced deeply by Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922), a 
Swedish political scientist whose book The State as a Living Organism stressed the 
importance of “human geography�” To Kjellén, the state was not unlike a biologi-
cal being� He invented the word autarky, or national self-sufficiency, which he 
believed was a requisite for attaining global power� Kjellén also coined the term 
Geopolitik, which Haushofer adopted for his own strategic approach�
Events in Haushofer’s personal life created new opportunities for him to refine 
his geopolitical perspective� For example, the woman he would marry, Martha 
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Mechtild Mary Mayer-Doss, had command of multiple languages, including a 
working knowledge of Japanese—a major asset to both� In 1908, the War Min-
istry ordered Haushofer to the German embassy in Tokyo� Haushofer’s stay in 
Japan proved to be an important formative period of his life�
Although they were located on opposite sides of the globe, Haushofer believed 
that Germany and Japan exhibited similar cultures� For example, the samurai 
tradition was not unlike that of the Junker military class, stressing discipline, 
monarchism, and a strong state� Consequently, he contemplated a strategic 
partnership between the two nations as a way to counter American and British 
influence, both economic and political, in the Far East�
Published in 1913, Haushofer’s book Dai Nihon (Great Japan) received favor-
able reviews� In it, Haushofer outlined his basic weltanschauung� He advanced a 
doctrine of social Darwinism, counseling that nations rose and fell according to 
unalterable biological laws� An unabashed imperialist, he exhorted Germany to 
expand into its border areas, as Japan had done in 1894–95 and 1904–1905�
When World War I broke out, Haushofer was given command of a battal-
ion of the 1st Ammunition Column, 7th Army Corps� During quiet periods at 
the front, he gave much thought to the political side of the war, and concluded 
that Germany had entered the conflict alongside the wrong ally, the moribund 
Austria-Hungary� As he saw it, Germany was fighting its two “natural allies” in 
Russia and Japan, with whom it should be united as part of the heartland of which 
he dreamed� When the United States entered the conflict in April of 1917, his 
anti-Americanism became more acute; he wrote that “Americans are truly the 
only people on this world that I regard with a deep, instinctive hatred�” With the 
U�S� military now in the war, the forces arrayed against Germany could not be 
surmounted� But many Germans found it difficult to accept that they had been 
defeated by superior military force; consequently, a “stab in the back” narrative 
crystallized that blamed imperial Germany’s downfall on internal enemies�
By the end of the war, Haushofer had attained the rank of colonel and was 
commanding the 30th Bavarian Reserve Division� In the chaos that followed the 
armistice, he restored order in Bavaria� Returning to Munich, he affiliated with 
the Thule Society, a study group formed in 1911 that was devoted to ancient 
German history� In the realm of politics, the organization had a leading role in 
squelching the leftist revolution led by Kurt Eisner in the spring of 1919� In an 
effort to win the support of the masses, the Thule Society launched the German 
Workers’ Party (DAP) in 1919� That same year, an obscure army corporal investi-
gating nationalist groups attended a meeting of the fledgling political party� Adolf 
Hitler eventually would assume its leadership and change its name to the Nation-
al Socialist German Workers’ Party—which came to be known as the Nazi Party�
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Not long after the war ended, Haushofer returned to academia, teaching at the 
Institute of Geography at the University of Munich� Eventually, he made a sober 
analysis of the reasons Germany was defeated in World War I� In his estimation, 
Germany’s leadership had failed to grasp geopolitics� The experience of World 
War I refined Haushofer’s views on sea power� He adopted Mahan’s precondi-
tions for sea power in his own theory of geopolitics� In his 1937 book World Seas 
and World Powers, Haushofer overcame his narrow continental viewpoint and 
sought to educate Germans on the subjects of commerce, colonies, sea-lanes, 
and oceanic trade� As Herwig points out, Haushofer’s foreign policy views were a 
blend of romanticism and realpolitik� Increasingly, he adopted the verbiage of the 
primacy of race and its influence on history� By 1930, he had established himself 
as Germany’s preeminent apostle of geopolitics�
At the university, Haushofer’s most cherished student was Rudolf Hess (1894–
1987)� They first met at a DAP meeting in May 1920 held in Munich� After the 
failed Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923, Hess was sent to the Landsberg Prison 
along with his coconspirator Adolf Hitler� Through his pupil Hess, Haushofer 
influenced Hitler early in his political career� While in prison, Hitler fleshed out 
the material that eventually became his autobiography and political opus, Mein 
Kampf� In particular, Hitler was influenced by Haushofer’s notion of Lebensraum 
(living room), which left a substantial imprint on his weltanschauung� The den-
sity of the German population cried out for territorial expansion, most especially 
into the broad expanses of Ukraine and Russia�
After the Nazi Machtergreifung (seizure of power) in January 1933, Haushofer 
hoped that Hitler would implement his geopolitical vision� On the foreign policy 
front—at least in the east—Haushofer was at first quite pleased with Hitler� The 
German-Soviet pact of 1939 appeared to be the quintessence of statecraft, in that 
it ignored ideology in favor of pursuing national interests� According to the secret 
protocol signed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, Germany 
and the Soviet Union would divide Poland along the Vistula, San, and Bug Rivers, 
while Berlin recognized Moscow’s claims to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania� With a single stroke of the pen, the pact seemed to bring Mac-
kinder’s geographical pivot of history one step closer to fruition� Haushofer was 
ecstatic over the treaty� With Russia as an ally, Germany would gain spatial mass, 
access to vast natural resources, and hinterland security� Furthermore, Hitler’s 
alliance with Japan seemed to be in lockstep with Haushofer’s grand strategy as 
well� Joined with Japan—whose navy was formidable in the Pacific—Germany 
would be virtually unassailable, never again subjected to “Anglo-Saxon tutelage�”
At least initially, the treaty seemed to fend off the strategic nightmare of an-
other two-front war on the continent� Much to Hitler’s dismay, however, Moscow 
evinced little interest in turning south to focus on the British colonies of India 
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and Persia� Instead, by late 1940, Molotov pressed Hitler on his intentions in Fin-
land, Romania, the Balkans, and the Baltic� Feeling rebuffed, Hitler signed War 
Directive No� 21 (Case BARBAROSSA), whose objective was to crush the Soviet 
Union in a rapid campaign� Initiated on June 22, 1941, the invasion effectively 
destroyed Haushofer’s dream of creating a “Eurasian continental block�”
The Western Allies’ successful operation at Normandy doomed the Third 
Reich� Haushofer was arrested not long after the July 20, 1944, plot to assassinate 
Hitler—Operation VALKYRIE—after it transpired that his son Albrecht was as-
sociated with the conspirators� Karl Haushofer was released a month later, most 
likely owing to the intervention of General Franz Ritter von Epp, but the Gestapo 
later killed Albrecht Haushofer�
Not long after Germany’s surrender, the International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg included Haushofer on its list of major war criminals; Chief Justice 
Robert H� Jackson went so far as to refer to him as “Hitler’s intellectual godfather�” 
But ultimately Justice Jackson spared Haushofer by failing to arraign him, and af-
ter interrogation Haushofer was allowed to return home� But by this time he was 
a broken man� Bereaved by the death of his favorite son, he lost all desire to carry 
on� On March 10, 1946, he and his wife committed double suicide by poisoning�
According to Herwig, Haushofer was blinded by a false sense of pride� As Her-
wig points out, the ultimate tragedy of Haushofer’s life, as his son Albrecht noted, 
was that he “broke away the seal” to the Aladdin’s lamp of geopolitics for Hess and 
Hitler and then “let the demon soar into the world�” Haushofer found an eager 
pupil in Hitler, but did not appreciate adequately how his geopolitical concepts 
could be misused in a country that harbored an acute sense of grievance and 
revanchist aspirations after the humiliating Treaty of Versailles� Herwig’s study 
illuminates the tragic story of Haushofer, and as such will be of great interest to 
students of geopolitics�
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Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s 
Trap?, by Graham Allison. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Har-
court, 2017. 384 pages. $28.
Thucydides was a political pathologist, a student of political disease, especially 
as it occurs during war. This is most evident from his account of the plague in 
Athens. He describes the physical symptoms of the disease first, but then turns 
to its political effects, including the breakdown of the Athenian political order 
(Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.47–55). Thucydides’s self-
understanding as a political pathologist is also evident in his account of the civil 
war in Corcyra. He begins with just the facts: the Corinthians inserted a fifth 
column into Corcyra to incite a revolution, in which the oligarchic faction would 
overthrow the democracy. The quarrel polarized the community and escalated to 
a struggle of extermination—while the Athenians watched, callously, from their 
ships at the port in Corcyra. War is a harsh teacher that reduces most of us to the 
necessities that war imposes on us, Thucydides said, so no means, fair or foul, 
were off-limits during this civil war (3.70–85).
Human beings cannot help being moral creatures, however, so the different 
factions had to justify their atrocities to themselves and their followers. In the 
process, words began to lose their customary meaning. Anticipating George Or-
well’s famous account of “doublespeak,” Thucydides showed the worst of the dis-
ease to be a breakdown of moral, political, and strategic judgment, with murder 
described as justice and crime as virtue. The 
desire for revenge was so powerful that it over-
came the drive for self-preservation (3.82). 
The civil war was suicidal; alas, it spread to 
almost every city in ancient Greece, including 
Athens, and contributed to Athens’s ultimate 
defeat at the hands of Sparta.
Little distinguishes Thucydidean from 
modern political science more than Thucydi-
des’s disdain for rational-actor models of 
politics and war. His greatest contribution 
may have been to explain the power of the 
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irrational passions when violence is a constant threat� If the civil war in Corcyra 
is treated as a microcosm of the struggle between democratic and oligarchic cities 
in ancient Greece, it is an apt description of how belligerents under the pressures 
of war often lose their minds�
The civil war in Corcyra is just one of the many traps against which Dr� 
Thucydides warns us� As a pathologist he diagnoses symptoms of diseases; 
sometimes he explains their causes; occasionally he makes predictions, or prog-
noses, about the likely progress of the disease at hand� He almost never offers 
prescriptions to cure the diseases he identifies, however� He expected the same 
sort of pathologies to arise again and again, so long as human nature remained 
the same (1�22)� He had a cyclical view of history� His answer to the question in 
the 1960s folk-rock anthemic lyrics—“When will they ever learn?”—almost cer-
tainly would have been “They never will�” Individual cities and countries might 
fare better or worse from time to time; some might resist the temptations, even 
compulsions, that lead to mutually suicidal wars; but wisdom is not cumulative� 
As one generation learns from the suffering of war, another forgets� So we are 
condemned to go through this cycle without end�
In contrast, much of modern political science is Whiggish; that is, it embraces a 
progressive view of history� If one treats Thucydides’s greatest translator, Thomas 
Hobbes, as the founder of this kind of political science, the genre certainly shares 
Thucydides’s concern with political pathology� It too diagnoses diseases (such 
as Hobbes’s famous state of nature as a state of war—a beginning point modeled 
clearly on Thucydides’s account of the civil war in Corcyra)� It too tries to explain 
causes and make predictions� But it does one thing Thucydides does not: it offers 
prescriptions� The first to explore in a systematic fashion the possibility of escap-
ing Thucydides’s many traps was Hobbes himself� Henceforward, the purpose 
of political science would be to escape the Thucydides-inspired Hobbesian state 
of nature as a state of war, although Hobbes admitted that this was possible only 
within a political community, not among them� So, the nature of international 
politics, as was true in Thucydides’s age too, was characterized by a state of war�
Others were more optimistic� Take, for example, Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, and John Jay in the classic American work on federalism, republican-
ism, and constitutional government, the Federalist Papers� Although Thucydides 
is never mentioned in the text, his shadow hangs over the entire project, begin-
ning with Jay’s and Hamilton’s accounts of the causes of war and the problems 
of federations in ensuring peace among their members and with other powers 
(essays 3–9, 11, and 15)� The pathology they feared was that the American union 
would become like the Athenian-led Delian League, a tyranny of one state over 
the others, or would descend into anarchy among its members as foreign pow-
ers exploited their internal divisions, as happened to the Delian League when 
Winter2018Review.indb   153 11/1/17   9:56 AM
159
College: Winter 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 1 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Persia intervened at the end of the Peloponnesian War� And just as Thucydides 
attributed the downfall of Athens to the rise of demagogues, such as Cleon and 
Alcibiades, and the hyperpartisanship they exploited to serve their ambition 
(2�65), James Madison is famous for diagnosing partisan faction as the “disease” 
that commonly destroys free governments from within (essays 10 and 51)� Again, 
human nature is the crucial constant� Eschewing almost all hope of curing the 
causes of faction in a free government, Dr� Madison advised treating its effects, 
or symptoms, in an extended republic whose pluralistic character would make it 
difficult for any one faction to tyrannize in its own name�
And others were even more optimistic about escaping Thucydides’s multiple 
traps—the constant dangers of war and tyranny arising from, and aggravated 
by, the wildest passions of human nature� Immanuel Kant famously argued that 
republican (law-based) government is possible even for a nation of devils, if they 
have but reason� And if that was possible inside a state, it also might be possible 
among them, if they established something like a League of Nations or a United 
Nations to provide collective security� Friedrich Hegel even predicted an end 
of history, in which the world spirit would transform human nature and put an 
end to violent conflict� And at the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama even 
claimed that, inside the West at least, the Hegelian end of history had arrived� 
Humanity soon might escape Thucydides’s many, many traps�
Not so fast, some argued� History might return, perhaps with a vengeance� 
And so it did in the Balkans, Iraq, and Syria today, where every political disease 
Thucydides predicted would happen in civil war has recurred, but with the sav-
age advantages of modern weaponry�
Now entering the fray comes Graham Allison in his latest book, Destined for 
War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, which is based on an 
earlier, provocative article in The Atlantic (September 24, 2015)� Those familiar 
with Allison’s distinguished body of scholarship know his question is rhetorical� 
Whether writing on the Cuban missile crisis or the dangers of nuclear terrorism, 
he always has combined a Thucydidean anticipation of recurring problems, such 
as military escalation, with a progressive aspiration to solve them, so far as they 
can be solved, at least in our own time� Precisely because the problems are rooted 
in human nature, they will never go away; they will increase or decrease in inten-
sity depending on the political conditions of the age� They might be mitigated, 
however, by anticipating them and avoiding some of the errors in judgment that 
led to calamities in the past�
The calamity Allison fears most is what he calls the “Thucydides Trap”: a 
situation in which a rising power’s growth inspires such fear in an established 
power that it seems, inevitably, to lead to war (p� xv)� To be clear, this is just one 
of many traps, or pathologies, Thucydides first diagnosed, but he did claim that 
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the “truest cause” of the Peloponnesian War was the growth of Athenian power 
and the fear it inspired in Sparta, which compelled Sparta to go to war (1�23, 1�88, 
1�118)� Scholars differ on how precisely to translate and interpret Thucydides’s 
understanding of the truest cause of the war� Did Thucydides mean the war was 
inevitable, and if so, what kind of inevitability was he talking about?
One might argue that even Thucydides did not believe in the Thucydides 
Trap as Allison defines it� What appears to be a clear and simple explanation of 
the causes of the Peloponnesian War is anything but� Wrote Carl Clausewitz, war 
arises from a clash of policies� If Athens insisted on challenging Sparta’s power 
and if Sparta insisted on containing Athens, then yes, some form of conflict was 
inevitable� But these policies were not inevitable� Athens might have chosen not 
to try to expand its power further; Sparta might have chosen to accommodate 
Athenian aspirations; some sort of compromise might have been possible if they 
had made different political choices�
And here Greek tragedy, which was born shortly before and flourished most 
during the Peloponnesian War, can be helpful� Was Oedipus (whose hubris 
during a plague reminds some of Pericles) destined to kill his father and sleep 
with his mother? Sophocles’s play Antigone is set after a terrible civil war—not 
unlike the one in Corcyra� Were Antigone and Creon destined to fight, and suf-
fer, over their different views of the demands of political authority and religious 
conscience? Yes and no� Tragic inevitability is a result of both circumstance and 
character� There would have been no tragedy if Oedipus were not Oedipus or 
Antigone not Antigone� Oedipus was the kind of arrogant character who would 
make the sort of judgments that brought about his reversal of fortune, and Antig-
one and Creon were the sorts of self-righteous characters who would allow their 
conflict to polarize unto death�
Likewise, in international politics, as Thucydides well knew and Allison’s book 
confirms, geopolitical circumstance is not destiny; the characters of potential 
belligerents matter, especially their willingness and ability to compromise� As 
Allison demonstrates, England was so fearful of the rise of Germany that it found 
ways to accommodate two other rising challengers, the United States and Japan, 
prior to the First World War, and avoided a war with them as a result (p� 85)� So 
not all rising and established powers are destined to go to war with each other, 
but, as Allison also shows, it is difficult to see how hubristic ones like Athens 
and paranoid ones like Sparta can avoid it� Their national characters fed on each 
other, aggravated their enmities, and made a difficult situation worse, perhaps 
even impossible to resolve without war�
In many ways, Allison is following in Thucydides’s footsteps� The structural 
situation of a rising China challenging the established power of the United States 
has to worry anyone who has seen this problem before� Whereas Thucydides 
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describes a microcosm of all war that is meant to diagnose the recurring pa-
thologies of war as such, Allison’s focus is far narrower, although his dataset is 
far bigger� Allison gathers evidence from sixteen different case studies in which 
the structural features of a clash between a rising and an established power are 
apparent� These range from the Peloponnesian War to the First World War to 
the Cold War� In twelve out of sixteen cases, war has been the result� No one who 
has studied the history of war in the twentieth century and beyond can rest easy 
about this� The First World War destroyed four great empires in Russia, Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman caliphate� It set England and France on a 
path of irrecoverable decline as great powers� And it established conditions for 
totalitarian government to arise in Europe and the Second World War to begin� 
The subsequent clash between the Soviet Union and the United States threatened 
humanity with nuclear extinction� Exactly why the Cold War did not escalate to a 
mutually suicidal war like the Peloponnesian War is not yet clear and is bound to 
be much disputed, but China is rising so quickly, and it has so many people and 
so much wealth, that it seems likely to make the Soviet Union’s challenge to the 
United States pale in comparison�
That does not mean war between the United States and China is inevitable; 
rather, it reveals the imperative to do all that is possible to ensure that it does not 
become so� This is the spirit in which Allison’s book was written and the spirit 
in which it should be received (pp� 235–40)� Thucydides scholars may cavil over 
particular passages Allison cites� China scholars may dispute some of his data� 
And, of course, specialists are bound to question his reading of the sixteen cases 
in his database, as well as why he chose those cases instead of others� Still oth-
ers will warn of the dangers of historical analogies that abstract from the unique 
features of antagonists� Fair enough; but we ought not to lose sight of the forest 
for the trees�
The great question is how to uphold American rights and interests, yet not 
go to war with China (pp� 3–24)� Allison supplies some helpful ways to begin 
to develop an answer� He gives us not a recipe book full of answers but a set of 
questions, or what he calls “clues for peace”—a research agenda, so to speak, for 
the twenty-first century (pp� 187–213)� It belongs to us, students and faculty at 
war colleges especially, to follow the clues—some of which might be false—and 
to develop the answers that fit our time�
Allison does point to some Thucydidean pathologies we would be foolish to 
leave out of our answers, however� One is the tendency toward hubris in many ris-
ing powers and toward paranoia in many established ones� That is a very bad mix� 
He documents the hubris in the character of Kaiser Wilhelm II (and many other 
Germans) and the rise of anti-German sentiment in England on the eve of the 
First World War� He also shows that, ironically, Germany before the First World 
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War feared the rise of Russia just as much as England feared the rise of Germany, 
but with the difference that the Germans developed a strategy of preventive war 
to address the challenge from Russia� They planned to start a war before it was 
too late, just as Sparta opted to go to war with Athens before it was too late to 
resist its growing power (pp� 63–83)� As the cataclysm of the First World War 
demonstrates, the escalation natural to war makes preventive wars opportunities 
well squandered� Starting a war to avoid a war is just too dangerous, especially 
when a rival has nuclear weapons (pp� 207–209)�
This, after all, is one of the key insights of the Athenians in the Melian Dia-
logue� Precisely because Thucydides was a pathologist, modern realists often take 
what Thucydides understood as diseased to be something natural, even healthy, 
like the Athenians’ famous observation that “the strong do what they can while 
the weak suffer what they must” (5�89)� Properly understood, Thucydides was 
diagnosing hubris in the Athenians, not endorsing their example� Of greater sig-
nificance is what the Athenians said immediately before this passage: that justice, 
understood as some form of restraint in international politics, is “only in ques-
tion between equals in power,” or, more literally, between equals in their power 
to compel (through their capability to destroy each other) (5�89)� Perhaps some 
powers are capable of self-restraint absent external compulsion, but the Athe-
nians anticipated what became the cardinal doctrine of the late Cold War: mutual 
assured destruction� Had Athens and Sparta known before their war began that 
it would result in the destruction of the Athenian empire and the irrecoverable 
decline of Sparta, perhaps neither would have gone to war� We know for certain 
and well ahead of time that a war between the United States and China could 
destroy them both� On the basis of that pessimistic premise from the Melian 
Dialogue, perhaps one might begin to build a system of mutual restraint for the 
United States and China�
Those who follow Allison’s path in seeking to avoid Thucydides’s diverse set 
of traps might do well to remember that the American founding was in many 
ways an effort to escape those traps, a practical application of republican secu-
rity theory meant to build a security community in North America in which 
the member states were neither warring nor preparing to war against each 
other� Alas, despite the best hopes of the authors of the Federalist Papers, neither 
demagoguery nor hyperpartisanship has disappeared from politics in Europe or 
America� The Madisonian system of treating the effects rather than the causes of 
faction clearly has its limitations� When combined with nationalist sentiments, 
hyperpartisan demagoguery might get out of control, just as it did in Athens, and 
divide members of the West among themselves, thus producing the sort of inter-
national anarchy an outside power might seek to exploit� Under the influence of 
its demagogues, Athens self-destructed, in part by exploiting its allies, thereby 
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driving them into rebellion� Pericles stated on the eve of the Peloponnesian War 
that Athens had a strong chance of weathering the gathering storm if it retained 
control of the sea and managed its alliances well (2�65)� This is probably true for 
the United States too� So long as it can avoid strategic overextension and lead its 
allies without dominating them, the United States ought to be able to generate 
sufficient loyalty among its allies to deter war while doing everything possible to 
make cooperation in China’s best interest� But woe unto the Americans if they 
undermine, or allow others to jeopardize, the system of alliances on which they 
based their security in the aftermath of the Second World War�
Allison has written an important book, one destined to be debated as much 
as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996)� 
Those who take it as a point of departure might consider therefore a different 
reading of the causes of the Peloponnesian War� What if both Sparta and Athens 
were revisionist powers, with Sparta seeking to revise the structure of power in 
ancient Greece to where it was before the Persian Wars, when Sparta was the 
undisputed hegemon in ancient Greece? Might that analogy fit China today, 
with its young leaders yearning for past hegemony before the European empires 
exploited its internal weaknesses in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries? And what about the United States? On the back of the American dollar bill, 
underneath the pyramid, is a Latin phrase, Novus Ordo Seclorem, “new order of 
the ages�” From its inception, the United States has aimed to be a revolutionary 
power in world affairs, although with much debate on whether the global revolu-
tion would come about from following the American example (what we call soft 
power today) or by force of arms (in crusades for freedom)� After the end of the 
Cold War, when enlargement and engagement became catchwords for American 
foreign policy, one might argue that the United States was anything but a status 
quo power� In time, it chose preventive war in Iraq� And it sought regime change 
elsewhere, too, which must have frightened regimes that Americans had not yet 
sought to change� Small wonder that they push back�
The worst nightmare for the twenty-first century is not one but two revisionist 
powers, China and the United States, each struggling for hegemony� On the eve 
of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles told the Athenians that he was “more afraid 
of our own blunders” than of the Spartans (1�144)� As George Kennan indicated 
long ago, Americans too might become their own worst enemies� While contain-
ing the Soviets, they needed to learn to contain themselves, lest they cause the 
war they meant to prevent� With respect to China, that insight is more relevant 
than ever�
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BOOK REVIEWS
EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN—EXCEPT WHAT’S NEW
Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century, by Andrew L� 
Oros� New York: Columbia Univ� Press, 2017� 320 pages� $90�
Andrew Oros, director of international 
studies at Washington College, opens 
his new book provocatively, proclaim-
ing that in security policy “Japan is 
back�” He then describes a series of 
government decisions made in the 
last decade that indicate a shift away 
from Japan’s postwar reliance on 
soft power and economic diplomacy 
toward a more pragmatic and mili-
tarized national security posture�
Oros uses the Western European Renais-
sance as a self-admittedly imperfect 
framework for understanding the 
threshold-crossing transitions that have 
taken place within Japan’s incremental 
evolution� He draws four general paral-
lels between the two renaissances� First, 
both situations blossomed after cul-
tural taboos were challenged in public� 
Second, both were directly related to 
changes in the global order� Third, just 
as Western Europe’s Renaissance was 
entwined with a growth in interest in 
the region’s classical legacy, many groups 
in contemporary Japan are reevaluating 
their views of history, particularly their 
perspectives on the nation’s military 
and cultural accomplishments� Finally, 
both transitional eras were marked by 
significant advances in communications 
technology that enabled a more rapid 
exchange of ideas and greater access 
for previously marginalized sections 
of society to participate in political 
discourse� In Europe, this technology 
was the movable-type printing press; in 
Japan, it is Internet-based social media�
A decade ago, Richard J� Samuels’s 
Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy 
and the Future of East Asia (Cornell, 
2007) described the nascent formation 
of a new political consensus in Japan 
under which realpolitik policies would 
supplant the long-standing Yoshida 
Doctrine as the nation’s predominant 
security paradigm� Oros’s book focuses 
on the years since the publication of 
Securing Japan, a period bookended by 
Shinzo Abe’s terms as prime minister, to 
describe a Tokyo where such a consensus 
has taken hold and the security commu-
nity now partakes in “a level of realistic 
and practical discussion of Japan’s 
defense needs unimaginable in previous 
decades�” Japan’s Security Renaissance 
analyzes elements of this new consensus, 
including a series of decisions ranging 
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from the 2007 establishment of the 
Ministry of Defense, the 2009 develop-
ment of Japan’s first overseas military 
base, the 2014 relaxation of arms-export 
controls and a constitutional reinter-
pretation to allow the limited exercise 
of collective self-defense, and the 2016 
security legislation, to the continued 
buildup of advanced defense systems�
The book also makes the important 
point that this shift in thinking is 
not confined to a handful of leaders 
or a single political party, but is 
influential across major parties and 
throughout much of Japan’s policy 
community� Oros explains that these 
changes arrive in a context in which 
Japan is viewed as a declining power 
in Asia, and are underwritten by three 
historical legacies: contested memories 
of imperial Japan and the war, postwar 
antimilitarism, and the unequal nature 
of the alliance with the United States�
Organizing the book into six chapters, 
Oros presents his argument in scholarly, 
but never pedantic, writing� The reader 
is impressed by the author’s knowledge 
and benefits from his large network of 
informed Japanese contacts� In addition, 
his argument is both convincing and 
of considerable significance, given that 
in the same decade the Asian security 
context has grown more complex� The 
author’s largely positive conclusion 
discusses implications for Japan, 
the United States, the Asia-Pacific 
region, and the rest of the world�
Oros also hints, however, at potential 
uncertainty and risk ahead� Contem-
porary students generally view the 
European Renaissance in a positive 
light, as it gave rise to new ways of 
thinking, including the empiricism 
that in turn sowed the seeds for the 
Enlightenment� However, a thorough 
analysis of the Renaissance shows that 
the process was also painful, as seen 
in the wars of religion that ravaged 
Europe in the seventeenth century� 
While Oros does not venture a value 
judgment, he cautions the reader to 
consider some of the more disturbing 
possibilities this new renaissance may 
bring for Japan, the United States, 
and Asia’s delicate security balance�
The book is not without its faults� 
It includes a chapter of theoretical 
reflections that seems a bit misplaced� 
That chapter’s discussions of political 
worldviews lack the foundational 
explanations needed by those without 
training in international relations theory, 
while the narrative descriptions of the 
subsequent chapters will disappoint 
academically inclined readers hoping 
to learn Oros’s thoughts regarding 
the conceptual implications of Japan’s 
new security posture� Perhaps a more 
vexatious complaint is that the author 
relegates valuable information and 
analysis to endnotes, which forces 
the reader to flip pages continually or 
risk missing some of the book’s most 
insightful facts and assessments�
Still, this book will stand out as one 
of the most important studies of the 
Japanese security landscape published 
in English in recent years� A highly 
readable treatment of Japan’s last decade, 
Japan’s Security Renaissance provides 
a useful starting point for those 
seeking to understand what is going 
on in Japan and an essential read for 
specialists keeping track of the many 
changes in Asian security dynamics�
JOHN BRADFORD AND MATT NOLAND
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The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global 
War against Radical Islam and Its Allies, by Mi-
chael T� Flynn and Michael Ledeen� New York: St� 
Martin’s, 2016� 208 pages� $26�99�
General Michael Flynn rose from 
relative obscurity to become President 
Donald Trump’s first national security 
advisor—only to be forced to resign just 
thirty-four days after Trump’s inaugura-
tion� While Flynn’s White House tenure 
was brief, his views align with those 
of Trump’s inner circle—few of whom 
have public writings of their own� 
Flynn’s 2016 book Field of Fight—part 
memoir, part strategic vision—therefore 
provides insight into a White House 
that eschews foreign policy conventions� 
Unfortunately, what Field of Fight 
offers is a breathless portrayal of global 
conspiracies and civilizational clash with 
Islam, and policy recommendations 
not developed much beyond slogans�
Michael T� Flynn is a career Army 
intelligence officer (also an alumnus 
of the Naval War College and a 
Middletown, Rhode Island, native) 
who reached the three-star rank of 
lieutenant general� His coauthor, 
Dr� Michael Ledeen, has authored 
numerous books and articles on U�S� 
Middle East policy� The two are listed 
as coauthors, but the book is written in 
Flynn’s first-person voice throughout�
The first third of Field of Fight is a 
memoir of Flynn’s career� Of greatest 
interest are Flynn’s assignments in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, among them serving 
as chief of intelligence for General 
Stanley A� McChrystal� By all accounts, 
Flynn played a key role in developing 
intelligence-led, quick-exploitation 
operations� Flynn sketches his innova-
tions, offers a few stories, and trumpets 
his “maverick” nature and dislike of 
rules� There are few new insights, 
however� Those interested in the opera-
tional angle will find better treatments 
in recent books by James Kitfield and 
Sean Naylor or McChrystal’s memoir�
The book then shifts to the global threats 
facing America� And a threatening world 
it is, as Flynn and Ledeen see imminent 
existential challenges from terror 
groups such as ISIS and Hezbollah, 
plus rogue nations such as Iran, Russia, 
North Korea, China, Venezuela, Cuba, 
and Bolivia� They contend that these 
actors—Sunni and Shia, Levantine and 
Latin—cooperate as an anti-U�S� axis� 
While dissimilar states and groups do 
sometimes have operational links—e�g�, 
cooperation on sanctions busting—the 
book’s portrayal of an axis is overdrawn� 
Moreover, Flynn seems to use loudness 
of rhetoric rather than capability to 
measure threat� Near-peer China is 
ignored, while worries about basket case 
Venezuela are raised several times�
Flynn considers “radical Islam” the 
primary danger, in that losing the 
fight literally would mean the U�S� 
government overthrown, ISIS’s flag 
over the White House, and 350 mil-
lion Americans either converted or 
beheaded� Tautologically true, perhaps, 
but laughable as serious threat as-
sessment (one recalls the 1984 movie 
Red Dawn)� The definition of radical 
Islam is slippery, but Flynn and Ledeen 
place Iran squarely at the center� They 
contend that the Shia-Sunni divide, let 
alone ethno-national differences, means 
little� ISIS and Al Qaeda are portrayed 
as generally collaborating with senior 
Winter2018Review.indb   161 11/1/17   9:56 AM
167
College: Winter 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 1 6 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
partner Iran� (Who, then, has been fight-
ing in Iraq and Syria is not clarified�) 
Flynn claims to distinguish between 
radical Islam and Islam as a whole, but 
repeatedly blurs that line, building to a 
four-page jeremiad on the “spectacular 
failure” of the “Muslim world” writ large�
Flynn’s ultimate strategic concept is that 
the United States ought to foster a theo-
logical “reformation” of Islam� Problems 
with the parallel aside—the Christian 
world engaged in global conquests after 
the Reformation—Flynn recognizes that 
the goal is aspirational� Our near-term 
approach should be mostly political, he 
writes� While Flynn emphatically wants 
to “take the gloves off ” counterterror 
operations, he opposes regime change 
by military means, as occurred in Iraq 
and Libya� Instead, top priority would 
be political support of Iranian opposi-
tion groups (coauthor Ledeen long has 
claimed the Iranian regime could be 
brought down rapidly, à la 1989 in East-
ern Europe)� Overall, Flynn’s campaign 
plans are vague and contradictory� The 
threat is imminent and requires World 
War II–style military mobilization, yet it 
will involve a decades-long competition 
of ideas� Promoting liberty and democ-
racy is the key, but the United States 
should back strongly such autocrats as 
Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Flynn is 
curiously opaque about the Saudis, and 
ignores Turkey’s Islamist government)�
Field of Fight was written after Flynn 
became a contributor to Russia’s RT 
network and appeared with Vladimir 
Putin in Moscow, among the Russia 
connections that eventually triggered 
his resignation� Yet Flynn’s book has 
few kind words for Russia: Moscow 
is a leader in the anti-American axis, 
Putin is an aggressor, and President 
Obama failed to criticize Russia strongly 
enough� There are hints, though, that 
Flynn sees potential for rapprochement� 
He says Russia’s true interest would 
be to join the United States against 
Iran and radical Islam, but Russian 
leaders suffer confusion from ingrained 
anti-Americanism and a dearth—Flynn 
asserts—of expertise on Islam� There is 
no suggestion that other “axis” members 
could be played against each other, nor 
much discussed regarding potential 
anti-Islamist allies such as India� Despite 
those hints, the tone of Flynn the author 
is hard to reconcile with the eager Russia 
outreach of Flynn the adviser� Perhaps 
the first-person voice obscures disagree-
ment with coauthor Ledeen, who in 
his own works is dubious of Moscow—
probably the more realistic view�
Overall, the book is thinly sourced� 
Many claims simply are asserted, and the 
few references often point to bloggers, 
op-ed writers, or advocacy groups� 
The book makes no pretense of being 
scholarly, but even a general audience 
would benefit from more evidence—and 
more fact-checking� As one example, 
Flynn and Ledeen claim that seven to 
thirteen million people of Lebanese 
ancestry live in the Brazil-Paraguay-
Argentina triborder region, whereas 
the correct number is around 25,000�
As a work of strategy, Field of Fight is 
forgettable� The literatures on jihadism, 
Iran, illicit transnational networks, 
etc�, are replete with more-thoughtful, 
well-researched works� The recom-
mendations seem more intended to 
back up campaign speeches than to 
support actionable plans� As a window 
into the Trump administration’s national 
security thinking, the book provides 
value—but not much reassurance�
DAVID T� BURBACH
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Designing Gotham: West Point Engineers and the 
Rise of Modern New York, 1817–1898, by Jon 
Scott Logel� Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ� 
Press, 2016� 280 pages� $45�
The idea of civil-military relations 
generally is framed in terms of the 
relationship between the government of 
a state and the military that serves that 
state� Whether the construct is the objec-
tive control posed by Samuel Huntington 
or the unequal dialogue of Eliot Cohen, 
the discussion largely focuses on how 
the civilian sector influences the actions 
of the military� In his new volume, 
Designing Gotham, Jon Scott Logel offers 
a window on a long-neglected aspect 
of the relationship: how the military 
wields influence in civilian society�
The book begins with an interesting 
account of the rise of Sylvanus Thayer 
and his vision for refashioning West 
Point into the first institution of higher 
education in the United States dedicated 
to teaching the principles of engineer-
ing� Professor Logel also discusses the 
inherent tensions between Thayer’s 
narrow view of a curriculum focused 
on military engineering and the public 
clamor of the Jacksonian era for West 
Point to graduate engineers trained 
in civil engineering� The compromise 
solution—adding a limited number 
of civil-engineering courses to the 
program at the academy—set the stage 
for the influence of West Pointers on 
the development of New York City� 
It is the influence of these men that 
forms the core emphasis of the book�
Through a series of well-crafted 
chapters, Logel describes the influence 
of U�S� Military Academy graduates 
on both the professionalization of 
engineering and a series of projects 
that helped shape modern New York� 
Tracing the progress of these public 
works, the chapters also trace the social 
and political changes in the relationship 
between the military-trained engineers 
and the civilian society in which they 
moved� The dramatic increase in 
political involvement by these officers 
after the Civil War is another subtheme� 
Weaving these ideas together, the book 
offers an interesting social history of 
the effects these military men had on 
New York society and the effects society 
had on these West Pointers� The cast of 
characters is populated with men made 
famous by the Civil War, such as George 
B� McClellan and Fitz-John Porter, as 
well as more-obscure graduates such as 
Egbert L� Viele and John Newton, who 
arguably were more important in the 
development of the city’s infrastructure�
The author does not delve deeply into 
the details of the engineering projects� 
This is not necessarily a shortcoming, 
as the development of engineering as 
a profession, not its development as a 
science, is a theme of the work� If the 
book has a weakness, it is the graphics� 
The only maps are reproductions of 
Viele’s famous “Water Map” of 1865 
and his plan for Central Park� A map 
highlighting the various projects might 
have been more valuable than the 
common, recognizable photos of Porter 
and McClellan that are included�
Jon Scott Logel has offered a unique 
perspective on the relationship between 
civil society and the graduates of West 
Point� His insights remind us that, while 
our civil government controls the mili-
tary in the United States, our military 
institutions have a powerful influence 
on our society—recognized or not�
KEVIN J� DELAMER
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Duel au large: La guerre de Sécession devant 
Cherbourg (19 juin 1864); Enquête et récit, by 
Jacky Desquesnes� Condé-sur-Noireau: Éditions 
Charles Corlet, 2014. 247 pages� $20 paperback�
Jacky Desquesnes’s book on the Civil 
War naval battle between CSS Alabama 
and USS Kearsarge is a useful contribu-
tion to understanding that event� The 
book’s publication coincided with the 
150th anniversary of the battle, an event 
the French press covered extensively in a 
nationally circulated magazine, L’express, 
and well-known regional newspapers 
such as La Manche libre, La presse de la 
Manche, and Ouest-France. Although the 
book was published in France more than 
three years ago by a regional publisher, 
it seems to have been ignored entirely 
in the United States and by American 
naval historians� At the time of this 
review’s writing, WorldCat showed only 
one library in the United States that had 
acquired a copy: Harvard University’s�
Numerous other books deal with this 
subject—in English� The author has used 
most of the standard American docu-
mentary sources in print, as well as the 
digital materials now available online� 
Among these are the Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Navies 
in the War of the Rebellion and the 
published memoirs of the participants, 
plus one unpublished memoir from the 
collection at Mystic Seaport� While the 
author does not cite all the published 
secondary sources in English that he 
might have used, the book’s importance 
is in its use of French sources that 
American scholars have consulted 
only rarely� Chief among these are the 
reports of the battle in the local and 
national French press and the archives 
of the French navy (series BB4 1346)�
Desquesnes, currently a lecturer at 
the Université populaire de Caen in 
Normandy and formerly a regional 
inspector of pedagogy, has placed his 
subject in the wide context of the 
Civil War, Franco-American relations, 
international law, and the concept of 
the duel� Many people at Cherbourg 
observed the action, and their impres-
sions appeared in the popular press� 
In French eyes, Raphael Semmes 
seemed a gentleman who fought the 
battle like a classic duel, and the press 
popularized this metaphor, which the 
maritime prefect at Cherbourg used to 
describe the action as he observed it�
In his closing chapter, Desquesnes 
makes an important contribution in 
discussing the cultural afterlife of the 
battle in memory and commemoration� 
In this, he places Édouard Manet’s mas-
terful painting of the event within the 
wider context of the popular images of 
the day� He goes on to discuss the local 
monuments, mentioning the unknown 
grave site at Cherbourg of William 
Carpenter of Alabama and the surviving 
and restored monuments of George 
Appleby, William Gowin, and Edward 
King, along with the commemorations 
held there over the years� Interestingly, 
he points out connections that have 
developed among these sites and those 
of American war dead in other parts of 
France, from John Paul Jones’s sailors at 
Nantes to those lost in the First World 
War� The volume ends with a brief 
discussion of the work of Captain Max 
Guérout of the French navy, the CSS 
Alabama associations in Washington 
and Paris, and the underwater archaeol-
ogy that led to the recovery of many 
objects from the wreck of Alabama�
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Jacky Desquesnes’s volume makes a 
useful contribution to the literature, 
one that deserves to be read more 
widely by American naval historians� 
It is also a reminder of the value and 
importance of the insights for naval 
history that are readily available in other 
languages, but too often are overlooked�
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collec-
tive Defence, ed� John Andreas Olsen� Whitehall 
Paper 87� London: RUSI, released by Taylor and 
Francis, 2017� 104 pages� $13�55 paperback�
As Russia’s naval posture and its restored 
naval and air capabilities have become 
more evident, the North Atlantic has 
reemerged over the last couple of years 
as a hot topic for researchers� For two 
decades the region and the idea of high-
end naval threats to the NATO allies 
were almost entirely off the table, but 
the North Atlantic has reemerged as a 
key topic in NATO headquarters as well� 
Both the Wales Summit Declaration 
(2014) and the Warsaw Summit Declara-
tion (2016) bring forward the North 
Atlantic as a renewed area of concern�
However, NATO and American allies 
largely lack the capabilities to deal with 
the increased threat that Russia’s new 
and modernized capabilities pose� Rus-
sia’s long-term intentions are difficult 
to assess, and most likely will change 
over time anyway� Still, there are some 
geopolitical constants, and it is possible 
—and important—to notice, keep track 
of, and understand the current threats 
and potential future ones as they evolve� 
Naval and air capabilities take a long 
time to develop, with regard to both 
technology and competency� Naval 
strategists and readers should reconsider 
this reemerging challenge, and several 
new reports from think tanks in the 
United States and the United Kingdom 
provide a good starting point�
Highly recommended are the following 
recent publications: “Updating NATO’s 
Maritime Strategy” (Atlantic Council, 
2016); Undersea Warfare in Northern 
Europe (CSIS, 2016); NATO and the 
North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective 
Defence (RUSI Whitehall Paper 87, 
2017); and “Forgotten Waters: Minding 
the GIUK Gap” (CNAS, 2017)� Each of 
these is beneficial, but readers should 
note especially the present book under 
review, NATO and the North Atlantic. It 
is edited by John Andreas Olsen, con-
tains a foreword by Philip M� Breedlove 
and an introduction and conclusion by 
Olsen, and consists of six chapters�
Olsen is an experienced book editor, 
always getting high-level experts on 
board his projects� For this project he 
has created a good team of experienced 
North Atlantic and Russian military 
experts from both sides of the Atlantic� 
The book connects historical and 
geopolitical military perspectives with 
more-current “post-Brexit” conse-
quences and modern hybrid threats�
In his chapter, “The Significance of 
the North Atlantic and the Norwegian 
Contribution,” Rolf Tamnes brings back 
the classical “bastion concept” for the 
protection of Russian strategic subma-
rines� Even though nuclear deterrence 
has been off the radar of academics 
and strategists for a couple of decades, 
it has always “been there�” We clearly 
should give more attention to this fact, 
and try to understand and appreciate 
how the nuclear deterrence forces of 
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today shape how the great powers play, 
be it in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere�
As John J� Hamre and Heather A� Conley 
argue in their chapter, “The Centrality 
of the North Atlantic to NATO and US 
Strategic Interests,” the North Atlantic 
is in fact the ocean that physically and 
metaphorically binds North America 
and Europe together� The book’s focus 
and main themes are intended to explain 
this to readers and to argue that NATO 
must retain the capability to secure 
freedom of maneuver across the sea 
and keep the waterways between the 
continents open for reinforcement and 
resupply of matériel and personnel 
in times of peace, crisis, and war� The 
alliance, as a guarantor of national sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, must 
be prepared to counter any potential 
threat to the North Atlantic Ocean�
As do the studies recommended above 
on Russia and the North Atlantic, 
this project clearly points out Russia’s 
increasingly provocative rhetoric and be-
havior over the last few years� Coupling 
this with the fact that Russia has 
introduced new classes of conventional 
and nuclear attack submarines and is 
modernizing its Northern Fleet through 
the addition of long-range, high-
precision missiles provides great reason 
for concern� The Russian navy could 
challenge NATO’s command of the 
high seas, and thereby put both Europe 
and North America at existential risk�
The book argues that now is the time 
for NATO and American allies to get 
a grip on the strategically important 
North Atlantic Ocean, in addition to 
the current, very Eurocentric focus on 
air and land forces in the Baltic States 
and on Russia’s land borders� The North 
Atlantic is in fact the northwestern part 
of the current NATO 360 perspective, 
but it needs to be reckoned as such� The 
challenges in the North Atlantic are of a 
very different nature from those NATO 
experiences in the east and south, but no 
less important� Arguably, in the longer 
perspective, these high-end threats 
may prove existential, and need to be 
acknowledged� It takes a long time to 
develop the countertechnologies and 
expertise necessary to meet Russia’s 
modernization of its submarines and 
missile systems� Fittingly, the last 
chapter before the conclusion and 
recommendations is Admiral James 
Stavridis’s “The United States, the North 
Atlantic and Maritime Hybrid Warfare�”
In the concluding chapter, Olsen 
offers some clear recommendations, 
arguing that NATO should renew 
its maritime strategy, reintroduce 
extensive maritime exercises and 
sustained presence, reform its com-
mand structure, invest in maritime 
capabilities and situational awareness, 
enhance maritime partnerships, and 
prepare for maritime hybrid warfare�
Overall, this book provides an 
excellent starting point from which 
to start discussing the North Atlantic 
challenges that are emerging as the 
Russian naval (and air) forces con-
tinue to make considerable progress 
toward modernizing for the future�
GJERT LAGE DYNDAL
The Leader’s Bookshelf, by Admiral James Stavri-
dis, USN (Ret�), and R� Manning Ancell� Annap-
olis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 272 pages� 
$29�95�
The Leader’s Bookshelf is unique in its 
style and structure and outstanding in 
its personal and confident presentation� 
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There are literally hundreds of books 
on leadership, including memoirs of 
former CEOs, guidebooks to leader-
ship from professional athletes, and 
personal commentaries from men and 
women who have succeeded in their 
fields of business, education, politics, 
and government; but this presentation 
is different� Admiral Stavridis, whose 
culminating military assignment was as 
supreme allied commander at NATO, 
and his highly competent coauthor, 
R� Manning Ancell, have designed a 
wide-ranging collection of books and 
essays within a relatively brief volume 
that exudes commitment to meeting the 
challenges of leadership and confidence 
regarding the qualities necessary�
The content and structure of the book 
are what make it different, especially 
worthwhile, and a great reading experi-
ence� The method taken was to invite 
each of fifty different military leaders 
to recommend his or her favorite book 
on leadership and explain the reasons 
for the choice� The coauthors add brief 
comments about the book’s author 
and the book itself, and select brief 
quotations and passages from the 
recommended work� But the heart of 
the work is the “Leadership Lessons 
Summarized,” which are developed and 
summarized by Stravridis or Manning� 
Suffice it to say, the quality and value of 
these lessons learned are truly inspiring�
The range and diversity of the fifty 
recommended books are remarkable� 
Military leaders, mostly contemporaries 
and colleagues of the coauthors, have 
recommended authors and books as 
varied as Rudyard Kipling’s Captains 
Courageous and William Manchester’s 
Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the 
Pacific War� The recommended authors 
include Carl von Clausewitz, Sun 
Tzu, Mark Twain, S� L� A� Marshall, 
Harper Lee, Thomas L� Friedman, 
H� R� McMaster, and dozens more� 
This book can be a great companion 
on deployments—it can be rejoined 
quickly after interruptions�
While the fifty presentations are 
the heart of the book, much more is 
included that is highly valuable but 
unfortunately not discussed widely and 
presented only infrequently� These five 
brief chapters—“Reading Lists,” “Writing 
and Publishing,” “What Young Leaders 
Are Reading,” “Building a Personal 
Library,” and “Reading and Writing: The 
Big Lessons”—are the “secret passages” 
to success, clues to how not just to get 
promoted but to live an enriched and 
meaningful life� These chapters show 
Admiral Stavridis’s own passion and 
commitment to his profession and his 
important, mentor-like dedication to 
midrange professionals who aim high 
and try harder to become great leaders�
“But wait, there’s more!”—a bonus, so to 
speak� An afterword offers an important 
discussion of how more-formal litera-
ture, specifically poems and plays, can 
provide valuable leadership lessons� In 
“A Play and Two Poems,” Admiral Stavri-
dis writes (p� 259), “In terms of impact, 
word-for-word, a beautifully crafted 
poem can deliver the most meaningful 
of reading experiences and provide star-
tling insights for a reader� Plays, which 
are of course essentially scripts written 
to be performed in front of us, often 
give us powerful voices to listen to and 
therefore sharpen our leadership skills�”
In a brief but brilliant analysis of The 
Persians by Aeschylus, William Butler 
Yeats’s poem “The Second Coming,” and 
Constantine P� Cavafy’s poem “Sailing to 
Ithaca,” Admiral Stavridis describes the 
intense and deep revelation of meaning 
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attained through creative literature and 
recommends the challenge of develop-
ing an active, creative imagination in 
reading intellectual literature as an 
important role of leaders� He writes 
(p� 266) that “in the end the very best 
effective leaders use hope to inspire 
us in the long voyages on which we all 
must sail� Poems and plays each have 
a role in helping leaders find their way 
not only to challenges, but to hope�”
At a program sponsored by the Naval 
War College Foundation a few years 
ago, Admiral Stavridis commented that 
during his tour of duty as Commander, 
Southern Command, he arranged to 
be tutored daily in Spanish because 
he thought a better understanding of 
the language essential to the success 
of his mission� This was a singular 
commitment to effective leadership, 
just as The Leader’s Bookshelf is a 
singular and valuable contribution 
to developing effective leaders�
JOHN J� SALESSES
A Tale of Two Navies: Geopolitics, Technology, and 
Strategy in the United States Navy and the Royal 
Navy, 1960–2015, by Anthony R� Wells� Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 264 pages� 
$35�
At its heart, this book both espouses 
the value of a global maritime strategy 
as seen from the perspective of two 
historically close allies, Great Britain and 
the United States, and acknowledges the 
enormous costs of maintaining one� It is 
not a history book, although it covers a 
historical period and provides context� 
It is more of a thematic illustration of 
the extraordinary measures necessary—
across the entire span of professional 
and political discourses—to nurture and 
maintain such partnerships� Above all, 
it highlights the need for trust: a shared 
understanding of goals and a willingness 
to cooperate at all levels that rises above 
what the author terms “the minefield 
of opponents, skeptics and those with 
ill-conceived agendas � � � who simply 
have little or no knowledge of the basics 
of maritime strategy�” Given the current 
interest in enhancing naval presence 
and the consequent drive toward an 
enlarged naval fleet, this is a timely 
message and one that deserves careful 
consideration from naval professionals�
Anthony Wells is perhaps uniquely 
qualified for this work� As an intel-
ligence specialist, he has served both in 
the Royal Navy (RN) in uniform and 
later for the U�S� Navy as a civilian ana-
lyst, and has been involved personally in 
much “special intelligence sharing at the 
most sensitive levels�” His first chapter, 
by far the most valuable, outlines the po-
litical changes that took place during the 
1960s and ’70s, particularly in Britain, 
that fundamentally altered the way in 
which naval concerns were represented 
to Parliament� He explains that although 
both countries’ defense establishments 
underwent considerable “centralization” 
after the Second World War, the loss 
of hundreds of years of naval influence 
in the cabinet of Great Britain caused 
by the sidelining of the First Lord of 
the Admiralty in 1946 in favor of the 
defense minister, and the eventual loss 
of the service ministries altogether in 
1964, was immensely damaging to the 
maritime case� It is no coincidence, 
for example, that these years saw 
the reorientation of British defense 
policy away from global responsibilities 
and toward an exclusively northern 
European focus� This in turn led to the 
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demise of the RN aircraft carrier fleet 
and loss of RN influence “east of Suez,” 
adding to the urgency with which the 
service sought partnerships with the 
only global player remaining, the U�S� 
Navy� Although similar “centralization” 
efforts were under way in Washington, 
Wells explains that the U�S� Navy was 
inherently better served, in that the 
crucial contact between senior serving 
officers and their political masters was 
preserved by virtue of the former’s 
ability to testify to influential congres-
sional committees� In this way, the 
maritime case continued and continues 
to be represented in Washington�
Throughout all these upheavals, the 
real saving grace was the professional 
links between the two navies that had 
been forged during the dark years of the 
world wars� The urgency of the Cold 
War competition with Soviet Russia and 
the need to know the opponent’s plans 
years in advance meant that, to stay 
ahead, the burgeoning technological 
energy of the United States needed to 
be combined with the long-established 
human-intelligence resources of the 
United Kingdom� To effect this, both 
navies continued to talk, no matter 
what tensions were extant nationally 
and internationally at the time� As the 
Soviets increasingly emphasized their 
submarine fleet as a means by which to 
conduct nuclear bargaining, Wells was in 
a prime position to observe and record 
this exchange� In the remaining chapters 
he charts some of the high and low 
points by way of illustration: the acoustic 
refining of the nuclear submarine, the 
use of maritime forces to signal resolve 
during the Six-Day War of 1967, the 
damage caused by the Walker spy ring, 
and the extensive cooperation during the 
Falklands War in 1982, to name a few�
In the end, the sheer importance 
of the subject matter and its timely 
appearance will ensure wide reader-
ship of this book—which is a good 
thing� Wells, although fluent, is not an 
overly engaging writer, and the factual 
nature of the prose can result in quite a 
mouthful at times� That said, the work is 
well researched and accurate, although 
no doubt still limited by ongoing 
classification issues� Uncharacteristically, 
however, the normally flawless Naval In-
stitute editorial process has allowed in a 
few grammatical errors and, in the Falk-
lands chapter, a minor inaccuracy� The 
Argentines had four, not three, diesel 
submarines in 1982: two Type 209s and 
two old, ex-USN Balao-class Guppy II 
conversions� Of these, only one of each 
was serviceable, and ARA Santa Fe was 
of the Balao class (ex–USS Catfish), not 
a Type 209 as stated on page 147� Luck-
ily, none of these errors detracts in any 
way from the theme being presented�
This book should be read and 
discussed by anyone with an interest 
in maritime strategy or the “special 
relationship” between the two countries� 
This special relationship endures, of 
course, and no doubt in a few years’ 
time—once the ships of the Queen 
Elizabeth class and their F-35Cs are 
in service—the next chapter in this 
cooperative story will be told�
ANGUS ROSS
Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War 
in Vietnam, by Mark Bowden� New York: Atlantic 
Monthly, 2017� 610 pages� $30�
The United States first committed combat-
size units (battalions or larger) to the 
war in Vietnam in March 1965� In the 
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years that followed, as the United States 
assumed a greater role in the fighting, its 
forces in theater continued to grow� By 
early 1968, the United States had several 
hundred thousand troops in Vietnam�
Concurrently, North Vietnam’s 
leadership was supporting a grow-
ing communist insurgency in the 
south—that of the Vietcong (VC)—the 
goal of which was to defeat South 
Vietnam and bring it under the North’s 
communist regime� To accelerate this 
process, North Vietnam developed an 
elaborate plan to infiltrate thousands of 
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops 
into South Vietnam and, with the VC, 
capture and hold South Vietnam’s major 
cities and U�S� and South Vietnamese 
military installations� No objective was 
given a higher priority than the old 
imperial Vietnamese capital of Hue�
The resulting Tet Offensive was, without 
exception, a battlefield loss for NVA 
and VC forces� However, Tet was a 
decisive communist victory on the 
political front: it turned the American 
public irrevocably against the war� 
America’s support for the Vietnam 
conflict and its trust in its elected, 
appointed, and military leaders—already 
on shaky ground by early 1968—would 
become permanent casualties of the 
Tet Offensive and the battle for Hue�
In the early morning hours of January 
31, 1968, the first day of Tet (the lunar 
new year), nearly ten thousand well-
trained, dedicated, and motivated NVA 
and VC troops clandestinely moved 
from neighboring forested highlands 
into Hue� By noon, with the exception 
of a couple of Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (i�e�, ARVN) units and the 
Military Advisory Command, Vietnam 
(i�e�, MACV) compound, the city was in 
communist hands� It would take nearly 
a month of bitter street fighting and 
thousands of casualties (the vast major-
ity to civilians) to return the city to the 
control of South Vietnam’s government�
Mark Bowden’s day-by-day chronicle of 
the battle to retake Hue is detailed and 
precise and covers both sides� He closely 
follows Lieutenant Colonel Ernest “Big 
Ernie” Cheatham, the commanding 
officer of 2/5 (2nd Battalion, 5th Marine 
Regiment), whose area of responsibility 
was south of the Citadel and the Huong 
River—an expanse that included Hue 
University, the treasury building, the 
provincial headquarters, a prison, a 
hospital complex, and several other 
structures� Cheatham’s basic tactic was 
to employ tanks, self-propelled “Ontos” 
antitank vehicles (each carried six deadly 
106 mm recoilless rifles), bazookas, 
81 mm mortars, flamethrowers, and 
gas to destroy the buildings across 
contested streets, while his young 
infantrymen prepared for the assault� 
It was an effective strategy: his rifle 
companies were able to advance� It 
took his battalion four days to fight 
from Route 1 to the Phu Cam Canal�
On the other side, Bowden focuses on 
VC lieutenant Hoang Anh De, com-
manding Battalion 55, who gave ground 
only grudgingly� Like many of his fellow 
NVA/VC leaders, as well as the senior 
leadership in Hanoi, he soon realized 
that the expected popular uprising was 
not going to happen� However, like his 
compatriots, he knew that the longer he 
could keep the battle in Hue going, the 
greater the political victory would be�
Combat operations for control of the 
city continued until nearly the end of 
February� Major Bob Thompson’s 1/1 
(1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment), 
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assigned the mission of retaking the 
Citadel on February 11, suffered nearly 
50 percent casualties by February 15� 
Nonetheless, the battalion successfully 
fought from the north to the south 
Citadel walls, then west to retake the 
royal palace and its grounds� Outside the 
Citadel and to the northwest, elements 
of the U�S� Army’s 1st Air Cavalry Divi-
sion were assigned the task of attacking 
the NVA Front’s command center in the 
village of La Chu� One battalion suffered 
50 percent casualties in the effort; 
subsequent attacks prevailed as the com-
munist forces initiated an orderly retreat�
While intelligence on the NVA/VC 
forces that captured Hue was not good, 
at least initially, Bowden nonetheless is 
critical of the senior leaders who failed 
to see the obvious� Of General William 
C� Westmoreland he writes, “Never had 
a general so effectively willed away the 
facts�” Westmoreland simply refused to 
accept that the NVA/VC actually had 
captured the city� Bowden notes that 
the general “continually and falsely 
assured political leaders in Washington 
and the public that the city had not 
fallen into enemy hands�” Brigadier 
General Foster C� LaHue, the com-
manding general of Task Force X-Ray 
(Marines), was little better, insisting that 
“there was nothing more threatening 
in Hue than a handful of snipers�”
Bowden has crafted a comprehensive 
and accurate account of the battle to 
wrest Hue from the NVA and VC� In his 
source notes he writes, “For a journalist 
interested in history the sweet spot is 
about 50 years� Enough time has gone by 
for a measure of historical perspective 
and yet there remain many living wit-
nesses�” Bowden personally interviewed 
hundreds of them, in the process 
crafting several compelling portraits 
of the junior Marines who faced their 
NVA/VC adversaries at very close range� 
The testimonies of large numbers of 
witnesses (in addition to unclassified 
and formerly classified reports from the 
National Archives, the Marine Corps 
Library at Quantico, Virginia, and other 
sources) serve to enhance the accuracy 
of the narrative� And from what this 
reviewer (who spent February 1968 in 
Hue with 2/5) can tell, the accuracy of 
Bowden’s narrative is unquestionable� 
He has produced an excellent read of a 
defining period in our nation’s history�
GEORGE HOFMANN
By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and 
American Power in the Asia Pacific since 1783, 
by Michael J� Green� New York: Columbia Univ� 
Press, 2017� 760 pages� $45�
In the fast-moving world of Washington, 
DC, capturing and conveying the 
context of policy choices challenge even 
the most committed national security 
professional� For busy senior officials, 
policy can seem to exist in historical 
isolation, with institutional memory 
rarely extending before the start of 
the current administration� Resources 
for understanding rarely address the 
contingencies and considerations that 
drove those who went before us�
Michael Green, author of By More 
Than Providence, confronted this 
problem as senior director for Asia 
on the National Security Council a 
decade ago� Arriving as an academic 
with a deep background in the region, 
he nonetheless was challenged to place 
proposed policy initiatives in the context 
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of America’s long relationship with 
Asia� On returning to academia, Green 
set out to write the book he wished 
he had had as a policy adviser� The 
result is an extraordinary overview of 
how America crafted itself as a Pacific 
nation, gaining its unique position in the 
region, as the title states, “by more than 
providence�” Since its birth, America has 
been tied to the Pacific by “commerce, 
faith, geography, and self-defense” in a 
dynamic interplay of interests, hopes, 
and fears� The process of balancing these 
forces is the focus of Green’s work, and 
his approach underscores the imperfect 
nature of any effort to address complex 
goals in a region of such diversity�
The overall U�S� policy focus historically 
has swung between Europe and Asia, 
with Europe benefiting from linguistic 
and cultural affinities among American 
elites� Within Asia, U�S� policy makers 
have cycled between China and Japan 
when prioritizing relations� These 
fundamental choices, still at play in 
the region, date to the earliest days of 
the United States� In considering this 
dynamic, Green benefits from his early 
academic career as a Japan specialist� In 
an increasingly China-focused field, this 
distinctive background allows him to 
place America’s critical relationship with 
Japan in proper context and provides 
an antidote to recent works that place 
too much emphasis on China issues�
Even well-read naval professionals will 
be struck by the central role that mari-
time issues and the U�S� Navy play in the 
narrative� From the creation of the first 
USN Pacific squadron in 1821, naval 
leaders have been a key outward face of 
the nation to the region and one of the 
constant interlocutors in internal U�S� 
debates� Indeed, Green credits Mahan 
with articulating the first comprehensive 
U�S� grand strategy for the Pacific 
region, tracing his influence through 
to the present� More recently, the 
Reagan administration’s Soviet-focused 
Maritime Strategy had its intellectual 
roots firmly in the Pacific as the then 
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 
Admiral Thomas B� Hayward, sought to 
address a growing Soviet Pacific Fleet� 
Hayward moved on to become Chief of 
Naval Operations and, paired with John 
Lehman as Secretary of the Navy, pushed 
the strategy into global execution� Naval 
professionals versed in military history 
and security issues will benefit from 
the book’s integrated and thoughtful 
discussion of economic and cultural ties�
By More Than Providence provides a 
balance between conceptual argument 
and the details of historic events� For 
example, while placing Nixon’s opening 
to China in broad context, Green also 
provides an excellent articulation of the 
assumptions behind the negotiation and 
signing of the Shanghai Communiqué� 
His personal experience in the policy 
arena has given him a sympathetic ear 
for the challenges our predecessors 
faced and their often-imperfect efforts� 
There is criticism of many decision 
makers across numerous eras, but always 
tempered with a welcome sense that 
meaningful statecraft is simply hard� 
Despite that fact, America has achieved 
and sustained a unique position in the 
Pacific� Green’s sense of contingency—
that events could have unfolded very 
differently and the U�S� position in the 
region might be weaker or nonexistent 
—presents the American reader with 
a clear if implied challenge: how to 
maintain this legacy going forward�
At well over seven hundred pages and 
exquisitely sourced with notes and 
comments, By More Than Providence 
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represents a substantial investment 
of time and effort for the thoughtful 
reader� It is, however, an essential book 
for any naval professional who wants 
to understand what lies in our wake 
before charting our course in Asia�
DALE C� RIELAGE
The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Ser-
vice since 1945, by Peter Hennessy and James 
Jinks� London: Penguin, 2015� 864 pages� £30�
The Silent Deep is a tell-all history of the 
Royal Navy’s submarine service since 
World War II� The authors were granted 
almost unlimited access to Royal Navy 
(RN) historical files of submarine opera-
tions� The discussion of formerly classi-
fied operational surveillance patrols off 
the North Cape of Norway and of the 
trailing of Soviet nuclear-powered attack 
submarines (SSNs) and nuclear-powered 
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) is 
eye-opening� As a former USN subma-
rine commanding officer—and a veteran 
of eight covert surveillance operations in 
the Pacific during the Cold War—I was 
stunned to read about British submarine 
operations in the “other ocean�”
The book is much more than that, 
though� It begins with a description 
of the “Perisher” (slang name for the 
Submarine Command Course), a 
demanding five-month-long training 
program for potential submarine com-
manding officers� Successful graduates 
normally go on to command; those 
dropped for lack of demonstrated ability 
generally leave the submarine service�
The authors describe the startling effect 
on the Royal Navy of gaining access 
to German submarine technology 
at the end of World War II and the 
ensuing revelation of the very advanced 
submarines that were being prepared to 
attack Allied warships and shipping� The 
German Type XXI high-speed, long- 
endurance, diesel-electric submarine was 
arguably the first modern submarine—a 
truly submersible warship� By the war’s 
end over a hundred Type XXIs were 
working up in the Baltic Sea, but they 
made no operational patrols� In fact, 
only one operational patrol was made 
by a boat of this class—U-2511—and 
the war ended before it could make an 
attack� (A number of Type XXIIIs, the 
smaller clones of the Type XXIs, did 
make operational patrols and sank nine 
ships without loss to their own ranks�)
The Type XXI boat was the model for 
postwar development of advanced-
capability diesel-electric submarines 
in three navies: the British Porpoise 
class, the Soviet Whiskey class, and 
the American Tang class�
Another German revelation was the 
Walther boat, a hydrogen peroxide– 
fueled true submarine, which had not 
yet become operational� A captured 
Walther-class submarine, U-1407, was 
commissioned as HMS Meteorite, and 
its trials led to the construction and 
commissioning of HMS Excalibur 
and HMS Explorer, both powered 
by Walther-cycle machinery� They 
turned out to be a dead end, however, 
as technical problems and financial 
concerns ended the experiments�
The authors also cover the Royal 
Navy’s first looks at nuclear power for 
submarines and its temporary abandon-
ment in favor of the Walther-cycle 
propulsion plant� When that avenue 
proved fruitless, the Royal Navy then 
turned to the United States—which had 
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put the first nuclear-powered submarine, 
USS Nautilus (SSN 571), to sea in 1955� 
In a major exercise named RUM TUB in 
October 1957, Nautilus showed convinc-
ingly that RN antisubmarine warfare 
ships and aircraft were totally unable 
to detect and track an SSN, owing to 
its almost unlimited endurance�
The British decisions to acquire 
SSNs and subsequently SSBNs are 
discussed in separate chapters, each 
offering an in-depth look at the design, 
engineering, management, and political 
aspects of the respective programs�
The Falklands War of 1982 offered 
an opportunity for the Royal Navy 
to employ SSNs in a limited-area, 
limited-combat role� The Royal Navy’s 
SSNs were the first British warships on 
scene after the Argentine invasion of 
the Falkland Islands� They provided 
essential surveillance and intelligence 
reporting about Argentine forces� On 
May 2, 1982, HMS Conqueror sank ARA 
General Belgrano, an Argentine navy 
light cruiser, south of the Falklands� 
That sinking effectively drove other 
Argentine navy units back inside their 
twelve-mile limit, a boundary British 
SSNs were not allowed to penetrate—a 
political constraint the British placed 
on themselves, and one that was very 
frustrating to SSN commanding officers 
who were anxious to engage Argentina’s 
aircraft carrier, which posed a significant 
threat to the British surface task force� 
The reviewer was fortunate to have had 
lunch recently with HMS Conqueror’s 
navigating officer and to query him di-
rectly about the decision of Conqueror’s 
commanding officer to use Second 
World War–vintage Mark 8 torpedoes 
instead of the much more advanced 
Mark 24 Tigerfish torpedoes—a decision 
discussed in the Falklands chapter�
Subsequent chapters deal with the 
complicated internal British politics of 
upgrading the Royal Navy’s submarine 
deterrent force from Polaris to 
Poseidon, and finally to current-day 
Trident missiles, as well as the continu-
ing operations vis-à-vis Russia�
This is an outstanding book, well 
researched and ably written� I highly 
recommend it for anyone interested in 
submarine operations or antisubmarine 
warfare or both� It is a must-read�
JOHN F� O’CONNELL
21st Century Gorshkov: The Challenge of Sea 
Power in the Modern Era, ed� Kevin Rowlands� 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017� 192 
pages� $21�95 paperback�
The published works of Soviet fleet 
admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov, 
whose naval career spanned three 
decades, are ostensibly the subject of 
this volume edited by the Royal Navy’s 
Kevin Rowlands� Yet the book also could 
serve as a blueprint for increasing naval 
prestige, power, and influence� Through 
the focus on Gorshkov’s writing, the 
reader is afforded an insider’s view 
of the Soviet navy’s post–World War 
and Cold War–era growth� At the 
same time, Rowlands is interested 
in how consideration of Gorshkov 
can help inform questions about the 
future roles and uses of naval force�
Admiral Gorshkov graduated from 
the Frunze Naval School in Leningrad 
in 1931 and showed early promise 
as a naval officer� His role in the 
Second World War was as impressive 
as his peacetime advancement� Unlike 
many of his peers, Gorshkov not only 
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achieved great responsibility as a young 
officer but was able to weather the 
many changes in the Soviet political 
environment and emerged as a leading 
practitioner and theorist of Soviet naval 
strategy� In essence, Admiral Gorshkov’s 
performance as a naval officer becomes 
a model for all who aspire to make a 
lasting contribution to the naval profes-
sion and to the security of one’s country�
Perhaps Admiral Gorshkov’s major 
military contribution was making the 
Soviet navy the most powerful navy in 
Russian history� For example, prior to 
his leadership the Soviet navy basically 
had as its major responsibility coastal-
defense matters, but Admiral Gorshkov 
changed that by building the service’s 
capabilities and expanding its role to 
worldwide responsibility and activity� By 
modernizing the navy and adopting new 
technological devices, he substantially 
increased its power, enabling it to take 
a first-class position in the world� He 
constantly tested new naval capabilities 
and adjusted to make improvements, 
recognizing that there were good 
reasons to do so; after all, other nations 
were making important and substantial 
changes to their navies� Gorshkov’s 
skills helped the Soviet Union achieve 
remarkable influence in the world; his 
bureaucratic skills also helped him gain 
respect and cooperation when he was 
involved with military representatives 
of other countries� The importance of 
this characteristic is becoming quite 
evident in today’s American military�
Admiral Gorshkov was also a patient 
politician regarding his role as a naval 
leader� “When cuts had to be made, he 
made them� When there were opportu-
nities for growth, he took them” (p� 5)� 
In addition, he had the ability—even 
when the Soviet navy appeard to be 
discredited, as in the case of the Cuban 
missile crisis—to adjust to new high-
ranking political leaders who were in a 
position to replace him if they thought 
it necessary to do so� His ability to make 
known in speeches and writings the 
important role that a navy can play in 
expanding the power and influence of a 
country, as well as defending it against 
potential enemies, was also an asset to 
him� Yet the admiral also knew that war 
was not the only context in which a navy 
could be useful� Even in peacetime it was 
important to have a strong navy, because 
possession of such could give a country 
important advantages, such as prestige 
and potential� Interestingly, “Gorshkov’s 
genius was not simply to grow his 
Navy, it was to justify its existence as 
an arm of the state in peacetime and 
in operations that fell short of all-out 
war” (p� 10)� He was truly an effective 
advocate for his chosen profession�
Realistically, this book will be a guide 
to nations whose intentions include 
expanding their influence on a global 
scale via the use of a navy� Although 
there may be a number of countries 
in this category, China and India are 
current examples� Yet perhaps a major 
benefit of the book is that it provides 
a learning experience for future naval 
officers who aspire to a high military 
position in which they will encounter 
many challenges similar to those 
Admiral Gorshkov faced, despite the 
changing complexities of naval military 
activity� We always can learn from the 
past� Hence, a new generation of officers 
may be helped in the future by becom-
ing aware of the challenges Admiral 
Gorshkov faced and how he overcame 
them to make the Russian navy one 
of the strongest in the world today�
WILLIAM E� KELLY
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International Studies in Singapore as an Olmsted Scholar� He has written articles for Asian Policy, 
Asian Security, Asian Survey, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Naval War College Review, and U�S� 
Naval Institute Proceedings.
David T. Burbach is an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College 
(NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island� He holds a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology�
Kevin J. Delamer is a retired naval aviator and former member of the resident faculty of the 
College, where he taught in the Strategy Department� Currently, he runs a Navy Junior ROTC 
program in Maryland and is an adjunct professor of strategy for NWC’s College of Distance  
Education�
Gjert Lage Dyndal, RN, is currently deputy head of NATO Headquarters Strategic Assessment 
Capability� He earned the MPhil and PhD in war studies and modern history from the University 
of Glasgow, and has researched and published extensively on air and sea power studies, as well as 
Arctic and High North security policy issues�
John B. Hattendorf is the Ernest J� King Professor Emeritus of Maritime History at the College� 
He is the author, coauthor, editor, or coeditor of more than forty books on British and American 
maritime history and naval warfare�
George Hofmann served in Hue as a platoon commander and battalion logistics officer with the 
2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment during the 1968 Tet Offensive� He retired from the Marine 
Corps as a colonel in 1992� He currently serves as the NWC Foundation’s volunteer regional direc-
tor for southwest Florida�
Bill Kelly received his PhD from the University of Nebraska� He is an associate professor of politi-
cal science at Auburn University�
Matt Noland is an operational planner on the Seventh Fleet Staff in Yokosuka, Japan� He previ-
ously served at sea in two San Diego–based cruisers and with the Canadian Atlantic Fleet Staff� He 
is a distinguished graduate of the College and the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School�
Captain John F. O’Connell, USN (Ret�), received a bachelor of science from the U�S� Naval Academy 
and a master of science from the U�S� Naval Postgraduate School� He served in two aircraft carriers 
and five submarines and on two submarine command staffs� He commanded USS Spinax (SS 489) 
and Submarine Division 41� He has authored two books on submarine warfare and written articles 
in Air Power History and the Submarine Review�
Dale C. Rielage serves as director for intelligence and information operations for the U�S� Pacific 
Fleet� He has served as Third Fleet N2, Seventh Fleet deputy N2, senior intelligence officer for 
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China at the Office of Naval Intelligence, and director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group� 
He is the author of Russian Supply Efforts in America during the First World War (McFarland, 
2002)�
Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer and professor of joint military operations at the Naval 
War College� He is a graduate of the College, received a second MA from Providence College, 
and is working on PhD studies, looking at naval transformation prior to the First World War� His 
recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the 
Royal Navy and the U�S� Navy in the wake of the dreadnought revolution�
John J. Salesses teaches an elective on leadership and the literature of war at the College� He is vice 
president emeritus for academic affairs at Rhode Island College and also served as chair of the 
Salve Regina University English Department� He served more than thirty-five years in a variety of 
active-duty and reserve assignments, including as commanding general of the 4th Marine Division 
and deputy chief of staff for reserve affairs�
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Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson’s reading list is on line, and it offers an opportunity to dive deep into a sea of history, heritage, 
strategic thinking, and practical advice for sailors and civilians interested in 
sea power and national defense� Released in March 2017 and maintained by 
the Naval War College, the list includes about 150 titles for the vibrant Navy 
Professional Reading Program� It includes a core “canon” of books that provides 
thought-provoking insights for leaders and communicators� Titles in the canon 
include Handel’s Masters of War, Liddell Hart’s Strategy, Madison’s Constitution, 
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, and Richardson’s 
Navy Leader Development Framework� Framework includes a great quote from 
President John F� Kennedy: “Learning and leadership are indispensable to each 
other�”
Admiral Richardson has said the following:
Reading can teach us the fundamentals of our business� Thucydides, Clausewitz, 
Mahan, Corbett � � � these masters wrote works of the highest quality that have stood 
the test of time� As the challenges the naval service faces have multiplied, knowl-
edge required to meet those challenges has also grown� This means that I cannot 
possibly dictate a comprehensive list of “the” books to read� Still, I will soon share 
with you what I consider to be a canon of classic works� I am also thinking of ways 
I can highlight other books that I have found interesting because they helped me to 
think through a problem or see things differently� I will make it easy to obtain these 
books through an e-book program that can be easily accessed through your personal 
electronic devices� Finally, I will open up a way for all of us to talk about what we are 
reading�
He went on to say: 
I want to revitalize the intellectual debate in our Navy� We all—officers, enlisted, 
and civilians—need to develop sound and long-term habits for reading and writing 
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
during the entire course of our careers� We must challenge our own assumptions, be 
informed by the facts, and be aware of the current context� We must commit to self-
improvement, through formal schools and courses, and especially through self- 
education� I strongly encourage you to read, think, and write about our naval profes-
sion� Our Navy benefits from a vigorous intellectual debate�
The 150 titles in the CNO’s Professional Reading Program are categorized into 
the “Canon,” “Core Attributes,” “Naval Power,” “Fast Learning,” “Navy Team,” 
and “Partnerships�” They include works by authors such as Kaplan, Stavridis, 
Winchester, Toll, Daughan, Hornfischer, Morison, Carlson, Singer, Levitt, and 
Gladwell�
The commitment to provide e-book availability is noteworthy� And for the first 
time we see movies, series, and documentaries recommended, including Saving 
Private Ryan, Band of Brothers, Zulu, Black Hawk Down, John Adams, Lawrence 
of Arabia, and Eye in the Sky. The last named stars Helen Mirren� “Colonel Kath-
erine Powell, a military officer in command of an operation to capture terrorists 
in Kenya, sees her mission escalate when a girl enters the kill zone, triggering 
an international dispute over the implications of modern warfare�” Beyond the 
entertainment factor, films are a valuable resource for communicating complex 
scenarios and emerging topics about war, peace, diplomacy, and ethics� Many 
movies based on books take some artistic license and provide an opportunity 
to compare film and literature; ideas conveyed visually in a ninety-minute film 
may provoke a more robust discussion of the titles in the Navy Reading Program� 
CNO Richardson values reading professional journals as well as books� And 
he encourages online discourse� “[M]ore recently, online blogs have hosted 
professional conversations� Thoughtful, well-researched articles can offer use-
ful insights and, when needed, can help us change our minds,” he writes—as he 
encourages his sailors to write�
As reading leads to broader thinking, writing leads to clearer thinking� If you have 
not written much, I urge you to get started� A sharp pen reflects a sharp mind� But 
writing is not for the weak� The writer must form and then expose his or her ideas 
to public scrutiny� That takes confidence� But an argument properly conceived and 
defended can be of great value to our profession� � � � It is not my purpose to offer 
writing lessons, but in my experience, simple is better� Avoid acronyms or code� Be 
clear and concise� Keep in mind Mark Twain’s warning, “The more you explain it, the 
more I don’t understand it�”
Reading is important for personal edification and education; however, we 
must recognize that the innate value of reading lies not in the words themselves, 
but what we do with those words� We digest and internalize the ideas and con-
cepts written in these books so that we can apply them to our profession, but the 
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reflexive personal benefit comes in challenging our own imaginations� To para-
phrase famous author Gustave Flaubert, we read not as children do for amuse-
ment or as the ambitious do solely to climb the corporate ladder; instead we read 
to live well� In the confines of a submarine, inside the skin of a ship, or in a dusty 
tent somewhere in the desert, reading is truly fundamental to who we are as men 
and women and who we are as sailors�
So, dive deep into reading and writing� In our humble opinion, books offer 
the deepest dives into insight and wisdom� Do you have the time? I am reminded 
of the statement attributed to Confucius: “No matter how busy you may think 
you are, you must find time for reading, or surrender yourself to self-chosen 
ignorance�”
JOHN E� JACKSON 
(With appreciation to the Navy Reads blog. This article republishes significant 
portions of Bill Doughty’s April 15, 2017, Navy Reads blog post. The blog can be 
found at navyreads.blogspot.com.)
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